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ABSTRACT 
 
This research empirically investigates how and to what extent bank subordinated 
debt plays a role in providing market discipline whereby the private sector is deployed 
to monitor and influence bank risk taking, hence complement government supervision 
and regulation of banks. The study comprises four essays on the use of subordinated 
debt as an instrument for creating direct and indirect market discipline, with specific 
reference to the case of the UK banking industry. Broadly, Chapters 2, 3 and 4 
examine the effectiveness of subordinated debt as an instrument of direct market 
discipline; Chapter 5 approaches the issue of indirect market discipline.  
First, we analyse whether the risk premiums or yield spreads of subordinated 
debt indicate banks’ financial health. Our results show that yield spreads contain 
timely and accurate information on issuing banks’ risk taking, and this underpins the 
proposals that advocate forcing large financial institutions to issue subordinated debt 
to the public on a regular basis. Then we examine whether the issued subordinated 
debt and its price have any impact on banks’ performance. The results have positive 
signs, implying that the signalling and influencing effects of subordinated debt can 
induce banks to act prudently and restrain them from assuming unsound risk. 
However, the final chapter finds that the UK financial regulator, the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA) has little enthusiasm for utilizing the subordinated debt to 
indirectly discipline financial institutions. This reflects the FSA’s doubt as to the 
usefulness of the market in providing disciplining effects. In contrast, the evidence 
documented in this research shows that the subordinated market proves to be sensitive 
to bank risk, and banks do respond to market information, hence it can be an effective 
mechanism for generating useful market discipline. In reforming the financial 
regulation regime, adding new regulations to the old is therefore not the best way 
forward. Rather, priority should be given to reforming the paradigm of financial 
regulation by allowing more room for the subordinated market to discipline the 
regulators to take more prompt and rigorous corrective actions.   
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Chapter 1  Introduction 
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1.1 Calls for Market Discipline 
 
The dramatic growth of financial institutions’ size and complexity over the last 
few decades has posted mounting challenges to the efficacy of financial regulation. 
Government discipline in the form of regulation has become less effective, since it is 
increasingly difficult for regulatory agencies to monitor and control banks’ risk-taking 
activity through traditional supervisory means. Another fundamental challenge comes 
from policy design. There has been a global trend for governments, especially in 
developed countries, to install deposit insurance schemes. The basic intention of the 
program is to ensure the safety of the deposits made by the general public with banks, 
and hence increase public confidence in the financial system. However, while this 
insurance eliminates much of the risk to bankers, bank managers are also released 
from having strong incentives to avoid risky investments, and depositors have little 
incentive to monitor bank activities. The lack of market discipline thus contributes to 
moral hazard in the banking industry.   
The recent global financial crisis highlights a critical dimension of moral hazard 
in banking. To contain contagion, governments in developed countries have engaged 
in large-scale financial bailouts for troubled banks. Such bailouts provide implicit 
guarantee for banks even if they behave badly, and reinforce the too-big-to-fail 
problem, while the costs involved are ultimately borne by the taxpayers. This 
encourages bank managers to act less prudently than they might otherwise, and so 
aggravates bank hazards.  
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The situation has called into question the conventional approach to financial 
regulation that relies solely on official effects, leading to the proposal to strengthen 
market discipline to complement traditional supervision and regulation (Bliss, 2001; 
Hamalainen et al., 2003). The growing calls for market discipline are echoed in a US 
Department of Treasury report which reveals that, in almost all policy discourse on 
financial reforms, an overarching theme is whether and how increased market 
discipline can supplement regulatory discipline to redress some of the moral hazard 
and efficiency problems in banking (US Department of the Treasury, 1991). In the UK, 
HM Treasury (2005) also claims that it will be beneficial to enhance the role of 
market mechanism in banking regulation, if sufficient care is given to the design and 
implementation of the process. 
Among the calls to increase the role of market discipline in encouraging banks 
and other financial institutions to operate soundly and efficiently, the two most 
influential proposals are those put forward by the US Shadow Financial Regulatory 
Committee (2000) and the European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee (1999, 
2000). They have raised the profile of market discipline as a critical instrument for 
building an effective prudential framework. In the proposals, the mandatory 
subordinated debt policy is of particular importance. The Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (2001a, 2001b) further highlights the role of mandatory 
subordinated debt as an instrument for market discipline, while designating market 
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discipline as one of the three pillars underpinning prudential regulation.
1
 While the 
notion of market discipline is intuitive, how its function can be activated is not well 
understood. One central proposition in the literature of market discipline in banking is 
that the use of subordinated debt could be an effective avenue. Issued by banks, 
subordinated debts are unsecured, uninsured, unsupported by a government safety net 
and in a subordinate position for repayment when the issuing bank defaults. On one 
hand, although subordinated debts are risky assets, and can offer higher returns than 
bank deposits, the implicit too-big-to-fail insurance provided by government means 
that big banks are virtually immune to default. This makes subordinated debt 
attractive to investors. On the other hand, in the case of default, subordinated debt 
holders have a lower priority in claiming bank assets and the debt is repayable only 
after other senior debt holders are paid in full. So, subordinated debt is risk-sensitive. 
This status makes subordinated debt a fitting tool for use to enhance market discipline 
in banking.   
Early studies in the field show little evidence of subordinated debt being an 
effective means of market discipline. More recent research however finds stronger 
and positive indications in this regard. In addition to this inconclusiveness of the 
research on market discipline in banking and the role of subordinated debt therein, 
there is a dearth of inclusive research on the interaction between subordinated debt 
and the nexus of banks, investors and regulators, particularly under a financial 
                                                             
1 The first two pillars focus on credit risk capital requirement and the future role of a national supervisor. The 
third pillar suggests that strengthening the role of market discipline has the potential to reinforce capital regulation 
and other supervisory effects to promote safety and soundness in banks and the financial system. 
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structure and institutional context that is different than that of the USA, where the 
proposal of using subordinated debt as an instrument for market discipline was first 
made popular.   
  
1.2 Theory of Market Discipline  
 
The meaning of market discipline has evolved gradually over the last few 
decades. Lane (1993) describes market discipline as a process whereby financial 
market participants produce value-relevant information able to restrain financial 
institutions’ management behaviour. Flannery and Nikolova (2004) define market 
discipline as “a situation in which private sector agents – equity holders and debt 
holders – produce information that helps supervisors recognize problem situations and 
implement appropriate corrective measures”. 
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1999) makes a 
distinction between direct and indirect market discipline. Direct market discipline is 
exerted when a firm’s expected cost of issuing debt instruments increases substantially 
with an increase in its risk profile, and thus direct market discipline is the process 
whereby the expected cost of a bank’s funds is a direct function of its risk profile. 
Given that investors can gather information about the firm’s risks and prospects, and 
then incorporate that information into their decisions to buy the firm’s debt, direct 
market discipline means that the anticipation of substantially higher funding costs 
should provide an incentive ex ante for the firm to refrain from excessive risk taking.  
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Indirect market discipline is the process whereby the yields of a bank’s 
risk-sensitive sources of funds are used as a means for bank supervisors to improve 
their tasks of risk monitoring and controlling. This type of market discipline is exerted 
when private parties or government supervisors monitor secondary market prices of 
debt instruments to help determine the risk exposure (or default probability) of a bank. 
In response to perceived increases in bank risk, such parties could substantially 
increase the institution’s cost of funds throughout the liability structure, limiting its 
supply of funding or reducing its ability to engage in certain types of contracts. 
Flannery and Sorescu (1996) suggest that market discipline must satisfy a 
two-stage process: recognition and control. Supporting this two-stage process in a 
slightly different taxonomy, Bliss and Flannery (2001) and Bliss (2001, 2004) hold 
that market discipline involves two key functions: market monitoring and market 
influence. Market monitoring refers to the hypothesis that investors accurately 
understand changes in a firm’s condition and incorporate those assessments promptly 
into the firm’s security prices. Monitoring requires the market participants to have the 
incentives and ability to monitor the actions of the firm and its managers, and 
therefore monitoring generates the market signals to which managers care to respond. 
Monitoring is a necessary but not sufficient condition for market discipline (Bliss, 
2004). For market discipline to be effective there must also be feedback from the 
monitors, which induces firm managers to adjust their behaviour. Bliss and Flannery 
(2001) call this “influence”. As such, market influence is the process by which a 
security price change engenders firm responses to counteract adverse changes in firm 
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condition (Bliss, 2001).  
Influence may come directly from market participants, as in the form of direct 
discipline. Alternatively it can come from other agents such as regulators, using the 
information provided by market monitoring to inform actions that influence managers’ 
decisions, creating indirect market discipline. Figure 1.1 illustrates the recognition 
(monitor) and control (influence) phases.  
Figure 1.2 expands the theoretical framework of market discipline into the 
banking sector, and includes conditions necessary for the effective market discipline 
suggested by Lane (1993) and Hamalainen et al. (2003). To implement market 
discipline and satisfy these conditions, Rochet (2004a) suggests three types of 
instruments: imposing more transparency, changing the capital structure of banks and 
using market information.  
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Figure 1.1     Phases and Sub-phases of Effective Market Discipline  
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Recognition (Monitoring) Phase 
                            Sub-phase 1                                           Sub-phase 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Control (Influencing) Phase  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Hamalainen, P., Hall, M., and Howcroft, B., 2003. Market Discipline: A Theoretical Framework for Regulatory Policy Development.  
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default risk 
Investors consider themselves at 
risk in the event of default  
Investor Reaction 
 
Primary & secondary market information 
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Borrowers behave in a manner consistent with 
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Regulatory 
authorities react to 
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Direct Discipline  
 
Borrowers respond to market signals  
Borrower reaction 
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Figure 1.2      Conditions for Effective Market Discipline  
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Recognition (Monitoring) Phase 
                                         Sub-phase 1                          Sub-phase 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Control (Influencing) Phase  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Hamalainen, P., Hall, M., and Howcroft, B., 2003. Market Discipline: A Theoretical Framework for Regulatory Policy Development.  
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1.3 Market Discipline and Subordinated Debt  
 
1.3.1 Subordinated Debt: Basic Definition   
Subordinated debt, also known as junior debt, is debt that has lower priority for 
repayment than other debt in the event of the issuer defaulting (Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System, 1999). In the event of liquidation during bankruptcy, the 
order of claims for all securities is usually prioritized as follows. First are the liquidator 
and government tax authorities, followed by holders of general debt, subordinated debt, 
preference shares and ordinary shares. In the case where the liquidation involves a bank, 
subordinated debt-holders can claim only after depositors (Avery et al., 1988; Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1999).  
The American Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2000) defines 
subordinated debt issued by banks as “unsecured debt that has an original weighted 
average maturity of not less than five years; is subordinated as to payment of principal 
and interest to all other indebtedness of the bank, including deposits; is not held in 
whole or in part by any affiliate or institution-affiliated party of the insured depository 
institution or bank holding company”. In 2000 the Federal Reserve and US Treasury 
Department jointly proposed a similar formal definition, according to which 
subordinated debt is: (1) unsecured debt with a maturity of five years or more; (2) 
subordinated in receiving default compensation to all other debts of the bank, including 
deposits; (3) not supported by any form of guarantee or credit facilities; (4) not held by 
any affiliates of the insured institution. The academic community largely follows this 
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official definition. For example, Maclachlan (2001a) defines subordinated debt 
(sub-debt) as a bank liability representing borrowing that, in the event of default, would 
be paid only after all other liabilities had been discharged. 
While these definitions have their distinct emphases, they all commonly highlight 
two essential features of bank-issued subordinated debt: its lower priority in receiving 
compensation when the issuer falls into liquidation, and its status as non-insured debt. 
As such, Caldwell (2005) summarily calls subordinated debt “a fixed-income financial 
instrument that is both unsecured and junior (subordinated) to all other obligations of 
the bank”. 
 
1.3.2 Attractions of Subordinated Debt as a Means of Market 
Discipline 
Because subordinated debt is repayable only after the senior debt holders are 
paid in full, and is not secured or insured by government as in the case of deposit 
insurance schemes, it is more risky for investors. But on the other hand, since it is 
issued by big banks and big banks rarely default, and because it pays better yields to 
compensate for the higher risk, it becomes attractive to investors. More importantly, 
however, for the interest of this research, it possesses several attractions that are very 
important to regulators. 
In the current bank supervision and regulation system, market discipline has been 
given considerable attention. With banks becoming ever more large and complex, it is 
increasingly difficult for internal control to be fully effective. Therefore, bank 
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regulators need to control and monitor from outside, which leads regulators to resort 
to market discipline. The New Basel Accord, introduced in 2001, formally treats 
market discipline as the third pillar, and advocates increased transparency and 
disclosure (Ashcraft, 2006).  
In regulators’ global search for ways to enhance the role of market discipline in 
complementing official regulation of banks, subordinated debt has received increasing 
interest as a potentially effective instrument for market discipline (Avery, Belton and 
Goldberg, 1988; Caldwell, 2005). The legal status of subordinated debt in bank 
regulation was established as early as 1988, when the Basel Accord set up general 
international guidelines for regulating banks’ capital. The Accord requires that the 
risk-weighted assets ratio of commercial banks must not be less than 8%. Capital of 
commercial banks includes core capital, such as ordinary shares, and supplementary 
capital, such as bank-issued long-term subordinated debt (Montgomery, 2005). This 
Accord effectively bestows a formal role for subordinated debt in bank regulation.   
The first attraction of subordinated debt as an avenue for regulators to promote 
market discipline in banks comes from the fact that it is a relatively simple and 
time-saving issuing method, compared with issuing stocks (Montgomery, 2005; 
Wihlborg, 2005). This makes it a fast, sustainable way to supply capital funds, and 
hence regulators are able to let in market forces to influence bank behaviour through 
adjusting required capital ratio and the portion of subordinated debt therein. At present, 
more than one hundred countries have adopted the 1988 Basel Accord as their basic 
guideline for bank regulation. As a result, subordinated debt is well established as an 
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important source of banks’ supplementary capital.  
Since bank-issued subordinated debt has excellent liquidity, and investors do not 
need to consider complex factors in bond prices in secondary market transactions, it 
provides an additional method to discover a bank’s true strength. The performance of 
subordinated debt in the secondary market thus functions as a barometer of a bank. In 
recent years, credit spread has become a powerful method to evaluate a bank’s 
risk-taking ability and assets volatility (Krishnan, Ritchken and Thomson, 2003; 
Bianchi, Hancock and Kawano 2005; Evanoff and Wall 2001a). When the issuing 
bank has a higher default risk, subordinated debt creditors will demand a greater risk 
premium to compensate their potential loss. This is a form of direct market discipline. 
If the issuing bank is exposed to abnormal changes in the external environment or 
experiences failures in internal risk management and risk control, subordinated debt 
prices in the secondary market will change accordingly, indicating an increased 
possibility of default. To a great extent, this facilitates indirect market discipline since 
supervisors and market participants can use the price variation information to 
scrutinize the issuing bank’s soundness.  
Transactions of subordinated debt strengthen indirect market discipline upon 
issuing banks effectively. Benink and Benston (2005) claim that “an important 
advantage of requiring refinanced debt capital is that it creates a creditable form of 
market discipline, mitigating the incentives that banks might have to present to their 
supervisors’ internal rating and VAR systems that underestimate credit and market 
risk”. The secondary market price for subordinated debt has a relatively direct relation 
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to bank risk factors; for example, the price can be reduced by default risk (Caldwell 
2005; Evanoff, Jagtiani and Nakata 2007). When there are no abnormal changes in the 
external environment, supervisory bodies and investors will judge risks of issuing 
banks through monitoring P/E ratio and yield of secondary market (Avery, Belton and 
Goldberg 1988). Hence, the issuing bank is held under the restraint of the market’s 
continuous supervision, which will enhance its own risk management. 
Subordinated debt holders can also benefit from their debt. Because subordinated 
debt is not insurable debt and involves more risk than ordinary deposits, debt holders 
can get higher interest rates as compensation. Moreover, subordinated debt holders 
can monitor issuing banks’ risk taking and other financial situations. Subordinated 
debt has relatively long maturity. During this time, it is not easy for investors to 
withdraw their money. Therefore, at some level subordinated debt mitigates the issuer 
bank’s system risk (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1999). 
Limitations  
There are some limitations that prevent the wider use of sub-debt for market 
discipline. First of all, Basel II requires a minimum proportion of total assets for 
commercial banks and bank holding companies. If this requirement is not fulfilled, 
sub-debt may not be an effective tool for these banks. For now, the SND only takes 
less than 3% of the total assets of UK banks (FSA, 2010b). As a consequence, 
compared with using other market tools such as shares, using the debt as a popular 
instrument to facilitate bank regulation is relatively limited. Moreover, although 
sub-debt holders can monitor an issuing bank’s risk taking and financial situation, 
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they must be sophisticated enough to interpret and analyse public and private 
information. Furthermore, the cost of collecting information is higher for sub-debt 
holders than for holders of other securities. Meanwhile, there is a potential moral 
hazard issue, generated from the deposit insurance, between the bank manager and the 
sub-debt holder. Lastly, the SND issuing cost is relatively higher than other financial 
products: therefore, most of the SND issued so far are from large banks. 
 
1.3.3 The Subordinated Debt Market 
Subordinated debt has been issued by many financial institutions and for various 
uses. Apart from its extensive use in structured finance, such as asset-backed 
securities, collateralized mortgage obligations, collateralized debt obligations or 
hybrid securities of monthly income preferred stock, subordinated debt has been most 
frequently used as a funding source for bank capital.  
Every large bank in the US and many in other major countries make extensive 
use of subordinated debt as a capital instrument. Well-performing banks optimize their 
financial status through issuing subordinated debt, while other banks use this 
instrument to supply capital and improve their financial situations. In addition to this 
use as a capital instrument, subordinated debt is also a major tool of long-term 
financing. Some large banks issue subordinated debt not only for replenishing capital, 
but also for raising long-term funds.  
The development of subordinated debt as a capital instrument has been greatly 
promoted by the changing bank supervision and regulation policy. One of the most 
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important impetuses is from the Basel Capital Accord (Basel Committee on Bank 
Supervision, 2003), which specifies that subordinated debt can be counted among a 
bank’s capital if it satisfies certain requirements. 2  In the European market for 
example, subordinated debt issuance has been quite active since the Basel Capital 
Accord became fully effective in 1992. From 1993 to 1999, the dollar value of 
subordinated debt outstanding for major EU banks increased significantly, from 
$85.746 billion in 1993 to $239.948 billion in 1999. At the end of 1999, European 
banks represented the largest issuers of subordinated debt, taking almost fifty per cent 
of the total amount of bank-issued subordinated debt worldwide. European banks’ 
country average of the ratio of subordinated debt to total assets (SND/TA) increased 
from 1.26% in 1996 to 1.65% in 1999 (Sironi, 2000).  
The structure of the subordinated market can be understood by its period, interest 
rates and redemption. According to the global scope statistics of the Bank for 
International Settlements (2001), with regard to bond period, the subordinated debt 
market includes dated subordinated debt and perpetual subordinated debt. The period 
of the subordinated debt is generally from 2 to 30 years, with 10-year debt 
representing nearly 73% of the whole market amount. With regard to nominal interest 
rates, subordinated debt can be divided into fixed-interest-rate debt and 
floating-interest-rate debt, with the fixed-interest-rate type taking about 82.5% of the 
total. With regard to redemption, there are two kinds of subordinated debt: redeemable 
and non-redeemable. To reduce the cost of issuing long-term subordinated debt, banks 
                                                             
2
 These include: (1) its minimum original maturity should be at least five years; (2) the total amount of 
subordinated debt counted into the bank’s capital should be up to 50 % of core capital; (3) the proportion of 
subordinated debt credits to capital should have a cumulative discount of 20% every year. 
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usually prefer redeemable provisions, and the standard form is redeemed during the 
last five years of a 10-year period. 
The main issuers of subordinated debt are financial institutions, such as large 
banks and bank holding companies (BHC). Very few of the smaller banks issue 
subordinated debt, mainly because issuing costs are higher than for ordinary debts, 
and these costs will be a heavy financial burden for small banks. Small banks do not 
have complicated risk-taking capabilities, and a minor change in the price of 
subordinated debt can put them at great risk of default. Furthermore, small banks do 
not have sufficient assets to make benefits. In other words, even if a small bank issues 
subordinated debt, it does not receive such substantial benefits as do large banks and 
bank holding companies (Lang and Robertson, 2002). 
Normally, when banks decide to issue subordinated debt, the issuing documents 
should include a clear definition of the nature of the debts, and issuers should 
establish the financial status in detail in standardized contract language, including the 
equity situation with other subordinated debt, priority to ordinary shares, the junior 
status of the debt, and priority of repayment in the case of default. Subordinated debt 
is more risky, hence issuing banks must disclose more information to protect investors. 
If involving retail investors, the disclosure standards will be even higher. 
The most important currencies of issuance are the US dollar (39%) and the Euro 
and its predecessor currencies (38% of total value), followed by the GBP and the 
Japanese Yen at 10% each (Basel Committee on Bank Supervision, 2003). With 
regard to issuing instruments, the vast majority of subordinated debt issues have been 
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“plain vanilla” fixed rate notes (80%) (Basel Committee on Bank Supervision, 2003).  
In terms of marketing type, 42% are publicly placed while 53% are private 
placements, public placements tending to be significantly larger than private 
placements, although there are cross-country variations such as in Germany and Japan 
(Basel Committee on Bank Supervision, 2003). Turning to the initial term to maturity, 
the vast majority of issues are between 5 and 15 years, except in the United Kingdom 
and Japan, where 40% of issuing-shares are perpetual. 
From the first half of the 1990s, the number of issues per year in these countries 
followed a strongly increasing trend, with some levelling off after 1994. However, this 
trend is somewhat exaggerated by the large increase in Germany, where no fewer than 
2500 private placements of subordinated debt are reported for the 1990s. If Germany 
is excluded, there is no strong trend during the 1990s in most of the other countries. 
New issuance cases in the EU market increased dramatically from 1998 to 2001, 
then underwent a falling-off period. The possible reason for the increase is the 
introduction of the Euro currency. During 2001 and 2004, the stock market crash hit 
the United States and Europe, as a consequence of which the new subordinated debt 
issuance showed a sharp drop. Another peak in the EU market occurred in 2006. The 
significant increase may have been caused by the New Basel Accord, which launched 
market discipline and intensive proposals of subordinated debt policy.  
Further, easy credit conditions during the period 2004 to 2006 encouraged 
high-risk lending and borrowing practices, and investors searched for high yields 
offered by treasury bonds. However, the booming of capital markets may have caused 
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the European sovereign-debt crisis from 2009. Since the beginning of the global 
financial crisis in 2007, new issuing of subordinated debt has declined significantly in 
both the EU and the US markets. However, there was a boom of new issuance in 
Japan between 2008 and 2009. 
In terms of the amount of subordinated debt issued by major countries’ banks, 
Japan took a relatively high percentage in 1990, 1991 and 1995. Since 1990, the 
cumulative amount of Japan’s issuing has been only slightly less than that of the UK 
(Imai, 2007). In the Japanese subordinated debt market, debt may be Yen-dominated 
or Dollar-dominated, and these two types assume different proportions in different 
periods. Within issued debt, permanent debt that does not require the repayment 
period makes up the majority. This is related to the Bank of Japan’s regulation that, if 
issuing permanent subordinated debt, its amount can be 100 per cent of the core 
capital, and counted as general subsidiary capital. If issuing period subordinated debt, 
its amount can be only up to 50 per cent of the core capital, and it is counted as junior 
subsidiary capital. Table 1.1 reports the new issuance of sub-debt for major issuing 
markets, and Figure 1.3 illustrates the changes graphically. 
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Table 1.1 New Issuance of Publicly Traded Subordinated Debt in Major Issuing Countries 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011:Q2 
Belgium 0 7 0 0 7 1 1 8 2 3 3 0 0 0 
Denmark 0 1 0 4 1 4 5 6 5 3 1 1 0 0 
France  18 4 12 19 29 29 15 21 33 27 22 17 7 6 
Germany 9 23 30 33 32 18 22 20 21 12 2 3 5 3 
Greece 0 0 0 1 3 3 3 7 3 4 2 0 0 0 
Italy 2 5 19 59 28 10 11 17 32 17 19 5 18 6 
Netherlands 2 14 23 61 33 13 6 11 13 12 8 5 2 4 
Norway 2 0 0 2 4 5 3 2 4 3 5 0 0 0 
Spain 8 25 26 15 31 10 16 12 38 23 1 2 4 0 
Switzerland 2 4 5 4 2 2 1 6 6 5 3 0 4 4 
UK 33 39 66 98 80 49 40 41 47 50 40 16 20 4 
In total 76 122 181 296 250 144 123 151 204 159 106 49 60 27 
US 258 242 119 240 149 278 188 89 130 165 68 17 23 14 
Japan 5 7 19 13 5 13 20 48 57 34 21 55 46 22 
Data Source: Thomson One Banker 
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1.4 Proposals for Using Subordinated Debt as Means of 
Market Discipline 
 
1.4.1 Main Proposals  
The idea of using subordinated debt as an instrument of market discipline goes 
back to the 1980s, in particular to proposals made in the US by the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (1983) and by Benston et al. (1986). A more recent elaboration 
can be found in Calomiris (1999). The idea was part of a joint statement by a 
sub-group of the Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee, and was a key element in 
proposals for the US banking regulatory reform in the early 21
st
 century (US Shadow 
Financial Regulatory Committee, 2000 & 2001). 
During the period 1999-2004, the literature analysing the proposals grew rapidly. 
Examples include the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1999 and 
2000), Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and Department of the 
Treasury (2000), Calomiris (1999), Evanoff and Wall (2000 and 2001a) and Sironi 
(2000 and 2003), among others.  
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the earliest bibliographic citation in 
most of the literature mentioned, proposed subordinated debt as a means of market 
discipline in 1983. It suggested that banks would be required to maintain a minimum 
protective cushion to support deposits (e.g. 10 per cent), which would be met by a 
combination of equity and sub-debt. Maturity selection should take into consideration 
the desirability of frequent exposure to market judgment. The total debt should mature 
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serially (e.g. by one-third every two years). As banks grew they would be required to 
add proportionately to their “capitalization”. Those heavily dependent on debt, 
primarily the larger banks, would have to go to the market frequently to expand their 
cushion and to refinance maturing issues. This proposal also discussed covenants, 
stating that penalties would be imposed on banks that fell below minimum levels. 
Provisions for debt holders to receive some equity interest and to exercise some 
management control, for example in the selection of members of the board of 
directors, may be appropriate, as may convertibility to common stock under certain 
provisions. With regard to insolvency procedures, the FDIC stated that its assistance 
might still be granted and serious disruption avoided in a manner which would not 
benefit stockholders and subordinate creditors. This could be accomplished by 
effecting a phantom merger transaction with a newly-chartered bank capitalized with 
FDIC financial assistance. The new bank would assume the liabilities of the closed 
bank and purchase its high-quality assets (Evanoff and Wall, 2000).  
During the 1980s, rapid deregulation exposed banks to unfamiliar sources of risk, 
resulting in an increase in the bank failure rate. Subsequently, banking regulators 
shifted their focus in building bank safety and soundness to banks’ capital level, and 
started to impose minimum levels of capital among banks. These requirements were 
later strengthened through a system of structured early intervention and resolution 
mandated by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) 
of 1991. 
In 1999, the US passed the Financial Services Modernization Act 
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(Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act), which requires large US national banks to have 
outstanding debt that is highly rated by independent agencies in order to fund the 
expansion of financial activities into areas not previously allowed. The Act also 
instructed the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Secretary of 
the Treasury to conduct a joint study of the potential use of sub-debt to protect the 
financial system and deposit insurance funds from “too-big-to-fail” institutions 
(Evanoff and Wall, 2000). 
The early subordinated debt proposals in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
emphasize the role of subordinated debt as an inexpensive substitute for bank capital 
in providing a cushion to the deposit insurer in case of bank failure. More recently, the 
proposed requirement that large banking organizations regularly issue sub-debt has 
aimed to mitigate the moral hazard problem induced by risk-insensitive deposit 
insurance pricing. In addition, these recent proposals focus on the information content 
of subordinated debt prices and their possible links to supervisory actions in an effort 
to reduce regulatory forbearance by insolvent banks (Pornrojnangkool, 2006). 
By the time of the new Basel Capital Accord (Basel II), implemented at the end 
of 2006, the traditional safety nets of the banking system had become ineffective, and 
integrating market forces increasingly necessary (Evanoff and Jagtiani 2004). Basel II 
proposes three pillars of safety and soundness for the banking system: risk-sensitive 
minimum capital requirements, coordinated supervisory review and enhanced market 
discipline. This proposal extends the use of the sub-debt market to supervisory and 
disciplinary purposes, and implies that the issuing of sub-debt should be more 
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extensive. In addition to the regulators, some academic researchers also propose 
subordinated debt requirements and frameworks. Sironi (2000) argues that a 
mandatory subordinated debt policy should be limited to the largest banks; that the 
policy should be aimed at improving direct rather than indirect market discipline, and 
that it is feasible and important to harmonize the characteristics of the mandatory 
subordinated debt policy by international co-ordination. In Table 1.2 we summarize 
major mandatory subordinated debt proposals. 
The Bank for International Settlements (2003) divided these proposals for bank 
disciplining devices into three generations. Table 1.3 presents a summary of the main 
characteristics of each generation. The weakness of the 1
st
 and 2
nd
 generation of 
subordinated debt proposals is that they create strong direct market disciplinary 
strength but fail to focus on indirect market discipline. The early proposals overlook 
the potential benefits of information contained in the primary or secondary market, 
such as yield spreads. Moreover, there are some arguments against put options of 
subordinated debt. Put options enable investors to claim early repayment to avoid 
further loss, and therefore help to create a powerful disciplinary tool. However, 
demanding early repayment may reduce market liquidity and comparability of risk 
premiums. To alleviate these disadvantageous features, the 3
rd
 generation proposals 
suggest risk-weighted assets, maturity requirements and issuing frequency basis. 
Furthermore, the 3
rd
 generation proposals impose a cap on spreads. This gives market 
participants a criterion and an effective instrument to monitor and influence issuing 
banks. 
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Table 1.2    Summary of Mandatory Subordinated Debt Proposals 
Reference Recognition Phase and Control Phase Criteria Control Phase Criteria 
 Debt Maturity Frequency of Issue Debt Size  Additional Control Features  
Horvitz (1984, 1987) x x √Discussed, but no specific 
details proposed 
√Discusses the control characteristics of debt-holder 
covenants, but no specific details proposed 
Benston et al. (1986) √Discussed, but no 
specific details 
proposed 
√Discussed, but no specific 
details proposed 
√3 to 5% of deposits √Covenants to restrict risky banks’ activities 
√Some debt is puttable  
Keehn (1989) √Subordinated bonds 
would have 
maturities of greater 
than five years  
√Staggered to ensure debt 
maturity in any one year is greater 
than 10% but less than 20% of 
issued subordinated debt  
√Minimum of 4% of 
subordinated debt to risk 
assets  
√Progressively increased sanctions as a bank’s 
performance deteriorates (similar to the prompt 
corrective action provision of FDICIA) 
Cooper and Fraser 
(1988) 
√Should not be 
long-term 
√Rolled over at frequent intervals  √3% of deposits  √Bonds would be puttable at 95% of par value 
√Failure by the bank to repurchase within a prescribed 
period would trigger revocation of its charter  
Wall (1989) √Minimum maturity 
of 90 days  
√Discussed, but no specific time 
period proposed  
√Minimum of 4-5% of 
risk-weighted assets  
√Bonds would be puttable 
√Exercise of put would force a bank to raise new debt 
or sell assets to meet debt size criteria within 90 days, 
otherwise it would be deemed insolvent 
√Restrictions on % of debt owned by insiders  
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Table 1.2 continued 
Evanoff (1993) √Long enough to tie 
debt holders to the 
bank (e.g. five 
years) 
√Semi-annual calls on the market  √A significant proportion of 
total regulatory capital (e.g. 
50%) 
√Progressively increased sanctions as a bank’s 
performance deteriorates (similar to the prompt 
corrective action provisions of FDICIA) 
√Possible issue of puttable debt, the exercise of which 
would force a bank to raise new debt within 90 days, 
otherwise it would be taken over by regulators 
Calomiris (1997) x √Discusses the rollover of 
overlapping generations of debt, but 
no specific time period proposed 
√2% of non-reserve assets or 
2% of risk-weighted assets  
√Debt yield would be restricted to 50 basis points above 
a riskless rate  
Litan and Rauch 
(1997) 
√At least one year  √A fraction due in each quarter  √Minimum of 1-2% of 
risk-weighted assets  
x 
The Bankers 
Round-table (1998) 
x x √Minimum of 2% of liabilities  x 
Calomiris (1999) √Two years  √1/24th of the issue would mature 
each month  
√Minimum of 2% of risky 
assets 
√Debt rates would be capped at a spread above treasury 
rates  
United States 
Shadow Financial 
Regulatory 
Committee (2000) 
√At least one year √At least 10% of debt would have 
to mature in each quarter  
√Minimum of 2% of risky 
assets 
√Progressively increased sanctions as a bank’s 
performance deteriorates (similar to the prompt 
corrective action provisions of FDICIA) 
√Debt must be sold at arm’s length 
Evanoff and Wall 
(2001a) 
√Five years  √Minimum two issues per year, 
with issues at least two months 
apart  
√Minimum of 3% of 
risk-weighted assets  
√Tie debt yields to the “trip wires” under prompt 
corrective action, such that progressively increased 
sanctions are imposed as a bank’s performance 
deteriorates  
Key: √ – Issue considered; x – Issue not considered  Source: Hamalainen et al. (2010a)
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Table 1.3 Summary of Subordinated Debt Proposals 
Generation Citations Objective  Amount  Maturity Issuance  Covenants  Rate Cap Puttable Debt  
1
st
  FDIC (1983); 
Benston et al. 
(1986); Horvitz 
(1987); Litan 
and Rauch 
(1997); The 
Bankers’ 
Round-table 
(1998) 
Discipline 
through 
increasing costs 
of funds 
Differs: 2% of 
liabilities; 
3-5% of 
deposits; 1-4% 
of RWA 
Relatively 
short, but long 
enough to 
prevent runs  
Frequent Generally not  Not  Generally not  
2
nd
 Cooper and 
Fraser (1988); 
Keehn (1989); 
Wall (1989); 
Evanoff (1993) 
Discipline 
through ability 
to issue and put 
options 
3% of deposits; 
4% of RWA 
Long-term (at 
least 5 years) 
Frequent 
(semi-annually) 
Yes; as a 
function of a 
bank 
performance; 
Convertible to 
equity; limits 
on insider 
ownership 
Generally not Yes, SND may 
be puttable at 
95% of par 
value  
3
rd
 Calomiris 
(1997, 1999) 
Discipline 
through cap in 
spread over 
risk-free rate  
2% of RWA 2 years  Frequent 
(monthly) 
Limits on 
insider 
ownership 
Yield capped at 
50bp above 
riskless rate 
No 
Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2003 August), Markets for Bank Subordinated Debt and Equity in Basel Committee Member Countries， 
Working Paper No.12. Basel: Bank for International Settlement
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1.4.2 Rationale of the Proposals 
A subordinated debt requirement could serve to produce both direct market 
discipline, by enticing the private sector to monitor and regulate bank risk taking; and 
indirect discipline, by having bank supervisors respond to the signal from sub-debt 
spreads. If investors gather information about bank risk and prospects and then 
incorporate that information into their transaction, the expected cost of issuing the 
subordinated debt will be an increasing function of bank risk. The anticipated higher 
funding costs should exert pressure on banks that take excessive risks, directly 
addressing the moral hazard issue. It has been well documented in the literature that 
the market accounts for risk when pricing sub-debts of banking organizations.  
Furthermore, recent research finds that market environment could be improved 
by a mandatory sub-debt program (Evanoff et al., 2007). With the improvements in 
market depth, trading and issuance frequency, and debt characteristics, the resulting 
market signals become more informative, market discipline becomes more effective, 
and it is likely that the market will become more complete. 
Meanwhile, the markets seem to respond by pricing risk more accurately, as debt 
holders no longer perceive themselves to be protected from losses. In the literature, 
the potential usefulness of incorporating market information into the bank supervisory 
system has been well documented (e.g. Evanoff, et al., 2011). This market information 
includes sub-debt spreads and changes in sub-debt spread, equity prices, returns, 
volatility and EDF estimated default probabilities
3
.  
                                                             
3 EDF stands for expected default frequency. 
  
The literature also suggests that market information could be used to improve the 
predictive accuracy of traditional off-site monitoring models in predicting the future 
condition of the bank, frequently measured in the US context by changes in the 
CAMEL rating assigned by regulators.
4
 An indirect discipline is achieved when 
banks’ stakeholders utilize pricing information from the subordinated debt market, 
especially the secondary market, to increase various costs of bank operations. For 
example, other creditors, such as uninsured depositors, can increase the cost of their 
funds or limit their supply of funds to excessively risky banks.  
More importantly, regulators can incorporate market information into various 
supervisory decisions, thus linking the supervisory review process in the second pillar 
to the market discipline in the third pillar under the Basel II framework. Therefore, a 
subordinated debt policy will be effective if its prices possess the following two 
qualities: the debt spread should reflect bank risks in a timely fashion; and as a bank 
increases risk, the widened spread should directly and/or indirectly influence the bank 
to reduce risk (Pornrojnangkool, 2006). 
Although these proposals aimed at increasing the role of sub-debt in the bank 
capital structure differ as to the specifics, they all agree that sub-debt has desirable 
properties for regulatory purposes. One argument based on the capital requirements 
claims that with the expanded use of sub-debt, banks can adjust fund portfolios, and 
satisfy regulators’ minimal private funds requirements without placing issuing banks 
at a competitive disadvantage. Another argument suggests that sub-debt signals 
                                                             
4 However, some argue that there is no evidence to show that the market knows more about the condition of banks 
than do bank supervisors, who have access to extensive private information through their on-site examination 
process. CAMEL stands for Capital, Asset quality, Management, Earnings and asset Liability management. 
  
provide timely information and reflect insolvency and system risks, and help 
regulators reach their statutory objects. For the equity holders, increasing risk has 
potential benefits since it may lead to higher profits. On the other hand, depositors are 
protected by a government safety net; therefore for both equity and deposit holders it 
is hard to achieve strong and efficient disciplinary strength (Evanoff and Wall, 2000).  
In conclusion, adopting subordinated debt in banking supervision has three main 
potential benefits. First, subordinated debt can mitigate principal-agent problems 
(Covitz et al., 2004 a&b). Driven by competitive forces and profitability, banks 
continuously take new risks and explore new businesses. Excessive risk-taking 
behaviour raises the probability of bank failure, and the likelihood that depositors will 
lose their savings. However, because not all depositors are able to process a bank’s 
information, due to a lack of the sophisticated skills and techniques needed to analyse 
a bank’s financial reports, the resulting information asymmetry raises the 
principal-agent problem in a bank’s operation and risk-taking behaviour. Market 
participants such as investment analysts and brokers, who use subordinated debt as a 
market-based instrument as a source of information, have greater incentives and skills 
to get information. If the information is accurate and timely it will be reflected in 
bond price.  
On the other hand, to minimize loss, market participants always choose the bank 
which has the more comprehensive report. For market regulators, public disclosure of 
a bank’s risk profile would reduce the regulatory cost. Therefore, issuance of 
subordinated debt enhances information disclosure and transparency. The process of 
  
how sub-debt mitigates the principal-agent problem is illustrated in Figure 1.4. 
 
Figure 1.4 Mitigation Process of Principal-Agent Problem 
 
 
Second, subordinated debt plays an important role in mitigating the moral hazard 
issue faced by banks (Chen and Hasan, 2011). In a bank’s operation, shareholders 
wield significant influence. However, shareholders earn more profits if a bank takes 
more risk, while they have only limited liability in the case of the bank defaulting. 
Therefore it is less likely that shareholders will constrain bank managers’ risk-taking 
behaviour. In some cases, shareholders may even encourage the bank to take 
excessive risk for higher profitability. During public trading the price of subordinated 
debt, which contains market-based information, will give regulators a signal to 
re-estimate a bank’s risk exposure and capital adequacy, and enact further regulatory 
enforcement. The process of how subordinated debt mitigates the moral hazard 
problem is shown in Figure 1.5. 
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Last, but not least important, when a regulator imposes supervisory steps on 
banks there might be time-inconsistency problems, which could lead to difficulties in 
detecting bank failure. The Basel Accord II suggests that a regulator should monitor a 
financial institution using on-site and off-site supervisory approaches. However, both 
approaches have weaknesses, leading to the inefficient triggering of “prompt 
corrective actions”. The market signals of subordinated debt provide continuous 
information of a bank’s exposure to risk, and hence can provide more efficient and 
accurate triggers for regulators to take prompt corrective actions (Evanoff et al., 2003 
and 2007). 
 
 
 
Figure 1.5 Mitigation Process of Moral Hazard Problem 
Price of subordinated 
debt in the financial 
market  
Supply regulatory information 
and comply with process  
Financial Market  Bank 
 
Process information and 
reconcile with bank’s 
information 
Regulator 
Flow of 
market-based 
information 
Seek 
information 
Flow of 
rule-based 
information 
Regulatory directive for corrective 
measures measures  
 
  
1.5 Potential Contributions and Thesis Organization  
 
Potential Contributions 
This research empirically investigates how and to what extent bank subordinated 
debt plays a role in promoting market discipline in the UK banking industry. The 
work contributes to the literature on market discipline in banks in several important 
ways, which may improve our understanding of the source and mechanism of market 
discipline as an effective complement to official supervision and regulation of banks.  
The current research fills a critical void in the literature by focusing on the UK 
case. While previous research mainly concerns the US banks, and to a lesser extent 
European and Japanese banks, our study complements the plethora of prior empirical 
studies with analysis of the UK market. British banks have their particular attractions 
as a case for studying desirability and feasibility of subordinated debt as an instrument 
of market discipline. In the global subordinated debt market, the British banks have 
been very active. According to the Basel Committee of Banking Supervision (2003), 
the total amount of the British subordinated debt market is no smaller than the US 
market, and is larger than the markets in other European countries (e.g. France, the 
Netherlands). However, the existing literature is largely silent about this very 
important UK market. Exploring whether market discipline is effectively channelled 
into British banks via subordinated debt in this data rich environment may 
meaningfully complement similar research in the previous literature. Moreover, most 
of the debt securities issued by the UK banks are publicly placed, hence the scope for 
  
and depth of the working of market discipline via subordinated debt could be 
substantial in the UK banking industry, as compared to privately issued debt, as is the 
situation in Japan. 
Another reason we adopt the UK banking industry as my case for empirical study 
is that a series of bank failure events and responses to them by supervisory authorities 
provides a useful setting for an empirical examination. The collapse of Northern Rock 
in 2007, the problems of Bradford & Bingley and Halifax Bank of Scotland (HBOS) 
in September / October 2008, and the intense criticism of the Royal Bank of Scotland 
Group (RBS) from 2009 onwards reveal the inherent fragility of the UK banking 
sector and the flaws in domestic financial regulation. One of the central issues of the 
current debate about how to reform the UK’s financial regulatory framework is the 
enhancement of market efficiency. On one hand, subordinated debt can enhance 
market discipline and efficiency. On the other hand, market discipline generated by 
sub-debt market can complement bank capital regulation in mitigating banks’ moral 
hazard problems at low cost (Chen and Hasan, 2011).   
A further contribution of this research to the literature is the comprehensive 
nature of the investigation, which covers a broad range of issues pertinent to the 
working of market discipline. Despite persistent recognition of its critical importance 
by policymakers and academics, e.g. Greenspan (2001), Knight (2004) and Turner 
(2009), subordinated debt is an under-researched topic and many aspects of it remain 
unknown. This thesis conducts a wide-ranging study to fill the gaps in the knowledge 
about how subordinated debt facilitates market discipline in banks. We approach both 
  
forms of market discipline, direct and indirect, to examine whether subordinated debt 
brings about more transparency of banking activity and imposes pressure on bank 
managements to act prudently. To explore essential attributes of the nexus between 
subordinated debt and market discipline, we consider in particular depth the 
monitoring effect, influencing effect and constraining effect that subordinated debt 
may have on investors’ decisions and banks’ risk taking. We also investigate whether 
subordinated debt price and its movements contain timely and accurate market 
information to improve the efficiency of official supervision and regulation of banks.  
The list then extends to cover the role of subordinated debt in promoting the 
establishment of an early warning system for banking crises, and whether the 
regulator in the UK has used information released from subordinated debt signals 
timely and effectively.   
Research findings that shed critical light on the key premises of deploying 
subordinated debt as a promoter of market discipline in the banking industry represent 
another aspect of the vital contribution made by the thesis. This area is a very 
crowded one, and we must postpone until the next sub-section an indication of the 
particular contributions of specific findings to the relevant literature. However, it is 
imperative that we highlight here two critical findings. First, we find that in the UK, 
yield spreads of subordinated debt are sensitive to bank risk indicators. This is crucial 
evidence proving that subordinated debt is risk-sensitive and hence it is justifiable to 
experiment with the market discipline via the signalling effect of subordinated debt 
price. Second, we unearth evidence that the UK banks take signals from the 
  
subordinated market seriously. The study has subjected to careful scrutiny a variety of 
market signals from the sub-debt market, including changes in the level of outstanding 
debt amount, interest rates and size of the issuing banks, and we find supportive 
evidence that these market signals are able to induce UK issuing banks’ fundamentals 
to move in a direction desired by the regulator. These findings positively confirm that 
the subordinated debt market in the UK context can be an effective mechanism to 
discipline banks.  
Finally, the contribution made by this thesis is embodied in a critical appraisal of 
the relation between the British financial regulator and market forces. For the first 
time in the literature, we provide research evidence that the UK banking regulator 
lacks interest in using market discipline to complement government financial 
regulation, although it should do so. Whether the UK’s bank regulator or the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA) adopts market information to improve supervisory 
effectiveness, as the Federal Reserve Bank does in the US, is largely unknown. Our 
results show little evidence that the FSA has been using subordinated debt market 
information along with other accounting information wisely and efficiently to enhance 
the disciplinary process. Therefore, the research results demonstrate that the UK bank 
regulator is yet to be commended for using market discipline to improve the efficacy 
of UK bank regulation.   
 
 
 
  
Objectives and Aims  
 
This thesis therefore intends to analyse subordinated debt as an instrument for 
enhancing market discipline in regulating the banking industry, with specific reference 
to the UK. The fundamental aim of this research is to ascertain whether subordinated 
debt can contribute to generating market discipline in the banking industry. To this 
purpose, I will empirically investigate the following questions: 
1. Is there a signalling effect stemming from price movements of 
subordinated debt? Specifically, I will examine whether fluctuations of yield 
spreads are a sensible indicator of the level of risk that banks are taking, by 
analysing the relationship between the two phenomena. 
2. To what extent do banks react to the price signal? For subordinated 
debt to act as an effective instrument for improving market discipline, it is not 
adequate that price movements of subordinated debt can indicate the 
risk-taking level of the banks. For the debt instrument to perform its desirable 
effects on facilitating and promoting market discipline, the price signal must 
be taken seriously by and influence the behaviour of the banks. 
3. How useful is subordinated debt as a tool contributing to regulatory 
action and efficacy?  
The research reaches three main conclusions. First, the UK evidence shows that 
the yield spreads of subordinated debt contain timely and accurate information on 
issuers’ risk taking, and this underpins the rationale of the proposals requiring 
  
financial institutions to issue subordinated debt on a regular basis. Second, banks are 
sensitive to the signalling effect of subordinated debt and so subordinated debt has a 
constraining effect on banks’ risk-taking behaviour. Third, there is no conclusive 
evidence to suggest that the UK regulatory agency, the Financial Services Authority 
(FSA), has been utilizing the subordinated debt program efficiently.  
As such, the thesis argues that a mandatory subordinated debt policy should be 
implemented in the UK banking industry. Furthermore, the UK regulatory authority 
should adopt the mandatory subordinated debt policy in their off-site supervision, in 
order to enhance the scope and scale of discipline. 
 
Organization of the Thesis & Major Findings 
The thesis comprises four essays on the use of subordinated debt as an 
instrument for market discipline, with specific reference to the case of the UK 
banking industry. The thesis is organized according to the potential roles of 
subordinated debt in promoting direct and indirect market discipline in the UK 
banking industry. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 examine the effectiveness of subordinated debt 
as an instrument of direct market discipline; Chapter 5 approaches the issue of indirect 
market discipline. The following chart graphs the structure of the research.  
  
  
Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 empirically examines whether 
yield spreads of subordinated debt issued by UK banks are sensitive to bank risks, 
with a unique dataset that includes spreads, ratings, accounting measures of bank risk 
and market condition indexes in the sample period between 1997 and 2009. The 
results show that traditional ratings have significant and negative impacts on spreads. 
Investors have exercised rational discrimination between different risk profiles of UK 
financial institutions. However, accounting measures show an absence of the 
explanatory power of spreads. Market condition indicators, particularly those related 
to European markets, also have significant influence on credit yield spreads. 
These findings make four major contributions to the market discipline literature 
in relation to subordinated debt. First, they reveal several potential problems in banks’ 
risk management which are under-researched. For example, our results suggest that 
rating agencies may mislead investors by over-rating or over-estimating subordinated 
debt and their issuing banks. Second, and more importantly, the findings provide 
evidence that subordinated debt could be an instrument to mitigate principal-agent 
Market 
Discipline  
Direct Market 
Discipline  
Sub-debt provides disciplinary force Chapter 2 
Banks react with sub-debt 
Efficiency Chapter 3  
Default Risk Chapter 4 
Indirect Market Discipline 
Chapter 5 
Figure 1.6 Structure of Thesis 
  
problems. Because subordinated debt is unsecured and uninsured, holders of sub-debt 
are sensitive to the issuing bank’s risk-taking behaviour and its strategic decisions. 
Furthermore, as a market-based investment instrument, sub-debt is traded in the open 
financial market. Market participants such as investment analysts have closer 
relationships with the issuing banks. Therefore, market participants of sub-debts have 
incentives and skills to extract information and allay information asymmetry. Third, 
the capital market regulator requires banks to publish information relating to its 
sub-debt and the issuing banks must disclose information regarding risk profiles. 
Investors can then require higher or lower premiums according to banks’ risk levels. 
In this respect, issuing sub-debt will also reduce the cost of regulation. Fourth, the 
different components (firm-and market-level components, liquidity) of yield spreads 
are recognized, thus providing a wider-ranging understanding of their effects in the 
market discipline mechanism. This understanding advances the existing knowledge on 
the relevant factors that affect yield spreads (e.g. Sironi, 2003; and Caldwell, 2007). 
The main objective of Chapter 3 is to investigate whether the issuing banks take 
market disciplinary signals seriously, or in other words, to what extent the issuing 
banks would respond to the signals of subordinate debt. To fill in the lacuna left by 
previous studies,
5
 we use panel datasets that include subordinated debt issued by 
banks, bank holding companies and building societies in the UK for the period 
between 1997 and 2009, to examine the effects of changes in subordinated debt 
market signals, such as amount of debt and interest payable, on the performance of 
                                                             
 
5
 For cross-sectional data, see, for example, Morgan and Stiroh (2001) and Covitz et al. (2004b). For time-series 
data, see, for example, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1999), and Krishnan et al. (2005). 
  
banks. Furthermore, we check whether market discipline has more effect on bigger 
banks, and whether market discipline has increased during the financial crisis.  
We find that, with a time-lag of one year, levels of sub-debt issued are a 
conditioning factor on banks’ capital adequacy and management quality. Interest and 
amount levels both have the power to explain changes in the quality of loans and 
securities investments, among other factors. The level of subordinated debt interest 
exerts strong market discipline on all proxies of bank liquidity, while the quantity of 
subordinated debt issued appears to intensify discipline on the liquidity ratio only. 
With this multitude of evidence, we conclude that, with some time hysteresis, signals 
emanating from the subordinated debt market induce interactions of market discipline 
with banks’ fundamentals.  
Chapter 3 provides a unique angle to examine the effect of market discipline via 
the subordinated market. Traditionally, the extent of market discipline is investigated 
in terms of quantity effects (e.g. Pop, 2009a; Cebenoyan and Cebenoyan, 2008), cost 
effects (e.g. Blum, 1999, 2002; Imai, 2007) and competition effects (e.g. Morgan and 
Stiroh, 2001; Mendonca and Loures, 2009) of sub-debts. We base our study on a 
distinct strand of literature of bank efficiency studies, and conduct investigations not 
only into the proxies of market discipline and bank efficiency, but also into changes in 
these proxies. Furthermore, we consider whether market discipline may be affected by 
issuing banks’ size, rather than by the sub-debt’s characteristics. In addition, by 
comparing the market discipline strength during pre- and post-crisis periods, we draw 
some valuable lessons from the global financial crisis.  
  
In Chapter 4 we further examine the impacts of subordinated debt on banks’ 
default risks and financial distress indicators. We adopt distance to default (DD), 
which is popularly used by investors, rating agencies and supervisory authorities, as 
an indicator of a credit institution’s default risk. We analyse whether issuing 
subordinated debt enhances the explanatory and predictive powers of fundamentals to 
the likelihood of default risks.  
We find that investors in bank-issued subordinated debt require more 
fundamental information to perform quantitative analysis of a bank’s default 
probabilities. This implies that upon banks’ issuing subordinated debt, market 
participants would require more information on bank performance. This will impose 
discipline on firms in terms of adequate information disclosure. Moreover, we find 
that issuing banks with a higher charter value or low capitalization are more efficient, 
indicating that issuing banks’ charter values and capitalization convey further 
information to market participants and enhance market discipline through better 
information disclosure.  
This chapter’s uniqueness as a market discipline study lies in its deployment of 
market-based risk measures in investigation of market discipline and the subordinated 
debt program. Previous studies on whether sub-debt can enhance informational 
efficiency and market discipline strength focus on information contained in sub-debt 
yield spreads (e.g. Avery et al., 1988; Sironi, 2003). By contrast, we construct distance 
to default, a formal quantitative analysis of market-based indicators of banks’ 
likelihood to default widely adopted by central banks and bank regulators, to analyse 
  
whether bank fundamentals predict the distance to default efficiently. Furthermore, 
this chapter contributes to the existing literature by comparing the ability of bank 
fundamentals to predict financial distress for banks issuing subordinated debt with the 
predictive ability for banks which do not issue subordinated debt, hence revealing that 
subordinated debt enhances information transmission, mitigating information 
asymmetry and moral hazards, and works effectively as an enabler of market 
discipline.  
In Chapters 3 and 4, sub-debt is regarded as a tool to mitigate moral hazards in 
supervising a bank’s risk taking. Although depositors are major creditors of a bank, 
their money is guaranteed by deposit insurance introduced by the UK government (as 
in most other advanced countries), hence depositors’ lack of incentive to constrain 
banks’ risk taking. Instead, shareholders and bank managers would encourage banks 
to take risks imprudently to maximize their own benefits. In addition, banks believe 
that when default occurs the government will bail them out to avoid adverse impact 
on the whole financial system, and the dire social consequences thereof. These are the 
origins of the moral hazard in the banking industry (Ahmed, 2009). Sub-debt, on the 
other hand, provides signals which indicate the true value of the bank, within a range, 
to the regulators. This will exercise a level of discipline upon bank managers and help 
regulators re-estimate a bank’s risk exposure. 
In Chapter 5 we examine the effectiveness of subordinated debt in promoting 
indirect market discipline. A sample of the five largest UK banks is selected, along 
with disciplinary actions taken by the UK FSA towards these five big banks between 
  
June 2001 and June 2011. Existing empirical studies adopt government ratings on 
each bank (for the US market, see Berger et al., 2000; Krainer and Lopez, 2001; Curry 
et al., 2003; for other markets, see Cannata and Quagliariello, 2004 as an example for 
Italian banks). However, ratings assigned by the British FSA to UK banks are 
confidential. To circumvent the problem, we test the role of subordinated debt in 
indirect market discipline in two separate steps. The first step of the investigation 
applies extensive bivariate analysis to ascertain whether there exists timely 
information in sub-debt spreads, which may be useful for the FSA’s regulatory actions. 
The second step tests whether sub-debt market information provides additional 
information. The results fail to provide significant evidence that the FSA has used 
sub-debt market data appropriately as an instrument of indirect market discipline.  
To further investigate whether sub-debt can indicate impending problems that 
should be a regulatory concern, we study the case of the Royal Bank of Scotland 
Group (RBS). Compared with stock-based market indicators, we find that it is 
difficult to extract clear signals from existing sub-debt spreads about a single bank.  
This chapter makes two contributions to the market discipline literature. First, 
based on a unique dataset that matches accounting, market and supervisory 
information, we conduct an event study for a major UK bank, RBS, to compare and 
contrast the performance and behaviour of the sub-debt indicators and three other 
widely used equity-based indicators. Second, we study to what extent the UK 
regulator cares about using signals from the subordinated debt market to improve 
regulatory efficacy. Evanoff and Wall (2001a, 2002) and Evanoff et al. (2011) 
  
investigate whether sub-debt mitigates time-inconsistency behaviour on the part of 
regulators in the USA. With empirical evidence from America, they believe that 
previous studies have probably underestimated the potential usefulness and 
effectiveness of the sub-debt programs. However, in the UK case, we show that the 
current bank regulator, the UK FSA, fails altogether to use sub-debt information. This 
may also explain why subordinated debt as an instrument of market discipline works 
less effectively in mitigating regulatory forbearance in the UK than in the US.  
Chapter 6 concludes.
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Subordinated Debt Yield Spreads 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
2.1 Introduction 
 
The New Basel Accord suggests the use of subordinated notes and debentures 
(SND or sub-debt) as an instrument of market discipline. Underlining the numerous 
proposals, Basel II introduces a mandatory subordinated debt policy, which has been 
drafted and critically discussed by many economists, practitioners and regulators. 
Subordinated debt yield spread has received the most attention so far, as an alternative 
market risk measure. The subordinated debt yield spreads are the differences between 
the yields on sub-debt and the yields on a Treasury security issued with same currency 
with similar maturity. 
In this chapter subordinated debt’s efficiency as an instrument of market 
discipline is empirically investigated by testing the risk sensitivity of the UK banks’ 
sub-debt spreads. A unique dataset of spreads, ratings, accounting measures of bank 
risks and market condition indicators is used for a sample of sub-debt issued during 
the 1997-2009 period.  
Four important findings emerge from the analysis. First, traditional rating 
agencies have a significant impact on sub-debt issuance and issuing banks: for 
Moody’s, S&P and Fitch ratings, when ratings worsen, spreads rise. Furthermore, 
sub-debt investors seem to have rational discriminations between different risk 
profiles of UK credit institutions. In addition, some accounting measures of bank risks 
show an absence of explanatory power of spreads. Market conditions, finally, have a 
significant impact on credit yields, especially European market indicators. 
The structure of this empirical chapter is organized as follows: section two 
presents a review of theoretical studies on this topic, and section three reviews 
empirical studies. The methodology and hypothesis are outlined in section four, and in 
  
section five the data sources are explained and sample characteristics are described. 
Interpretations of empirical results are shown in section six, and section seven 
concludes the section. 
 
2.2 Literature Review  
2.2.1 Theoretical Underpinning 
 
The most commonly applied model in examining the impact of debt market 
discipline on risk-taking incentives is the contingent claims valuating model, derived 
from Black & Scholes (1983) and Merton (1984). Levonian (2001) suggests a 
theoretical framework to evaluate the impact of subordinated debt discipline on 
risk-taking incentives for banks. Hypothetically, a bank has assets with a market value 
of A and limited liabilities, and the bank operates continuously for T periods. The 
bank issues three types of claims to finance its assets: senior debt (or deposits) with 
promised payment DT, junior (or subordinated) debt with promised payment BT, and 
equity with the value of E( E=AT - DT - BT in the event of the bank is solvent). 
Depositors are protected by a safety net and payments are guaranteed by governance 
in the period during which subordinated debt and equity are risky, which means it is 
possible that the promised payments on the claims might not be received. Table 2.1 
shows various possible terminal asset values. 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 2.1. Payoffs to Claimants at Termination (t=T) for Various 
Values of Assets 
 DT+BT < AT DT < AT<DT+BT AT < DT 
Senior debt 
(deposits) 
DT DT AT 
Junior debt  BT AT - DT 0 
Equity AT - DT - BT 0 0 
Source: Levonian (2001) 
In the case of DT+BT < AT, deposit holders and subordinated debt holders receive 
full repayments, and equity holders pick up the residual. If the bank’s total assets are 
not insufficient for the sum of deposits and sub-debt, then deposit holders still secure 
full repayment and sub-debt holders will receive the residual. Equity holders, in this 
case, are unable to recover their investment. If the assets value is smaller than the 
deposit value, then the bank’s assets are fully employed in repaying deposits. 
Sub-debt and equity holders must absorb the losses.  
To examine the disciplinary impact of subordinated debt on banks’ risk-taking 
incentives, Levonian (2001) suggests that: 
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which indicates debt holders lose if asset risk rises. The first term of expression above 
reflects that an increase in assets volatility increases the likelihood of sub-debt being 
fully repaid, because senior debt absorbs a portion of the downside risk. The second 
negative term implies that an increase in asset risk reduces the market value of assets 
and raises the possibility that banks have insufficient assets to repay claims in full. 
Therefore, the subordinated debt market does ‘punish’ shareholders for shifting risk to 
debt holders, which is the essence of market discipline (Levonian, 2001).  
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2.2.2 Empirical Literature Review  
 
The findings to the question whether SND spreads are sensitive to bank risks are 
inconsistent between the periods before and after the enactment of the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) in 1991. Studies prior to FDICIA 
find that subordinated debt yield spreads are not sensitive to bank risks (e.g. Average 
et al., 1988; Gorton and Santomero, 1990). In later studies, sub-debt yield spreads are 
believed to correlate with the riskiness of the bank (Evanoff and Wall, 2001a &b). 
Economists and researchers (e.g. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
1999; Flannery and Sorescu, 1996, etc.) have provided some evidence on the 
usefulness of these spreads. Flannery and Sorescu (1996) argue that “too-big-to-fail” 
(TBTF) may mislead sub-debt creditors in believing that they would not suffer credit 
losses on debt issues of the largest banks. Since the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) imposed losses on sub-debt holders at large failed banks in the 
late 1980s, and passed the least-cost resolution provisions in 1991, part of Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA), they found that sub-debt 
yield spreads are related to a bank’s risk exposure, and strongly suggested that 
sub-debt holders would remain at risk in future failures. Jagtiani et al (2001) and the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1999) find similar results in the 
post-FDICIA period and the early to middle 1980s, respectively. The possible reason 
for the inconsistency is that before the FDICIA in 1991 the issued SND were covered 
by the government safety net, or guaranteed by the government. In this case, SND 
yield spreads fail to reflect issuers’ risk-taking information. After the FDICIA, the 
SND was not longer covered by the government safety net, and became attractive to 
market participants. 
  
Many studies have concerns on using primary or secondary market spreads (e.g. 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1999). Balasubramniam and 
Cyree (2011) examine data from secondary subordinated debt market for the period 
1994 – 1999 and find that sub-debt spreads reflect firm-specific default risks. By 
examining the sizes of banks, they find that the “Too-big-to-fail” phenomena reduce 
the risk sensitivity because the market expects that governments will bail out 
sub-debt-issuing banks. This perception has been enhanced particularly since the 
Federal Reserve Bank brokered the Long Term Capital Management bailout in 
September 1998. Furthermore, as the determinants of yield spreads are changing, 
some traditional risk measures become irrelevant. Besides, other securities, such as 
trust-preferred securities (TPS) which began to be issued in October 1996 reduce the 
risk sensitivity of sub-debt yield spreads.  
The majority of empirical studies focus on the US market, and only very few 
have been concerned with the European and UK subordinated debt markets. 
Hamalainen et al (2003) focus on examining the mandatory subordinated debt policy 
in the UK and assessing the suitability of introducing into UK banking regulation 
mandatory subordinated notes and a debentures policy. Furthermore, the authors 
explore the issuance of subordinated notes and debentures and their characteristics at 
a bank-level and, uniquely, considered them in relation to regulatory, structural and 
economic events that are either specific to the UK or otherwise affect international 
banking. Therefore, our research fills the gap. 
In previous literature, using rates from different rating agencies appears to be 
intuitive. Sironi (2003), employing the Moody’s Banking Financial Strength (MBFS) 
and Fitch IBCA individual (FII) ratings and analyzing data concerning issuers, 
investors, markets and securities structure, has a unique comprehensive browse 
  
through the market of banks’ subordinated notes and debentures in Europe. 
Also, in past scholarship the use of accounting variables is quite common. 
Flannery and Sorescu (1996) hypothesize that a bank’s spread should increase relative 
to the amount of risk implied by its accounting reports as measured by loan quality, 
leverage, interest rate risk exposure, and profitability. In addition, debt-holders could 
monitor banks’ risk through these accounting indicators. Svec (2003) uses total assets, 
total loans, total equity issued, total demand deposits, operating income, net income, 
required capital based on risk, and certain off-balance sheet variables: off-balance 
sheet claims against central banks, off-balance sheet claims against banks, off-balance 
sheet collateralized loans, and off-balance sheet loans to corporations. Benink and 
Benston (2005) claim that the present regulatory structure of European banks is likely 
to achieve banking stability in the future based on the record of and changes in EU 
banking regulation, new data on bank capital/asset ratios in ten European countries 
and an analysis of market and technological changes.   
Pornrojnangkool (2006) uses non-accruing loan to asset ratio, 90 days or more 
past due loans to total assets ratio, absolute value of the difference between assets and 
liabilities that will be reprised within one year divided by book value of equity, 
leverage ratio defined as total liabilities divided by book value of equity, and the ratio 
of other real estate owned to total assets. 
    There are very few studies that have considered market condition variables. Part 
& Perostiani (1998) use several market variation control variables, intending to test 
the presence of depositor discipline, including local banking wage and state 
population growth. Pornrojnangkool (2006) uses market conditions including market 
value of equity and the market leverage. In our research, we adopt market conditions 
from several resources, which also fill the gap in the related field.  
  
2.3 Models and Hypothesis  
 
As in previous literature, this study also correlates the yield to maturity spreads 
of subordinated debt to observable risk measures. Previous proposals have 
recommended using subordinated debt yield spreads as a trigger for supervisory 
discipline under prompt correct action (PCA). Evanoff and Wall (2001a) provide the 
first empirical analysis of the relative accuracy of various capital ratios and 
subordinated debt spreads in predicting a bank's condition, suggesting that the 
performance of sub-debt yield spreads satisfy an important pre-requisite for using 
sub-debt as a PCA trigger. The main reason for this is that some capital ratios, 
including the summary measure currently used to trigger PCA, have almost no 
predictive power. However sub-debt yield spreads perform slightly better than the best 
capital measure, the Tier – 1 leverage ratio. 
Sironi (2003) suggests that the spreads should relate to banks’ risks, which 
including rating risks and accounting risks, maturity, issuing amount and currency. 
Based on this basic idea, we consider the market conditions to be an independent 
variable for spreads. Based on Sironi (2003), the following baseline regression 
equation has been estimated: 
SPREADi = f (RISKi, MATUi, AMOUNTi, CURRi, Market conditionsi) + εi   (2.1) 
The spreads are calculated as the differences between the yields to maturity of 
sub-debt at launch of issuance and the yield to maturity of corresponding currency 
Treasury security with a similar maturity. Maturity, amount and currency are sub-debt 
features. The maturity measured as the time to maturity (in years) of issue, the amount 
in the log of the US dollar equivalent amount of issue, and the currency adopted is the 
currency of denomination of issuance. The risk includes two alternative measures of 
  
the default risk of the issuing banks: rating risks and bank risks, where: 
 
Rating Riski = (S&P ratingsi, Moody’s ratingsi, Fitch ratingsi, Moody’s Long Term 
ratingsi)                                                          (2.2) 
Bank Riski = (Leveragei, Profitabilityi, Asset Qualityi, Liquidityi )            (2.3)
6
 
 
The following bank-specific accounting variables are employed: LEV is the ratio of 
total (book) liabilities to the book value of equity. Higher leverage indicates higher 
default risk. ROA is the ratio of annual net income to the average of the preceding and 
current year-end total assets. NLTA is the ratio of net loans to total assets. EITA is the 
ratio of equity investments to total assets. LIQ is the ratio of liquid assets to 
customers’ deposits and short term funding. LLRGL is the ratio of loan loss reserves 
to total loans.  
We also adopt Z-Score and the interest coverage ratio as one of measures to bank 
risk, as these two measures have been widely used in banking studies of risk 
assessment (e.g. Jostarndt and Sautner, 2008; Uhde and Heimeshoff, 2009). We 
construct Z-score per firm and time by aggregating the banks’ consolidated balance 
sheet data, define Z-score as the ratio of the sum of equity capital to total assets and 
ROAA (return on average assets before taxes) to standard deviation of ROAA. 
Initially, the Z-score measures banks’ attitude to risks and the probability of a bank 
becoming insolvent (Uhde and Heimeshoff, 2009), therefore, higher Z-score implies a 
lower probability of insolvency risk. As a measure of banks’ financial distress, interest 
coverage ratio is calculated as EBIT (earnings before interest and taxes) over total 
interest expenses.  
                                                             
6 Similar as Sironi (2003) and Caldwell (2005). 
  
The following market-index variables are employed: The FTSE 100 market 
index on the day of bond issuance. The FTSE 100 index is a share index of the 100 
most highly capitalized UK companies listed on the London Stock Exchange. It is the 
most widely used of the FTSE Group’s indices and is frequently reported (e.g., on UK 
news bulletins) as a measure of business propriety. The FTSEuro first 300 index is 
part of the FTSEuro first Index series and the FTSEuro first 300 index on the day of 
bond issuance has been adopted. FTSEuro first 300 indices are tradable indices 
measuring the performance of European portfolios. It is a capitalization-weighted 
price index which uses free-float. It measures the performance of Europe’s largest 300 
companies by market capitalization.  
Nikkei is the Nikkei 225 index on the day of bond issuance. Nikkei 225 is a stock 
market index for the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE). It is a price-weighted average (the 
unit is Yen) and the components are reviewed once a year. Currently, the Nikkei 225 is 
the most widely quoted average of Japanese equities, similar to the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average. NASDAQ is the NASDAQ index on the day of bond issuance. 
The National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ) is 
an American stock exchange. It is the largest electronic screen-based equity securities 
trading market in the United States
7
. LIBOR is the LIBOR 3M index on the day of 
bond issuance. The London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) is a daily reference rate 
based on the interest rates at which banks borrow unsecured funds from other banks in 
the London wholesale money market (or interbank market). It is roughly comparable 
to the US Federal funds rate. EuroLibor is London Interbank Offer Rate, which is 
denominated in euro, indicating the interest rate that banks offer each other for large 
short-term loans in euro. 
                                                             
  7 All the definitions of market indices quoted from the Financial Times website: www.ft.com/markets 
  
   FEST 100, FTSEuro, Nikkei, NASDAQ, Libor3M and Euro Libor 3M are used 
for market condition variables, to examine whether the blooming of sub-debt is 
because issuers realize that subordinated debt is a positive potential instrument of 
market discipline, or simply because the fact that the market is blooming means that 
issuing banks and investors want some high portfolio investments. 
Control variables used in the four alternative specifications. MATU is the time to 
maturity of issue. AMOUNT is the natural log of the US dollar-equivalent amount of 
the issue. STG, EURO, USD, OTHERCUR are currency dummies indicating bonds 
issued by British pounds, Euro, US dollars and other currencies, respectively. Size is a 
control variable for the size of the issuing bank. It is calculated as a natural log of 
issuing bank’s total assets. 
The Standard & Poor, Moody’s and Fitch Individual ratings for each single issue 
as an alternative measure of the default risk: These are the ratings assigned by one or 
all three rating agencies to a single issue at the time of issuance. Meanwhile, they can 
also reflect both the issuing bank's default risk and the facility's seniority and security 
structure. Moody’s Long Term issuer ratings, which focus on the role of the issuing 
banks’ default risk, address the possibility that a financial obligation will not be 
honoured as promised. Such ratings reflect both the likelihood of default and the 
probability of a financial loss suffered in the event of default. Since Moody’s Long 
Term ratings were introduced more recently, they are only available for a smaller 
subset of issues. Dummy variables allow more flexibility than would result from 
imposing a linear specification, therefore, ratings are represented by dummy variables 
in both two ratings-based specifications, with each dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
issue or issuer has the corresponding grade and 0 otherwise.   
In contrast to most of the studies on market discipline conducted using US banks’ 
  
subordinated notes and debentures data, this study is based on primary market spreads 
in the UK. The liquidity of the secondary market for European banks is quite poor. 
Therefore, the use of secondary market spreads is avoided. Furthermore, yields on 
newly-issued bonds can reflect actual transaction prices, rather than ‘indicative 
prices’, which are estimated by brokers and derived from pricing matrices or dealers’ 
quotes. At the present time, from a bank’s point of view, yields of subordinated debt 
can provide a more accurate measure of actual cost, and also satisfy investors because 
of the provision of a more sophisticated measure of the risk premium measure. 
Another significant reason for using primary market spreads is that the rating reflects 
the rates’ assessment near the time of the initial issuance (Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, 1999). 
 
2.4 Data Sources and Sample Characteristics 
 
The data is mainly taken from Moody’s Credit Report, Thompson One Banker 
and Datastream. Spreads of issued subordinated debt are fixed-rate, subordinated 
notes and debentures issued by UK banks. The sample is collected from data between 
1997 and 2009, and includes 631 subordinated notes and debentures. 
In this 631 subordinated debt issues sample, two potential selection biases need 
to be noted. First, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, especially around the period from 
1999 to 2001, a relatively large number of subordinated notes and debentures issues 
were completed, compared with previous years. There are several possible reasons. 
Partly, the European banks’ sub-debt issues showed a general increase in the average 
number, indicating that European banks tended to issue subordinated debt when the 
market was more receptive (Sironi, 2003). The Russian financial crisis in 1998 is 
  
another reason for the larger number of issues between 1999 and 2002. Therefore, as a 
consequence of the low interest rate environment, the issuing numbers are noticeably 
higher since 1999. However, these biases should not limit the adequacy of the 
empirical sample as a basis for answering the key question of this study. The second 
selection bias in particular should not affect the conclusion if the risk profile of UK 
banks appears to be monitored by private investors. 
Sub-debt issuance saw another upsurge around 2005 and 2006. This was largely 
the consequence of the launch of the New Basel Capital Accords (Basel II), which are 
recommendations on banking laws and regulations issued by the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision. The initial purpose of Basel II, published in June 2004, was to 
create an international standard for banking regulators when writing regulations about 
how much capital banks need to put aside in order to guard against the types of 
financial and operational risks they face. The status of subordinated debt claims on 
banks assets after senior debt holders and the lack of upside gain enjoyed by 
shareholders makes it perfect for researching the significance of market discipline, the 
third pillar of Basel II. Therefore this bias should be significant in this study. 
Moody’s rating at issuance for these 631 issues is taken either from Moody’s 
rating watch list, or from Thompson One Banker. The former list is a relatively 
complete history of Moody’s long term rating assignments for both individual bonds 
and issuers, and for US and non-US corporate and sovereign bonds, including issuer 
names, locations, ISIN, bond issuance dates, maturity dates, ratings and coupons. The 
latter list provides detailed reports about subordinated bond issues in the primary 
market, including the basic information mentioned above, along with ratings from 
S&P and Fitch II, yields of new issuance, basis point spreads between benchmark 
securities (such as UKGILT), underwriters, etc. The market-index data is from 
  
DataStream, which provides a complete list of all index variables which have been 
employed for the sample period. Rating classifications is shown in Table 2.2, and 
detailed information on sample characteristics is provided in Table 2.3-2.5. 
 
 
Table 2.2 Rating Classes 
 
Table 2.2 reports the rating classification based on Moody’s, Standard & Poor (S&P), Fitch and 
Moody’s Long Term issuer ratings (MLTR). Ratings are sorted out from 1 to 5 according to the 
rating scales where rating 1 represents the highest rating while rating 5 refers to the lower ratings. 
Rating Moody's  S&P Fitch MLTR 
1 Aaa AAA AAA Aaa 
2 Aa1,Aa2,Aa3 AA+,AA,AA- AA+,AA,AA- Aa1,Aa2,Aa3 
3 A1,A2,A3 A+,A,A- A+,A,A- A1,A2,A3 
4 Baa1,Baa2, Baa3 BBB+,BBB,BBB- BBB+,BBB,BBB- Baa1,Baa2,Baa3 
5 Lower ratings Lower ratings Lower ratings Lower ratings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 2.3 Sample Descriptive Statistics Summary by Rating Classes 
 
Table 2.3 shows the sample descriptive statistics distributed by rating classes over the period 
1997-2009. Panels A, B, C and D indicate statistics summaries for Standard & Poor’s issue ratings 
at launch, Moody’s issue ratings at launch, Fitch issue ratings at launch and Moody’s long term 
issuer rating, respectively.  
               Spreads (b.p)   Amount (USD mil) 
Rating 
Classes 
No. of 
issuance 
Mean Median Min Max 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
Total Average 
  
Panel A. Standard & Poor’s issue ratings at launch 
1 19 50.50  35.00  0.00  325.00  73.59   5442.85  286.47  
2 111 74.14  48.00  0.00  290.00  69.58   55811.58  502.81  
3 279 112.37  94.00  0.00  659.00  103.34   156007.83  561.18  
4 98 158.28  162.50  0.00  565.00  104.77   18017.16  183.85  
5 124 181.27  99.00  0.00  933.00  212.43   22227.59  180.71  
Panel B. Moody’s issue ratings at launch 
1 15 50.73  29.00  0.00  325.00  83.30   5815.61  387.71  
2 212 99.07  72.50  0.00  659.00  92.31   131176.57  618.76  
3 182 106.51  85.00  0.00  633.00  100.56   80438.86  444.41  
4 96 145.30  141.50  0.00  565.00  110.08   18147.54  189.04  
5 126 185.94  117.50  0.00  933.00  209.37   21928.42  175.43  
Panel C. Fitch issue ratings at launch 
1 8 78.44  35.75  0.00  315.00  104.22   3563.76  445.47  
2 137 111.74  67.50  0.00  659.00  113.78   108220.84  789.93  
3 75 106.80  100.00  0.00  438.00  81.97   27796.63  370.62  
4 57 167.44  165.00  0.00  491.00  106.34   7566.64  132.75  
5 354 127.23  83.50  0.00  933.00  150.68   110359.13  313.52  
Panel D. Moody’s long term issuer rating  
1 34 72.29  55.00  0.00  236.00  71.54   14713.20  432.74  
2 288 110.46  75.00  0.00  659.00  111.14   154079.54  536.86  
3 177 114.85  95.00  0.00  633.00  106.69   68685.99  390.26  
4 30 201.17  175.00  0.00  933.00  199.77   5862.89  195.43  
5 98 175.14  120.00  0.00  896.00  193.66    13749.99  140.31  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 2.4 Sample Descriptive Statistics Summary by Year and 
Currency 
 
Panel A and B in Table 2.4 report the descriptive statistics of alternative measurements of the 
default risk: S&P, Moody’s, Fitch and MLTR distributions are sorted out by year and currency, 
respectively.STG is a dummy variable and equals to one if the issue currency is Sterling; USD is a 
dummy variable and equals to one if the issue currency is US dollar while EURO is also a dummy 
variable and equals to one if Euro is the issue currency. 
    Average rating at launch               Spreads(b.p)   Amount (USD mill) 
Panel A. Distribution by Year 
Year  No. S&P Moody Fitch MLTR   Mean St.dev Min Max   Total Average 
1997 24 3.71  3.42  5.00  3.04   109.25  127.47  0.00  550.00   3894.50  162.27  
1998 23 3.83  3.48  4.87  3.00   202.30  249.01  0.00  933.00   3363.95  146.26  
1999 42 3.38  3.31  4.79  3.17   198.16  176.58  0.00  707.00   13219.75  314.76  
2000 71 3.31  3.32  4.28  2.77   127.63  108.41  0.00  445.00   11282.15  158.90  
2001 106 2.96  3.23  4.01  2.96   117.14  108.34  0.00  515.00   25897.54  244.32  
2002 97 3.33  3.29  3.94  2.86   110.23  122.62  0.00  896.00   17451.70  179.91  
2003 46 3.13  2.59  3.83  2.65   76.88  87.57  0.00  445.00   25048.79  544.54  
2004 33 3.30  3.09  3.97  2.55   94.00  122.76  0.00  594.00   20849.39  672.56  
2005 44 3.64  3.32  2.93  2.67   97.27  117.56  0.00  450.00   24419.68  554.99  
2006 50 3.48  3.12  3.58  2.66   94.43  85.50  0.00  315.00   26008.99  520.18  
2007 57 3.39  3.00  3.33  2.68   130.73  132.14  0.00  659.00   44998.29  789.44  
2008 30 2.93  2.53  2.67  2.20   184.47  131.87  0.00  450.00   35121.39  1170.71  
2009 8 3.88  3.88  4.00  3.00   266.75  265.05  0.00  633.00   5950.89  743.86  
Panel B. Distribution by Currency 
Currency No. S&P Moody Fitch MLTR   Mean St.dev Min Max   Total Average 
STG 288 3.35 3.31 4.17 2.96  147.16  121.56  0.00  638.00   89008.13  309.06  
USD 152 3.36 3.05 3.73 2.68  137.81  172.43  0.00  933.00   85880.45  565.00  
EURO 156 3.31 3.19 3.86 2.65  87.13  106.03  0.00  600.00   77014.49  493.68  
Others  35 2.80  2.43 3.86 2.51   45.83  45.32  0.00  225.00    7605.35  217.30  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 2.5 Sample Summary Statistics 
 
Table 2.5 shows the summary statistics for sub-debt characteristics, accounting variables and 
market conditions of the whole sample. Panel A refers to the variables of sub-debt characteristics. 
MATU is the time to maturity of issue; AMOUNT is the natural log value of the US 
dollar-equivalent amount of issue; SPREAD is the difference between the yields to maturity of 
sub-debt at launch of issuance and the yield to maturity of corresponding currency Treasury 
security with a similar maturity. Panel B shows the relevant accounting variables. LEV is the ratio 
of total liabilities to the book value of equity; NLTA is the ratio of net loans to total assets; EITA is 
the ratio of equity investments to total assets; LIQ is the ratio of liquid assets to customers’ 
deposits and short term funding; LLRGL is the ratio of loan loss reserves to total loans; ROA is 
the ratio of annual net income to the average of the preceding and current year-end assets; SIZE is 
the natural log value of issuing bank’s total assets; coverage is the interest coverage ratio; Z-score 
is the ratio of the sum of equity capital to total assets and ROAA (return on average assets before 
taxes) to standard deviation of ROAA. FTSE100, FTSEURO, NASDAQ, NIKKEI, LIBOR and 
EUROLIBOR in Panel C are market condition variables to examine whether the booming of 
sub-debt is caused by the market discipline effect. 
Variable  No. Mean Median Min Max St.dev 
25th 
Percentile 
75th 
Percentile 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Panel A. Sub-debt Characteristics           
MATU 631 14.65  10.15  0.16  42.68  10.80  6.09  20.30  1.10  3.01  
AMOUNT 631 5.17  5.52  -0.98  8.05  1.59  3.92  6.46  -0.74  2.98  
SPREAD 631 124.45  90.00  0.00  933.00  133.05  30.00  175.00  2.06  9.15  
Panel B. Accounting Variables           
LEV 523 22.44  20.86  0.20  404.42  26.79  13.79  26.99  11.16  158.85  
NLTA 507 0.55  0.58  0.00  8.43  0.78  0.31  0.65  8.28  84.27  
EITA 523 0.13  0.05  0.00  0.87  0.19  0.03  0.07  2.16  6.47  
LIQ 504 2.33  0.02  0.00  305.17  19.52  0.01  0.05  11.69  153.33  
LLRGL 401 0.01  0.01  0.00  0.06  0.01  0.01  0.01  2.08  11.95  
ROA 469 2.31  1.15  -88.53  31.57  7.66  0.83  3.02  -5.95  88.75  
Coverage  505 2.69 0.81 -3 121.5 8.52 0.47 1.29 7.84 87.24 
Z-Score  498 20.64 4.64 -1.40 431.99   8.52 1.17 12.65 5.38 39.29 
SIZE 523 5.00  5.33  1.08  6.38  1.04  4.54  5.66  -1.46  4.68  
Panel C. Market Condition Variables            
FTSE 100 631 5447.86  5430.31  3436.05  6724.54  826.90  4908.40  6170.42  -0.41  2.12  
FTSEURO 584 3187.79  3217.27  1824.34  4150.76  543.18  2804.88  3617.96  -0.41  2.38  
NASDAQ 542 6081.13  5485.36  3290.41  14759.31  2302.33  4868.94  6332.03  1.89  6.30  
NIKKEI 631 13564.59  13175.49  7838.83  20833.21  3131.97  10882.18  16312.61  0.20  1.92  
LIBOR 631 5.04  4.98  0.66  7.81  1.10  4.13  5.86  -0.03  3.89  
EUROLIBOR 584 3.47  3.42  0.72  5.13  0.97  2.68  4.41  -0.06  2.07  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 2.6 presents correlations among employed variables. With regard to 
correlations between subordinated debt characteristics, spreads have low correlations 
on issuing amount (0.0292) and maturity (0.0681). Correlations between accounting 
variables are low with the exceptions of the correlation between NLTA (the ratio of 
net loans to total assets) and EITA (the ratio of equity to total assets) with the value of 
0.5576; and correlation between LIQ (the ratio of liquid assets to customers’ deposits 
and short term funding) and ROA with the value of 0.5388; size is also relatively high 
compared with leverage ratio (0.4282) and ROA (0.5456). Results indicate that S&P 
ratings and Moody’s ratings are comparatively close (0.6816). Also, the correlation 
between Moody’s bond rating and Moody’s Long Term rating on Banks is relatively 
high (0.4347). Market condition variables have relatively higher correlations between 
variables. This result is not coincidental since stock markets are highly-liquid.  
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Table 2.6 Correlation 
 
 
 
 Amount  Spread Maturity S&P Moody Fitch MLTR LEV NLTA EITA LIQ LLRGL 
Amount  1.0000             
Spread 0.0292 1.0000           
Maturity -0.1365 0.0681 1.0000          
S&P -0.2259 0.3165 0.0274 1.0000         
Moody -0.3637 0.3188 0.0783 0.6816 1.0000        
Fitch -0.3994 0.0555 -0.0200 0.2100 0.3134 1.0000       
MLTR -0.3211 0.2070 -0.0541 0.3492 0.4347 0.2703 1.0000      
LEV -0.1233 0.0127 0.0504 0.0252 0.0041 -0.0013 0.0555 1.0000     
NLTA 0.0778 -0.0335 0.0438 -0.0294 -0.1318 -0.0731 -0.0687 0.1791 1.0000    
EITA 0.0693 -0.0185 0.0452 0.0073 -0.0531 -0.0863 -0.0207 -0.0473 0.5576 1.0000   
LIQ -0.0369 -0.0348 -0.0221 0.0708 0.1336 0.0773 0.1308 -0.2016 -0.0092 0.0592 1.0000  
LLRGL 0.063 -0.0444 -0.0458 -0.0471 0.0090 0.0268 0.0266 -0.3026 0.0240 0.1143 0.2521 1.0000 
Size  -0.1036 0.0582 0.0090 0.0659 0.0882 -0.0258 0.0715 0.4282 0.0088 -0.2747 -0.2895 0.0196 
ROA -0.0658 -0.0312 -0.0044 0.0496 0.0899 0.1142 0.0909 -0.2815 -0.0147 0.1897 0.5388 -0.0303 
FTSE100 -0.0048 0.0490 0.0336 0.0143 -0.0119 0.0886 -0.0308 0.1792 0.0110 -0.0313 0.0105 -0.0108 
Nikke225 -0.0285 0.0494 0.0316 0.0251 0.0120 0.0597 -0.0340 0.1240 -0.0308 -0.0278 0.0279 -0.0025 
LIBOR 0.0432 0.0178 -0.0162 -0.0330 -0.0502 0.0751 -0.0196 0.2338 0.0304 -0.0159 -0.0267 -0.0089 
EuroLibor 0.0768 0.0505 0.0150 -0.1212 -0.1035 0.1284 -0.0383 0.1925 0.0556 -0.0831 -0.0667 -0.0400 
Coverage  -0.0575 0.1039 -0.0407 0.1724 0.1875 0.0998 0.0499 -0.1352 -0.0207 0.0009 0.0368 -0.1911 
Z-score -0.025 0.0465 0.1142 -0.0129 0.0131 0.0754 -0.0773 0.0423 -0.0144 -0.0853 -0.0544 -0.0564 
  
Table 2.6 Continued 
 
 Size  ROA FTSE100 Nikke225 LIBOR EuroLibor Coverage  Z-score 
Size  1.0000        
ROA -0.5456 1.0000       
FTSE100 -0.0074 -0.0044 1.0000      
Nikke225 -0.0323 0.0122 0.8931 1.0000     
LIBOR 0.0550 -0.0874 0.8402 0.7760 1.0000    
EuroLibor 0.0356 -0.0733 0.6463 0.4002 0.7271 1.0000   
Coverage  -0.1376 0.0636 0.1026 0.1180 0.0589 0.0233 1.0000  
Z-score 0.0010 -0.0286 -0.1518 -0.0519 -0.1407 -0.1757 -0.0441 1.0000 
 
2.5 Empirical Results 
2.5.1 Impacts of Traditional Rating Agencies on Sub-debt 
Spreads 
 
This section examines whether the ratings on sub-debt at launch assigned by 
traditional rating agencies (S&P, Moody’s and Fitch in our study) impact on sub-debt 
spreads. Table 2.7 shows that results of OLS estimations for conventional issue 
ratings (as scaled in table 2.2) are used as proxies for RISK in equation (2.1) during 
the period 1997 to 2009. The data is constructed for OLS regression as cross-section 
because the spreads are fixed on the issuance. Coefficients for estimated parameters 
are reported, as well as the coefficients for constant terms. Test statistics for model 
specific and goodness of fit, such as F statistics for testing whether rating coefficients 
are jointly different from zero, and adjusted R
2
, are reported in table 2.7. 
Columns (1), (2) and (3) of Table 2.7 estimate the coefficients when conventional 
issue ratings are used as proxies for rating risks in Equation (2.1). All S&P rating 
dummies are statistically significant at 1% level with the exception of rating =2 and 
  
rating =3 in the issuing specification (Aaa/AAA is the omitted rating category). 
Moody's traditional ratings are similar. The monotonic pattern of S&P and Moody's 
dummy coefficients might due to high correlation between these two ratings (0.6816, 
as reported in Table 2.6). Fitch rating dummies are also significantly related to the 
spreads at 1% level, except the AAA rating (BBB-/BBB/BBB+ is the omitted rating 
category). These results indicate that spreads rise when rating worsen. However, these 
results might reveal the potential issues of independence and accuracy of rating 
agencies. Adjusted R
2
 of 0.1440 and 0.1375, respectively, indicate that ratings and 
control variables explain a relative portion of SND spreads' cross-sectional variability.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 2.7. Regressions of Spreads on Rating Variables 
 
Table 2.7 reports the standard OLS regression results of spreads on rating variables over the 
sample period 1997-2009. The data is constructed for OLS regression as cross-section. SPREAD 
is the difference between the yields to maturity of sub-debt at launch of issuance and the yield to 
maturity of corresponding currency Treasury security with a similar maturity; R1, R2, R3 and R4 
are rating dummies which are defined as shown in Table 1. AMOUNT is the natural log value of 
the US dollar-equivalent amount of issue; MATU is the time to maturity of issue; STG is a dummy 
variable and equals to one if the issue currency is Sterling; USD is a dummy variable and equals to 
one if the issue currency is US dollar while EURO is also a dummy variable equals to one if Euro 
is the issue currency. All OLS regressions are robust with the White heteroskedasticity estimator 
of variance. P-values are shown in brackets as ***, **, * indicating significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively.  
Variable 
S&P                        
(1) 
Moody's                   
(2) 
Fitch                                 
(3) 
MLTR             
(4) 
R1 
    ------- -------- 87.8743 ------- 
        [0.055]*     
R2 
55.0128 67.0636 62.9086 67.0636 
[0.072]*  [0.043]**  [0.004]*** [0.043]** 
R3 
71.6507 76.6832 68.9458 76.6832 
[0.013]**  [0.020]**  [0.002]*** [0.020]** 
R4 
129.037 133.078 ------ 133.078 
 [0.000]***  [0.000]***   [0.000]*** 
R5 
157.8213 167.788 44.9296 167.788 
 [0.000]***  [0.000]*** [0.016]**  [0.000]*** 
AMOUNT 
0.0398 0.0418 0.0212 0.0419 
 [0.001]***  [0.001]*** [0.117]  [0.001]*** 
MATU 
0.6251 0.3902 0.2827 0.3902 
[0.203] [0.047] [0.584] [0.427] 
STG 
70.2045 59.1664 86.6025 59.1664 
 [0.003]***  [0.014]**  [0.001]*** [0.014]** 
USD 
55.5216 49.765 73.2442 49.7655 
[0.024]** [0.044]**  [0.004]*** [0.044]** 
EURO 
13.955 3.9679 33.4643 3.9674 
[0.570] [0.874] [0.198] [0.874] 
SIZE 
12.1951 14.5742 6.8176 14.5742 
[0.016]**  [0.004]*** [0.194]   [0.004]*** 
CONS 
117.765 114.4018 53.3087 114.4018 
  [0.000]*** [0.015]** [0.213]  [0.015]** 
N  631 631 631 631 
R2 0.1604 0.1540 0.0800 0.1540 
Adj-R2 0.1440 0.1375  0.0620 0.1374 
F   9.78***    9.32***   4.45***    9.32*** 
 
 
  
The fourth specification of Equation (2.2) uses Moody's Long Term issuer rating 
to test whether sub-debt investors sense banks' risk profile. Column (4) in Table 2.7 
shows the estimated coefficients for MLTR rating dummies. All dummies have 
positive and statistically significant coefficients (Aaa is omitted). This result indicates 
when ratings on issuer worsen and spreads rise in correspondence with the results of 
issue ratings. The correlation between issuer and issue ratings is comparatively high 
(0.3492, 0.4347 and 0.2703, respectively, as reported in Table 2.6). 
MATU has a positive coefficient as expected, but surprisingly without any 
statistical significance
8
. One possible explanation for this result is based on the nature 
of SND, which investors usually target as a long-term investment. AMOUNT has 
positive and statistically significant coefficients in both S&P and Moody’s 
specifications, but insignificant in Fitch ratings regression. The potential reason for 
this result is that smaller issues are usually issued by smaller banks, which do not 
issue as frequently as larger banks. Sironi (2001 & 2003) gives an alternative 
explanation which is related to the rise of European banks sub-debt capital in two 
principle ways: private retail clients via distribution networks with private placements, 
which have a smaller average size and less bargaining power; and institutional 
investors via public issues. 
STG (British pound) and USD (US Dollar) are the only currency dummy 
variables which show a positive and 1% level statistically significant coefficient. 
These results indicate that sub-debts issued in Sterling and US Dollars have higher 
                                                             
8
 In Sironi (2003), MATU is statistically significant at 1% level with spreads in the case of European banks 
  
spreads than other sub-debts denominated by other currencies. This may be because 
Treasury security in British pounds and US dollars pay lower yields and result in 
sub-debt spreads, calculated by subtracting Treasury yields from sub-debt yields 
which tend to be higher. 
 
2.5.2 Accounting Measures of Bank Risk and Variability of 
Sub-debt Spreads 
 
Other empirical studies employing accounting variables linked with sub-debt 
yield spreads do not use the link between sub-debt and accounting-variables as an 
indicator of market discipline, they may only show that regulators and/or investors 
pay attention to accounting measures of risk. When comparing banks during different 
periods, two barriers arise. 
First, many of the balance-sheet variables used as proxy for bank risk are not 
available for all the sub-debt issuing banks in the sample (such as LLRGL) for credit 
risk proxy. Because of this problem, bivariate linear regressions have been conducted 
between sub-debt spreads and individual accounting variables. The results are shown 
in Table 2.8. 
Second, banks’ accounting data is not available for all observation years in the 
sample. One possible reason is that a number of banks, building societies and bank 
holding companies may not have existed. Due to this problem, samples have been 
selected from 1997 onwards, for which large portions of banks’ annual reports are 
  
available. Another reason is that certain banks co-funded a program to raise sub-debt 
capital. For this reason, the leading bank has been chosen, or the one which invested 
the most in order to have an absolute control right (over 50%) as the observed bank. 
Three important results emerge. First, accounting proxies of bank risk have 
relatively poor explanatory power regarding the UK banks' sub-debt spreads 
(estimated coefficients by bivariable OLS regression are reported in panel A, table 
2.8). LEV has a positive and 1% level statistically significant coefficient, and the 
interest coverage ratio has a positive coefficient with 5% level significance. These 
results indicate that SND investors are more focused on issuers' leverage and 
capability to pay interest on outstanding debts. NLTA, EITA, LIQ and LLRGL never 
present statistically significant coefficients, suggesting that sub-debt investors do not 
consider these variables to be key predictors of bank risk. Unlike our key paper 
(Sironi, 2003), ROA does not appear to be significantly related to with the spreads, 
implying that investors in UK sub-debt market are not concerned with this bank risk 
measure as much as investors in other European markets.  
Second, accounting variables do not provide strong joint explanatory power 
regarding sub-debt characteristics information, with the Adjusted R
2
 not increasing 
significantly in the estimation reported in Column (10) in Table 2.9. The following 
results emerge as far as specific accounting variables are concerned: (1) Coverage has 
a positive and statistically significant sign. (2) LEV still has a positive coefficient but 
not in any reported significant level. (3) NLTA and LIQ have negative coefficients; 
LLRGL and ROA have positive coefficients, and these variables are never statistically 
  
significant. (4) EITA has a positive coefficient instead of a negative one as reported in 
Table 2.8. (5) Z-score coefficient's sign is not as expected. These results confirm the 
interpretation that investors of the UK sub-debt market rarely focus on banks' 
balance-sheet information, besides the interest coverage ratio, which indicate how 
easy the issuer can pay interest on outstanding debts.  
Third, consistent with the results obtained with the help of the stand-alone 
accounting measure based specifications (Panel A of Table 2.8), size, a natural log of 
issuing banks' total assets, fails to display at statistically significant at any reported 
level (as shown in Table 2.9). One potential explanation for this result is that, besides 
the economic advantages such as a higher portfolio diversification, more importantly, 
large banks have regulatory advantages, namely "too-big-to-fail" (TBTF) guarantees 
(Sironi, 2003; Balasubramnian and Cyree, 2011). Therefore, size fails to be a key 
factor for market participants.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 2.8 Bivariate Linear Regressions on Accounting Measures 
and Market Condition Variables 
Table 2.8 shows the regression results of spreads on bank accounting variables and market condition variables calculated by the 
traditional OLS regression which is robust with the White heteroskedasticity estimator of variance. The dependent variable is the 
spreads between yields (at issuance) on SND and a Treasury security of comparable maturity denominated in the same currency. 
LEV is the ratio of total liabilities to the book value of equity; NLTA is the ratio of net loans to total assets; EITA is the ratio of 
equity investments to total assets; LIQ is the ratio of liquid assets to customers’ deposits and short term funding; LLRGL is the 
ratio of loan loss reserves to total loans; ROA is the ratio of annual net income to the average of the preceding and current 
year-end assets; SIZE is the natural log value of issuing bank’s total assets. AMOUNT is the natural log value of the US 
dollar-equivalent amount of issue; MATU is the time to maturity of issue; Coverage is the interest coverage ratio; Z-Score is the 
z-score of each firm on the date of issuance. P-values are shown in brackets as ***, **, * indicating significance at 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively. 
Variables
Coef.
(p-value)
Cons.Coef
(p-value)
N
F-statistics
(p-value)
R
2
Adj-R
2
Panel A. Accounting measures
LEV 0.6285 104.3855 10.0000
[0.002]***     [0.000]*** [0.017]**
NLTA -4.4869 129.9521 0.8300
[0.525]     [0.000]*** [0.364]
EITA -34.0297 122.8801 0.4300
[0.235]     [0.000]*** [0.514]
LIQ -0.1584 119.9081 0.1500
[0.728]     [0.000]*** [0.699]
LLRGL -75.7141 127.7221 1.0500
[0.303]     [0.000]*** [0.307]
ROA 0.1394 117.9081 0.0400
[0.849]     [0.000]*** [0.838]
Coverage 1.3351 115.5014 4.37
[0.037]*** [0.0000]*** [0.037]
Z-Score 0.0784 117.6263 0.51
[0.476] [0.000]*** [0.476]
SIZE -4.6100 150.2270 0.6500
[0.421]     [0.000]*** [0.421]
Panel B. Market condition variables
FTSE 100 0.0150 43.3800 5.4300
    [0.020]** [0.218]     [0.020]**
FTSEURO 0.0260 40.7150 7.0400
     [0.008]*** [0.199]       [0.008]***
NASDAQ 0.0020 109.9500 0.9100
[0.340]      [0.000]*** [0.340]
NIKKEI 0.0030 81.8110 3.4600
  [0.063]*      [0.001]***   [0.063]*
LIBOR 7.1740 88.2570 2.2100
[0.138]      [0.000]*** [0.138]
EUROLIBOR 14.2020 74.1200 6.7100
    [0.010]**      [0.000]***     [0.010]**
0.0017 0.0003
0.0026 0.0001
0.0005
0.0016 0.0003
0.0011 0.0008
542
631
631
584
0.0014
469
505
498
523
631
584
523
507
523
504
401
0.0021 0.0001
0.0086 0.0066
0.01 0.01
0.0012 0.0007
0.0086 0.007
0.0119 0.0103
0.0114 0.0097
0.0017 0.0002
0.0055 0.0039
0.0035 0.0019
  
Table 2.9 Linear Regressions of Spreads on Bank Accounting Variables  
Table 2.9 shows the regression results of spreads on bank accounting variables calculated by the traditional OLS regression which is robust with the White 
heteroskedasticity estimator of variance. The dependent variable is the spreads between yields (at issuance) on SND and a Treasury security of comparable 
maturity denominated in the same currency. LEV is the ratio of total liabilities to the book value of equity; NLTA is the ratio of net loans to total assets; EITA is 
the ratio of equity investments to total assets; LIQ is the ratio of liquid assets to customers’ deposits and short term funding; LLRGL is the ratio of loan loss 
reserves to total loans; ROA is the ratio of annual net income to the average of the preceding and current year-end assets; Coverage is the interest coverage ratio; 
Z-Score is the z-score of each firm on the date of issuance; SIZE is the natural log value of issuing bank’s total assets. AMOUNT is the natural log value of the US 
dollar-equivalent amount of issue; MATU is the time to maturity of issue. P-values are shown in brackets as ***, **, * indicating significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
Variable 
    Models      
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
AMOUNT 
0.0088 0.0103 0.0109 0.011 0.0117 0.0085 0.0139 0.0124 0.015 0.0097 
[0.461] [0.385] [0.367] [0.364] [0.345] [0.518] [0.261] [0.332] [0.229] [0.509] 
MATURE 
0.9299 0.9086 0.9988 0.9942 1.1233 0.9531 0.8954 0.9342 0.8165 0.7312 
[0.063]* [0.068]* [0.051]** [0.051]** [0.030]** [0.082]* [0.085]* [0.073]* [0.122] [0.214] 
SIZE 
9.1235 4.9404 8.0136 8.8364 6.2213 7.676 12.7345 13.7051 13.6232 11.4421 
[0.077]* [0.354] [0.172] [0.193] [0.340] [0.364] [0.104] [0.060]* [0.063]* [0.301] 
LEV 
 0.5778 0.5945 0.6007 0.5933 -0.066 -0.0635 0.1097 -0.1775 0.1568 
 [0.006]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.005]*** [0.915] [0.910] [0.851] [0.757] [0.828] 
NLTA 
  -8.2746 -8.9391 -8.434 -6.7119 -5.9591 -5.845 -6.4023 -6.9503 
  [0.245] [0.242] [0.238] [0.433] [0.420] [0.421] [0.388] [0.451] 
EITA 
   8.8164      21.3832 
   [0.810]      [0.735] 
LIQ 
    0.0162     -12.4271 
    [0.972]     [0.769] 
  
 Table 2.9 Continued 
LLRGL 
     -6.5978    59.489 
     [0.387]    [0.956] 
ROA 
      -0.1345   0.4621 
      [0.939]   [0.854] 
COVERAGE 
       2.6223  2.4236 
       [0.007]***  [0.043]** 
Z-SCORE 
        0.0623 0.0786 
        [0.573] [0.473] 
CON 
55.3009 62.9542 49.4475 44.3506 56.8955 75.2469 39.0372 25.0065 36.6566 37.5495 
[0.053]* [0.028]** [0.112] [0.239] [0.107] [0.090] [0.329] [0.469] [0.573] [0.545] 
N 523 523 523 507 490 402 481 477 475 523 
R2 0.0124 0.0270  0.0327  0.0328 0.0323 0.0139 0.0168 0.0299 0.017 0.0221 
Adj-R2 0.0067 0.0195  0.0230  0.0212 0.0203 0.0011 0.0043 0.0175 0.0044 0.0089 
F 2.18 3.59** 3.38*** 2.82*** 2.69** 0.93 1.35 2.41 1.35 0.71 
  
2.5.3 Market Conditions and the Issuance of Subordinated Debt  
In this section a range of financial variables is employed to capture the influence 
of general economic and financial market conditions since sub-debt spreads may be 
affected by business cycles. The FTSE100 index captures the performance of the UK 
stock market, while the FTSEuro index indicates the European stock markets’ 
fluctuations. Also, the NASDAQ share index is used to represent the US market since 
the US dollar is one of the main sub-debt issuing currencies, and the NIKKEI index 
indicates the Japanese market. In addition to this, indexes from stock markets, 
LIBOR-3M and EuroLibor-3M, are also used to capture interest rates.   
Panel B of Table 2.8 shows results of bivariate regressions of spreads on a matrix 
of market index. All market condition variables have positive impacts on credit 
spreads. FTSE100 is statistically significant at 5% level and FTSEuro is at significant 
1% level, while the coefficient of NIKKEI is at 10% level and NASDAQ does not 
show any significant signs. As an indicator of interest rates, LIBOR has no significant 
relation to spreads. However, the coefficient on EuroLibor appears positive with a 5% 
level statistical significance. These results indicate that spreads are affected by the 
stock market (another highly-liquid capital market) and when the stock market levels 
out sub-debt issuing spreads rise. Moreover, spreads of sub-debt issued by UK banks 
are more sensitive to European financial markets.  
To test the appropriate specification of a model by adding one or more 
explanatory variables, an F-test is conducted and statistics which are reported in Table 
2.10 are tested. Adjust-R
2
 values are generally greater than the model excluding 
market conditions. Amount has positive coefficients in most of the models, and 
negative coefficients in model (6) and (7). FTSE 100 has a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient at 5% level in model (1), and similar results as FTSEuro index. 
  
These results indicate that stock market has positive and significant impact on SND 
spreads. When stock market booming, the spreads rose. Also, EuroLibor shows 
positive and 5% level statistically significant relation with the SND spreads. However, 
as a similar and alternative specification, LIBOR fails to show significant efficient as 
expected. Recent LIBOR scandal may explain this result, since the LIBOR has been 
manipulated by large banking groups and it failed to be an effective market risk 
indicator. Besides FTSE100, FTSEuro and EuroLibor, there is no strong evidence that 
other market condition variables provide additional information to investors over 
sub-debt’s own characteristics. The possible reason for this may be that the sub-debt 
market is less liquid than stock markets. Therefore, this result can be interpreted as 
market investors considering sub-debt as a highly-diversified investment instrument. 
Since most sub-debts are long term, investors are sensitive to issuers’ risk portfolios 
and take yield spread as an effective instrument for monitoring issuing banks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 2.10 Regression Estimations of Spreads on Market Condition 
Variables 
 
Table 2.10 reports the linear regressions of spreads on market condition measurements. The results 
are calculated under the traditional OLS regression which is robust with the White 
heteroskedasticity estimator of variance. The dependent variable is the spreads between yields (at 
issuance) on SND and a Treasury security of comparable maturity denominated in the same 
currency. FTSE100, FTSEURO, NASDAQ, NIKKEI, LIBOR and EUROLIBOR are market 
condition variables that mainly represent worldwide stock market indexes. AMOUNT is the 
natural log value of the US dollar-equivalent amount of issue; MATU is the time to maturity of 
issue; P-values are shown in brackets as ***, **, * indicating significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
   Models     
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
AMOUNT 
0.0012 0.0021 0.0089 0.0068 0.0015 -0.0012 -0.0004 
[0.928] [0.874] [0.950] [0.962] [0.914] [0.927] [0.980] 
MATURE 
0.2162 0.2988 0.3328 0.3435 0.3548 0.3561 0.3984 
[0.700] [0.595] [0.571] [0.552] [0.546] [0.527] [0.499] 
SIZE 
-5.1168 -3.1068 -4.1964 -4.1074 -3.4304 -4.492 -3.2868 
[0.371] [0.388] [0.512] [0.521] [0.597] [0.435] [0.612] 
FTSE100 
0.017  0.0162 0.0289 0.0343  0.0254 
[0.018]*  [0.507] [0.299] [0.236]  [0.397] 
FTSEuro 
 0.028 0.0189 0.0178 0.0174  0.0082 
 [0.011]** [0.614] [0.634] [0.643]  [0.832] 
NASDAQ 
  -0.0047 -0.0035 -0.0027  -0.0026 
  [0.221] [0.401] [0.533]  [0.545] 
NIKKEI 
   -0.0046 -0.0043  -0.0006 
   [0.342] [0.377]  [0.920] 
LIBOR 
    -8.1701 -5.6068 16.8713 
    [0.491] [0.524] [0.238] 
EUROLIBOR 
     19.6228 13.3581 
     [0.022]** [0.274] 
CON 
56.3607 46.6181 24.0317 10.4726 9.664 102.436 32.0611 
[0.253] [0.335] [0.646] [0.847] [0.859] [0.014]** [0.581] 
N 523 494 461 461 461 494 481 
R2 0.0122 0.0146  0.0186  0.0206 0.0216 0.0157 0.0242 
Adj-R2 0.0046 0.0065  0.0057  0.0054 0.0043 0.0056 0.0047 
F 1.6 1.81 1.44 1.36 1.25 1.55 1,24 
  
2.6 Conclusion  
 
There are four main conclusions which emerge from the empirical work 
presented in this chapter. Firstly, traditional rating agencies, such as Moody’s, S&P 
and Fitch have a significant impact on sub-debt issuing and issuing banks. When 
ratings worsen, the spreads rise. Secondly, sub-debt investors act rationally when 
discriminating between different risk profiles of UK banks and price them accordingly. 
Thirdly, some bank risk accounting measures have little explanatory power regarding 
variability in sub-debt spreads, but provide additional joint explanatory power over 
sub-debt’s own characteristic information. Fourthly, market conditions, especially 
stock market conditions, have a significant impact on sub-debt yield spreads. 
Moreover, stock indexes, such as FTSE100 and FTSEuro, interest rate indicators such 
as EuroLibor have strong influence power to spread, indicating that the motivation of 
market participants investing in sub-debt is rational. 
These findings have important implications for using the measurement of yield 
spreads as an effective method for disciplining issuing banks from the market and for 
further subordinated debt research in addition to mandatory subordinated debt policy. 
The correct and unbiased ratings issued by rating agencies are always of intense 
interest to academics and practitioners. The influences of ratings agencies have been 
aggrandized, and it does not seem possible to challenge their authority. However, this 
raises another question: who will supervise the rating agencies?  
In addition, as can be seen from these findings, spread is an effective indicator 
because it contains timely and useful information on issuing financial institutions’ risk 
portfolios and performance. Furthermore, sub-debt issuance in the UK is more active 
and more liquid than in the European markets. In addition, sub-debt investors use 
  
yield spread as an instrument to monitor and control issuers’ risk taking incentives, 
hence achieving stronger market discipline. However, there are obstacles for the UK 
sub-debt market as it becomes more powerful and a more effective instrument for 
market discipline. One major barrier is the TBTF effect. Although empirical analysis 
shows the absence of significant TBTF effect, in our sample, 72.27% of subordinated 
debts are issued by median- or large-sized financial institutions. The magnitude of 
coefficient on the log of total assets (Size) increases indicates that size affects all 
banks, and yield spreads reflect the market’s perception that all large banks will be 
bailed out when default occurs. 
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Chapter 3 The Impacts of Subordinated 
Debt on Bank Efficiency 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
3.1 Introduction  
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, subordinated debt provides reasonably 
reliable market signals, and investors are sensitive to issuing banks’ risk portfolios. 
The main objective of this chapter is to investigate whether the issuing banks take 
these market signals and the pressure from investors seriously, or whether 
subordinated debt has forced market discipline upon issuing banks.   
Morgan and Stiroh (2001), Sironi (2003) and Covizt et al. (2004b), employing 
cross-sectional data, have discovered that subordinated debt can constrain banks’ 
risk-taking activities. Other scholars, such as Krishnan et al. (2005), argue that there is 
no evidence that subordinated debt can provide effective market discipline to banks’ 
risk-taking motivations. To fill lacunae left by previous studies, panel data sets have 
been used, including subordinated debt issued by banks, bank holding companies and 
building societies in the UK in the period between 1997 and 2009, in order to examine 
the effects of changes in subordinated debt market signals (e.g. amounts and interests) 
on the performance of banks. Furthermore, checks have been made on whether market 
discipline has greater effect on bigger banks, and whether market discipline has 
increased during the financial crisis.  
The potential contributions of this chapter are: first, to complement the plethora 
of empirical studies that focus mainly on the US subordinated debt market with a 
comprehensive analysis of the UK market; second, to investigate from a unique angle 
whether market discipline actually functions. Not only proxies of market discipline 
have been applied, but also changes in proxies. Furthermore, a consideration has been 
made as to whether issuing banks’ size could affect market discipline over sub-debt’s 
characteristics. Finally, lessons are drawn from the global financial crisis by 
  
comparing the strength of market discipline just before and after the crisis. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 reviews 
existing studies on theoretical frameworks; section 3.3 briefly reviews literature on 
empirical studies; section 3.4 explains the methodology; section 3.5 reports the data 
and sample and section 3.6 interprets the empirical results and findings. Conclusions 
are presented in section 3.7. 
 
3.2 Theoretical Literature Review  
 
There has been vehement theoretical debate about whether subordinated debt can 
constrain banks’ excessive risk-taking incentives and, hence, engender capacity to 
discipline banks. Previous studies outline three major approaches whereby debt 
holders (both junior and senior debts) can affect banks’ risk-taking incentives. In the 
first approach (valuation effects) the issuing of bonds and debentures is a popular 
means to acquire capital, enlarge issuing banks’ capital ratio, control leverages and 
portfolios, and affect banks’ performance on capital adequacy and risk management. 
Requiring banks to issue a certain level of subordinated debt, or to convert a portion 
of assets to subordinated debt is one possible approach to efficient market discipline 
(Calomiris and Kahn, 1991; Kupiec 2002; Gorton and Santomoro, 1990).  
In a second approach (cost effects) the market can discipline the banks by 
demanding higher or lower risk premiums of subordinated debt (e.g. Blum, 1999 
&2002; Repullo 2004). With the third approach which addresses competition effects, 
the issuing of subordinated debt could increase or decrease the market value of banks’ 
assets, hence enhancing or damaging banks’ reputations and market competitiveness 
(Levonian, 2001; Niu, 2008 a&b).   
  
3.2.1 Valuation Effects 
The Contingent Claims valuation model, derived by Black and Sholes (1973), 
has been well expanded and applied. For example, Merton (1974) applies the 
valuation model to liability pricing in the case of a single issue of nonconvertible debt; 
Black and Cox (1976) expanded the model to consider multiple debt claimants. 
The works by Gorton and Santomero (1990) and Calomiris and Kahn (1991) 
form one of the precursors that examine how debt can discipline banks by explaining 
that demandable debt has advantages in an incentive scheme for disciplining the 
banker, since the depositors can withdraw their deposits to punish a bank if they are 
unsatisfied with the bank’s behaviour. Depositors assume that bankers are taking 
advantage of information asymmetry problems, since bankers can determine which 
projects are most worthy of financing. Gorton and Santomero (1990) and Calomiris 
and Kahn (1991) propose two models: a single deposit model, and a model for 
multiple depositors with independent signals. The timeline of these two models is as 
follows: 
 
 
Period 1: the depositor may 
invest on receiving a 
signal. The depositor is 
given the option of 
demanding liquidation or 
not, based on his own 
information. 
Period 2: the bank may be 
liquidated. This is a method 
used to thwart absconding. 
The bank’s assets are taken 
over by a receiver, 
controlled by a court. 
 
The bank has the 
opportunity to 
abscond with the 
funds. This 
absconding 
reduces the 
realization Ti by 
the proportion A 
(A∈ (0,1)) 
Period 3: the 
payoff is realized 
and the loan is to 
be repaid, if the 
banker decides 
not to abscond.  
 
In period 0, the banks offer a profit-maximizing contracted deposit rate and the 
optimal contract can take one of the following four forms: 
  
1) A simple non-liquidating contract 
2) A simple liquidating contract; in this case, AT1 < P ≤ M.  
3) A compound contract composed of two simple non-liquidating contracts (Λb 
= Λg = 0); in this case, Pb ≤ AT1 and AT1 < Pg ≤ AT2 
4) A compound contract composed of one simple liquidating contract and one 
simple non-liquidating contract (Λb = 1,Λg =0); in this case, AT1 < Pb<Pg ≤ 
AT2 
T1 and T2 are two values of investment opportunity, and T2 > T1, A is the 
proportion that absconding reduces the realization value Ti, and A ∈ (0,1). ATi 
represents the “tax” on absconding. P is the amount that the banker promises pay to 
depositors. M is the value of assets reduced by liquidation in proportion L. b and g 
represent “bad” and “good” respectively.  
If a compound contract has been chosen, then the depositor invests in the signal, 
otherwise he would not. If the depositor receives a bad signal, he liquidates the bank. 
If he receives a good signal, he will not liquidate the bank, but needs to run the risk of 
the banker’s absconding. In other words, when the depositor invests in demandable 
debt, he can observe the risk-taking behaviour of banks. If he observes that banks 
have incentives to gamble, he can withdraw his deposit immediately to avoid loss. If 
he does not observe the banks, the banks may invest in gambling assets. If the 
depositor keeps his deposit in banks and obtains interest from the bank, he needs to be 
prepared to take the bank’s insolvent risk. If there are multiple depositors entering into 
contracts with the banker, optimal contracts for the banker can maximize the banker’s 
profitability. 
For low-cost-information depositors, how demandable debt maintains incentives 
to invest in signals and report truthfully must be questioned. Calomiris and Kahn 
  
(1991) assume that there is a sufficient amount of potential depositors and potential 
monitors, the cost of monitoring is low, the probability of monitors receiving a bad 
signal is slight, and there is little possibility of the value of the contract becoming a 
bad realization. From the viewpoint of individual depositors, the contract must have 
some constraints. High-cost-information depositors require receiving higher than 
expected return announcements and are willing to report signals truthfully in order to 
participate in the contract. Truthful reports give a higher return than untrustworthy 
reports. In the former case individual depositors are willing to invest, monitor and 
report observations. If a bank chooses to hold reserves (prudent assets), a small 
number of monitors can receive early payment without the bank being forced into 
receivership, hence optimal outcome can be achieved with a simple demandable-debt 
contract. 
Levonian (2001) also proposes a contingent claims valuation model which 
models the subordinated debt as a contingent claim on the issuing bank’s assets. 
Decreasing the value of the subordinated debt claim can affect the asset volatility and 
market value, and raise the bank’s risks due to the increasing probability of default 
losses; therefore the bank’s competitive advantage will be lower. Levonian (2001) 
employ the basic form is as follows: 
'( ) ( ) '( )
ds
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d
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
       (3.1) 
 
The first positive term on the right indicates that increased asset volatility will 
make the subordinated debt more likely to be fully paid. The negative second term 
signifies that in case of a rise in risk, the value of subordinated debt decreases. Overall, 
it shows that the value of subordinated debt falls when risk increases, as long as the 
bank remains solvent. 
  
Kupiec (2002) proposes a modified credit VaR model, and claims that mandatory 
subordinated debt can help implement an internal model approach for regulatory 
capital requirements for credit risk: 
1 0[ [ ( , ),0]]
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 

                          (3.2) 
This gives the capital requirement when the minimum portion of a bank’s assets 
is in subordinated debt. Therefore, if a bank overstates loan values, it is required to 
issue more subordinated debt, thus offering a larger buffer for the deposit insurer. 
 
3.2.2Cost Effects 
Many researchers use cost effects to examine relations between banks and 
subordinated debt. 
Blum (1999&2002) provides a dynamic framework demonstrating whether 
subordinated debt can constrain the banks’ risk-taking incentives, and concludes that 
the effect is ambiguous. If banks can commit a credible level of risk after debt 
issuance, subordinated debt can reduce the banks’ risk-taking behaviour. On the 
assumption that banks cannot commit a level of risk, or creditors cannot accept a risk 
level that banks are given because the interest rate of subordinated debt is contracted, 
and banks’ liability is limited, banks are easily induced to take excessive risks to gain 
higher profits and reduce costs. In this eventuality, rational debt holders ask for higher 
risk premiums as compensation. At the same time, heavy interest burdens force banks 
to choose high risk financial derivative products to earn more money in order to pay 
interest. In this case, subordinated debt cannot restrict the banks’ risk-taking 
incentives and may even push the banks towards a riskier situation.  
Blum (1999 & 2002) considers a single, risk-neutral bank, which only has one 
type of liability which is deposit and follows a simple time structure: 
  
At time 0, a bank can invest its available funds. It has w0 amount of initial stock 
of equity, supplies D0 amount of deposit and two investment opportunities, a safe 
asset with (gross) return rf (rf >1) and a risky asset with return rate r , r within a 
two-point distribution: 
       X    with probability  p(X) 
r  = 
       0      with probability 1-p(X) 
   
At time 1, returns are realized, the bank is obliged to pay the cost of C(D0). 
Subsequently, a bank can invest in another asset. 
At time 2, all investments are mature and final returns are realized. 
Assuming that a bank raises a fraction (λ,λ∈ (0,1]) of its capital via issuing 
subordinated debt, which is not covered by an insurance or safety net, Blum (2002) 
considers two eventualities: a bank can commit to any level of risk, or a bank cannot 
commit to any level of risk.  
If a bank can credibly commit to a level of risk, then the subordinated debt 
creditor could charge high compensation for the banks’ gambling incentives and the 
promised return (rD) that the debt holders require satisfies: 
P(X)rD = rf, or ( )
( )
f
D
r
r X
p x

                                   (3.3) 
 
which indicates that the higher the interest rate that the bank is promised, the 
higher the level of risk that the bank chooses. According to Blum (2002), the optimal 
level of risk that a bank needs to solve is as follows: 
max ( )[ (1 ) ] (1 ( ))f D B
x
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Formula (3.4) suggests that a bank’s default cost with subordinated debt is higher 
than the default cost with deposit insurance. Market discipline through the use of 
subordinated debt leads to a lower risk than deposit insurance. This indicates that 
subordinated debt indeed reduces a bank’s risk-taking incentives.  
Conversely, a bank cannot commit to a level of risk. To change risk profiles 
quickly and substantially, a bank should replace its safety assets with highly flexible 
financial derivative products after the interest rate of subordinated debt is contracted. 
The subordinated debt creditors are hypothetically rational and can perfectly observe 
and anticipate the bank’s risk choice. Therefore, the creditors will require a promised 
return rate due to the optimal risk level that a bank sets, and two conditions must 
pertain: subordinated debt creditors require expected returns to be at least equal to the 
risk-free interest rate, and banks always try to reach profit maximization. Where a 
bank chooses an increased risk level, subordinated debt holders require the promise of 
a higher interest rate, whereas an increased interest rate raises a bank’s preferred risk 
level. Thus, these two conditions can influence and restrict each other, and the result 
yields the optimal risk level on which market discipline could work through 
subordinated debt. In case of a bank that cannot commit to a credible level of risk, 
market discipline through the use of subordinated debt (in the case of a bank being 
unable to commit to a reasonable risk level), is more risky than market discipline 
through the use of deposit insurance.  
From the analysis above, it can be seen that Blum (1999 &2002) suggests the 
problematic incentive effects of subordinated debt. The fundamental reason for failure 
of market discipline through subordinated debt is lack of commitment to a risk level. 
  
Because banks have a limited liability to investors, there is always the temptation to 
gamble for high profits. If banks cannot commit to a level of risk after issuing 
subordinated debt equal to the higher risk premium asked by creditors, banks are 
compelled to invest in risky financial products. Consequently, subordinated debt can 
foster banks’ risk taking incentives. 
3.2.3 Competition Effects 
Employing competition effects to examine the relationship between banks and 
market discipline has recently become more prominent. Boot and Schmeits (2000) 
established a model to analyze the optimality of conglomeration. Both scholars show 
that conglomeration has benefits that compensate for ineffective market discipline. 
Repullo (2004) provides a dynamic model of imperfect competition in banking where 
banks can invest either in a prudent or in a gambling asset.  
Based on this model, Caldwell (2007) develops a dynamic model of banking 
competition to determine which capital instrument is most effective in controlling 
banks’ risk choices. Boyd et al. (2009) adopt the symmetric Cournot-Nash 
competition models to analyze in what way banks may invest in a riskless asset and 
how they may compete in deposit and risky loan markets.  
Niu (2008 a&b) extends previous studies by introducing subordinated debt in a 
dynamic model of banking which examines whether a certain range of subordinated 
debt can constrain banks’ risk-taking incentives. His papers show that a small amount 
of subordinated debt can reduce banks’ gambling incentives. Compared with equity 
capital, subordinated debt costs much less. Due to limited liability, banks have 
incentives to chase higher profits, but higher profits also lead to higher risks.  
In cases where subordinated debt creditors make investment decisions, they 
should check banks’ risk portfolio. If debt holders consider portfolios too risky, they 
  
should ask for a higher interest rate as risk premium for compensation. To avoid a 
higher interest payment, banks could change and smooth their risk portfolio, investing 
in safe assets instead of risky ones. Therefore, subordinated debt can constrain banks’ 
risk-taking incentives.  
Niu (2008 a) claims that a bank invests in two safe assets only if the regulator 
sets the amount of subordinated debt within a range. With the increase of the costs 
occurring only if the bank invests in risky assets after debt issuance, the lower bound 
on sub-debt decreases and whereas the upper bound on subordinated debt increases. 
In other words, a bank is less likely to invest in risky assets after it has issued a large 
amount of subordinated debt.  
Niu (2008a)’s model shows that requiring banks to issue subordinated debt 
within a range motivates them to invest in safe assets before debt issuance, although 
the range may vary across countries depending on a number of factors such as the 
return of the safe asset and creditors’ ability to assess banks’ riskiness. 
To support this theory, Niu (2008 b) studies a dynamic model of banking 
showing that subordinated debt can constrain banks’ risk-taking incentives. At the 
stage of mobilizing deposits, if banks offer a deposit rate higher than the expected 
return of prudent assets, this situation might be observed by subordinated debt holders 
to push banks to invest in gambling assets after debt issuance. To compensate for risk, 
subordinated creditors would require a risk premium from a bank. At the stage of 
allocating assets, paying off debt could reduce a banks’ solvency. Since the interest 
rate of subordinated debt would have been contracted, the larger the amount of 
subordinated debt, the stronger the incentives for banks’ gambling. 
When the regulator imposes both a subordinated debt requirement and a capital 
requirement, the prudent equilibrium exists only if the capital requirement is set 
  
within a range. Two bounds of capital requirements decrease if a profit margin 
decreases. Hence the more profitable banks are the lower capital requirements should 
be set. At the same time, bounds have a positive correlation with the spread between 
successive returns of gambling assets and that of prudent assets. Therefore, the higher 
the returns of a gambling asset are, the higher the capital requirement should be set; 
the higher the probability of gambling asset failing is, the lower the capital 
requirement needed.  
Another vital question concerns how subordinated debt requirement and equity 
capital requirement can be balanced. Niu (2008 b) proposes that the critical amount 
for subordinated debt. When the critical amount of subordinated debt is greater than 
the minimum amount of subordinated debt bank issues, subordinated debt 
requirement reacts to equity capital requirement. That means that an increase of 
subordinated debt requirement decreases capital requirement. When the minimum 
amount of subordinated debt that a bank issues equals or is greater than the critical 
amount, the two requirements have a positive correlation and an increase of 
subordinated debt requirement increases capital requirement. Regulators are inclined 
to adopt a two-tier capital structure.  
The majority of banks believe that the cost of subordinated debt is lower than 
equity capital. One reason for this is that issuing subordinated debt could lead to a tax 
reduction on the interest paid to creditors. Furthermore, according to certain empirical 
studies from the USA during the 1990s, the cost of raising equity capital is higher than 
the cost of raising subordinated debt. Besides, issuing subordinated debt does not 
involve cash transactions and could therefore help to reduce agency costs. Thus, 
empirical evidence (e.g. Bank for International Settlements, 2001) shows that banks 
consider subordinated debt to be a better funding instrument than equity capital.  
  
3.3 Empirical Literature Review 
 
Previous empirical studies produce conflicting results on the issue of 
subordinated debt. Certain researchers employ cross-sectional data, and find that 
subordinated debts can constrain banks’ risk taking (Morgan and Stiroh, 2001; Sironi, 
2003; Coviz et al, 2004b). Other scholars find that there is no change to banks’ 
risk-taking behaviour before and after debt issuance. For example, the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1999) finds that subordinated debt’s 
reflection on risk-taking behaviour of banking organizations fades as time goes by, 
and does not have a significant effect on accounting measures. Krishnan et al. (2005) 
also find no evidence that subordinated debt can control risk taking; neither the raw 
risk characteristics nor the risk-matched-firm adjusted characteristics change 
significantly after a banking firm first issues subordinated debt. This section 
summarises empirical literature which addresses the different effects that subordinated 
debt can have on banks, i.e. quantity effects, cost effects and competition effects. 
 
3.3.1Quantity Effects  
Because quantity always gives the most intuitive illustration, researchers (e.g. 
Sironi, 2003; Covitz et al, 2004b; etc.) and policy makers (e.g. Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System (1999), US Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee 
(2000), Basel I (1988) and Basel II (2004)) tend to use amounts as the essential 
parameter. Most recently, Pop (2009 a) employs a bivariate analysis to examine 
whether requirements for some large banks to issue a minimum amount of 
subordinated debt might enhance market discipline.  
By conducting statistical tests on panel data sets, the results are inconsistent. 
  
Comprising the largest European banks, Pop (2009 a) finds that there are stronger 
market discipline forces after a minimum-amount of mandatory subordinated debt is 
enforced as a policy: firstly, the sub-debt issues are, in general, issued by the most 
profitable banking organizations; furthermore, voluntary sub-debt improves issuing 
banks’ overall capitalisation and reduces their Tier 1 capital ratios. Moreover, the 
amount of sub-debt has a negative relation with the quality of the credit portfolio and 
is correlates positively with total loans reserves ratio.  
Cebenoyan and Cebenoyan (2008) investigate market discipline in the US 
banking system through analyzing both uninsured depositors and subordinated debt 
holders, the two potential sources of market discipline. Using a panel data set of US 
banks and bank holding companies, Cebenoyan and Cebenoyan did not, however, find 
encouraging results. Although uninsured depositors provided strong monitoring, there 
was no response from bank to investors’ pressure. Changes in subordinated debt’s 
quantity and decrease in sub-debt amounts have little influence on market discipline. 
Therefore, Cebenoyan and Cebenoyan conclude that high expectations for market 
discipline on banking system’s stability are premature.  
 
3.3.2 Cost Effects  
Certain researchers have highlighted cost effects by investigating market 
discipline in banks (Blum,1999 & 2002; Niu, 2008 a&b, etc). The range of empirical 
literature adds to the studies performed mainly on US data (Avery et al, 1988; Gorton 
and Santomero, 1990; Flannery and Sorescu, 1996; etc.).  
There are researchers who claim that requiring higher or lower costs of 
subordinated debt has very limited discipline effects on banks. Cebenoyan and 
Cebenoyan (2007) also employ the changes in interests charged by the subordinated 
  
debt holders of US banks for the period between 1996 and 2005 to test whether an 
increase in interest costs could increase market discipline. However, no strong 
evidence was found to support the hypothesis that changes in interest payments can 
affect US banks’ risk behaviour and performances. 
On the contrary, Imai (2007) uses a unique panel data set of Japanese banks to 
show that subordinated debt investors punish weak banks by requiring a higher 
interest rate. Therefore, subordinated debt can make market discipline more efficient 
by increasing or decreasing banks’ interest costs.  
Furthermore, Pop (2009 b) employs secondary market prices and finds 
contradictory results in European banks. His hypothesis is that if the pricing of a bank 
debt in the secondary market is accurate and can convey to supervisors and other 
market participants a reliable signal of a bank’s financial conditions and default risk, 
then the market can discipline the bank. When market participants receive the signal, 
they will punish riskier banks by raising financing costs or by restricting business 
opportunities. By analyzing price formation in the European secondary bank debt 
market, Pop (2009 b) concludes that secondary market signals do contain valuable 
information, and that issuing subordinated debt does improve the effectiveness of 
market discipline in the European banking sector.  
 
3.3.3 Competition Effects  
Recently, literature on market discipline has extensively analysed the use of 
competition effects to discipline banks. The incentive for competition may put banks 
in a risky situation, and the greater the competition, the riskier the situation becomes. 
On the other hand, market discipline can reduce risks in an environment where there 
is greater competition. Therefore, in the absence of market discipline, competition in 
  
the banking industry can put the stability of the banking system at risk (Mendonca and 
Loures, 2009).   
However, we find conflicting results. Supporters, such as Morgan and Stiroh 
(2001), use spreads on nearly 500 bank bond issues between 1993 and 1998 to 
investigate the relationship between the spreads on those bonds and the full portfolio 
of assets held by the issuing bank. They find that bond spreads reflect not only the 
overall mix of banks’ assets at the time of issuance, but also control risks and 
performance. Therefore, riskier activities are expected to pay higher spreads and 
become more attractive and competitive to investors. 
Furthermore, Santos (2009) investigates whether the bond market disciplines all 
banks equally in the sense of demanding the same relative risk premium across banks 
of different levels of risk over time. His results show that the market does not 
discipline all banks equally; for riskier banks, market discipline is tougher. Thus, 
market discipline does exist and subordinated debt provides market discipline for 
risky financial institutions. Mendonca and Loures (2009) examine the Brazilian 
banking industry and conclude that market discipline is weak in Brazil. 
On the contrary, Krishnan et al (2005) apply the credit-spread curve on 
subordinated debt. However, they do not find strong evidence that changes in credit 
spreads reflect changes in bank risk variables, nor do they not find evidence that the 
first issue of subordinated debt changes risk-taking behaviour. Mendonca and Loures 
(2009) examine the Brazilian banking industry and conclude that market discipline is 
weak in Brazil.  
The analysts referred to above suggest that for most studies of the US, 
subordinated debt produces less effective market discipline in that country than in 
Europe. Many mandatory subordinated debt proposals which use quantity control or 
  
interest restrictions as paths to an efficient market discipline do not seem to work as 
well as expected.  
However, case studies of European countries show that quantity and costs affect 
banks’ risk-taking incentives and behaviour and that subordinated debt has recently 
been playing a greater role as an efficient instrument of market discipline. Empirical 
investigations of the banking industry of several non-European countries, such as 
Japan and Canada, have also shown that subordinated debt provides effective market 
discipline to banking industries. There is no strong evidence that the spreads which 
have been considered contain timely and accurate information indicating that issuing 
banks work significantly as a proxy of competition effects. Moreover, the market does 
not discipline all banks equally. For the riskier banks, the market discipline is tougher 
and subordinated debt works better. 
 
  
  
3.4 Methodologies  
The main goal of this chapter is to investigate banks’ responsiveness to 
disciplinary action by subordinated debt holders. In particular, whether banks follow 
the market’s action, and remedy their overly risk-taking behaviour efficiently will be 
examined. The previous chapter has already demonstrated that in the UK market 
subordinated debt investors do have concerns about issuing banks’ performance. 
However, if banks did not take the market signals seriously in their risky business 
ventures, market discipline would not be a useful mechanism after all. Although 
subordinated debts are not directly involved in the day-to-day management of banks, 
they are responsible for risky decisions made by bank managers, and so indirectly 
play an important role in the banks’ performance. Therefore, subordinated debt is a 
good tool for measuring market discipline on banks.  
Inspired by previous studies (e.g. Cebenoyan and Cebenoyan (2008)), the 
following equation as a work-horse model is proposed: 
 
Rank (Yi,t) = a0 + a1Yi,t-1+ a2MDi,t+ a3MDi,t-1+ a4Xi,t + εi,t                 (3.1) 
where rank (Yi,t) is a rank order of critical indicators of banks’ fundamentals.Yi,t-1 
is the one-year lagged value of Yi,t, MDi,t is a vector of information related to 
subordinated debt, X is a control variable, εis an ordinary error term following a 
normal distribution, a0 is the intercept, and a1, a2, a3 and a4 are vectors of parameters 
to be estimated. 
The performance of a bank is measured by four aspects: capital adequacy and 
earnings, quality of loans and investment securities, management quality, and liquidity. 
We use Capital Ratio (CR), which is the ratio of equity to total assets, and Return on 
Average Assets (ROA), which is the ratio of net income to average assets to measure 
  
issuing banks’ capital adequacy and earnings. There are four ratios adopted to 
examine the quality of loans and investments: Residential Real Estate Loans Ratio 
(RRELR), which is the ratio of residential real estate loans to total assets; Commercial 
and Industrial Loans Ratio (CILR), which is the ratio of commercial and industrial 
loans to total assets; Individual Loans Ratio (ILR), which is the ratio of loans to 
individuals to total assets; Investment Securities Ratio (ISR), which is the ratio of 
investment securities to total assets. Inefficiency ratio (IR), the ratio of net 
non-interest expense to total assets is employed as an indicator of management. Three 
variables are used as indicators of liquidity: Liquidity ratio, the ratio of liquidity assets 
to total assets; Loans to Deposits Ratio (LTDR), the ratio of total loans and leases to 
total deposits; and Deposit Ratio (DR), the ratio of total deposits to total liabilities.  
The equity level of a bank is a good indicator of its health and its ability to 
sustain future financial distress. Equity over the total asset ratio is used as a capital 
adequacy measure, and it is expected that subordinated debt has a positive influence 
on capital ratio. The earnings component is measured by returns to assets (ROA) with 
an expected positive relationship with sub-debt’s amount and interest. However, some 
empirical studies (e.g. Balasubramnian and Cyree, 2011) also employ ROA as a proxy 
for operational efficiency. In this case subordinated debt should have a negative 
influence on the ROA. 
After considering capital adequacy and earning, it is also necessary to consider 
the quality of loan portfolios. The ratios of residential real estate loans to total assets, 
commercial and industrial loans to total assets, and loans to individuals are used. In 
previous studies, sub-debt’s influence on residential real estate loans has proved 
ambiguous. Since residential real estate loans are mostly mortgage loans with 
collateral, they are considered safer. However, after the subprime crisis occurred in 
  
2007, this loan was considered to be a risky loan because of its high concentration of 
real estate. Since these ratios measure the quality of loan assets, ideally they would be 
expected to have positive relationships with subordinated debt. 
Management quality and liquidity also need to be examined. Management 
quality is measured as the ratio of non-interest expense to total assets. Inevitably, as 
liquidity is one of the critical proxies of banking operations, three ratios are employed 
to measure liquidity: the liquidity ratio, which is liquid assets divided by total assets, 
total loans and leases divided by deposits, and deposit ratio. In addition to all these 
bank characteristics, the size (natural log of total assets) of the bank as a control 
variable is adopted. 
Subordinated debt characteristics variables are considered as indicators of market 
discipline. SND amount level (SDTL) is the ratio of SND amount to total liabilities, 
and Interest level (INTELEV) is the ratio of interest on SNDs to total amount of SND. 
A summary of variable definitions is presented in Table 3.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 3.1 Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Definition 
Bank Characteristics 
Capital Adequacy and Earnings: 
Capital Ratio(CR) Equity / Total Assets (TA) 
Return on Average Assets(ROA) Net Income / Average Assets 
Quality of loans and investments: 
Residential Real Estate Loans Ratio(RRELR) Residential Real Estate Loans / TA 
Commercial and Industrial Loans Ratio(CILR) Commercial and Industrial Loans / TA 
Individual Loans Ratio(ILR) Loans to Individuals / TA 
Investment Securities Ratio (ISR) Investment Securities / TA 
Management: 
Inefficiency Ratio (IR) Net Non-interest Expense / TA 
Liquidity: 
Liquidity Ratio (LR) Liquidity Assets /TA 
Loans to Deposits Ratio(LTDR) Total Loans and Leases (TLL) / Deposits 
Deposit Ratio (DR) Total Deposits / Total Liabilities 
Subordinated Debt Characteristics 
Market Discipline variables 
SDTL Levels of SND = Amount of SND/ Total 
Liabilities 
Intelev Interest level of SND = interest on 
SNDs/amount of SNDs 
Other Market discipline variables 
DSDTL A dummy indicator which takes the value of 1 
when the change in level of SNDs is positive 
from time t-1 to t 
DIntelev A dummy indicator which takes the value of 1 
when the change in the interest level of SNDs 
are positive from time t-1 to t. 
Control Variables 
Size Log of TA 
 
3.4.1 The Impacts of Sub-debt Characteristics on Banks’ 
Performance 
Based on this baseline model, the following models for each SND group, the 
quantity of the debentures and the interest are estimated: 
 
, 0 1 , 2 , 3 , 1 4 , ,i t i t l i t i t i t i tY a a Y a SND a SND a X                           (3.2) 
, 0 1 , 2 , 3 , 1 4 , ,i t i t l i t i t i t i tY a a Y a Interest a Interest a X                     (3.3) 
 
  
Equations (3.2) and (3.3) capture the reaction of fundamentals to the levels of 
sub-debt amount and the interests at both the time t and t-1. If disciplinary action 
taken by the market is efficient in influencing banks’ fundamentals, a2 and a3 should 
be statistically significant. In other words, current and lagged sub-debt amount levels 
should be one of the significant factors that affect bank characteristics.  
 
3.4.2 The Impacts of Sub-Debt Changes on Banks’ Performance 
The possible effectiveness of market discipline is also tested by examining the 
changes in firm-specific characteristics at time t, following the changes in the quality 
levels and interest levels of subordinated debt at both time t and t-1. The regressions 
are expressed as: 
 
, 0 1 , 2 3 1 4 , ,i t i t l t t i t i tY a a Y a SND a SND a X                           (3.4) 
, 0 1 , 2 3 1 4 , ,i t i t l t t i t i tY a a Y a Interest a Interest a X                      (3.5) 
 
Equations (3.4) and (3.5) capture the reaction of fundamentals to changes in the 
levels of amount and interest of sub-debts. However, the changes used in these two 
equations do not distinguish between positive and negative changes in sub-debt 
signals and assume that bank managers respond similarly to these two types of market 
signals. Now, whether market discipline is affected by the sub-debt holders through 
credit rationing or higher interest demand is examined. Two dummy variables are set: 
one for positive changes in levels of sub-debt amount (D1 and D2), and the other is for 
positive changes in interest levels of sub-debt (D3 and D4) to show additional powers 
of disciplining variables in explaining changes in bank fundamentals. The models are 
  
specified as follows: 
 
, 0 1 , 2 , 3 , 1 4 , 1 5 , 1 2 6 , ,* *i t i t l i t i t i t i t i t i tY a a Y a SND a SND D a SND a SND D a X                
                                                                   (3.6) 
, 0 1 , 1 2 , 3 , 3*i t i t i t i tY a a Y a Interest a Interest D         
4 , 1 5 , 1 4 6 , ,*i t i t i t i ta Interest a Interest D a X                               (3.7) 
3.5 Data and Sample 
This study is mainly based on data derived from Thompson One Banker, a 
database which includes subordinated debt market data and the issuing banks and 
building societies accounting data. For subordinated notes and debentures, the debt 
issued by banks, building societies and bank holding companies in the UK has been 
chosen. The data sample period runs from 1997 until the end of 2009. The Thompson 
One Banker provides essential information such as issuing date, issuer, amount, 
currency, coupon rate, spread, maturity, call date, and minimum life. Thompson One 
Banker further provides information like ISIN, package number and book runner with 
which we can track down the debt. Moreover, it provides details about issuing 
subordinated debt and issuers (e.g., target market and description), which proves very 
useful in this empirical investigation. 
The accounting data is taken from World Scope, provided by Thompson One 
Banker. This database provides annual accounting data and financial ratios for all 
issuing financial institutions. Accounting variables used in this study include data 
from the annual balance sheet, such as equity, total assets, total loans, total investment 
securities, residential real estate loans, commercial and industrial loans, loans to 
individuals, deposits, and subordinated debt amount. Data is also collected from the 
  
annual income statement as it appears in this database, such as net income, net 
non-interest expense, interest charged on subordinated debt, etc. All numerical data is 
measured in million GBP. 
After collecting original data from the banks’ annual reports, financial ratios 
have been calculated to examine banks’ performance from many perspectives. These 
include capital adequacy, profitability, asset quality, loan quality, investment quality, 
management and liquidity. Definitions of variables are shown in Table 3.1, and 
descriptive statistics of variables are shown in Table 3.2. The sample starts with over a 
thousand firms’ annual observations, but later, some observations had to be deleted 
due to missing information. For example, issuing companies which only existed for a 
few years and/or only issued a couple of sub-debts were dropped. Secondly, 
non-financial-related companies depending on company description were abandoned. 
The final sample includes pooled 912 (annual) observations for 76 firms for over 
twelve years from January 1997 to December 2009. 
 
3.5.1 Data and Hypothesis Tests for Regressions Two and Three 
As shown in Table 3.2, the sample size for each bank characteristic variable is 
not the same. This is because the data is not available for some issuing banks for 
certain particular factors. The sample period is from 1997 to 2009. Table 3.2 
illustrates descriptive statistics for banks’ performance variables and subordinated 
debt characteristics variables. There are in total 76 banks, building societies, insurance 
companies and other bank holding companies issuing subordinated debt during the 
sample period 1997 to 2009. Many big banks, such as The Royal Bank of Scotland 
Group, HSBC, and Lloyds Banking Group have issued sub-debt regularly and 
disclosure clearly, being the largest number of sub-debt issuing firms. Medium and 
  
small businesses, generally speaking, only hold few numbers of sub-debts.  
Figure 3.1 illustrates the consistency of the data sample for regressions two and 
three. The panel data sample is collapsed into time series on the basis of the mean for 
each variable. The capital ratio (CR), the liquidity ratio (LR) and the deposit ratio (DR) 
move smoothly in the sample period, while the ROA is increasing in the first half of 
the sample period but dramatically falling later, similar to the loans to deposit ratio 
(LTDR). Loans portfolios and investment securities have a smooth performance. The 
management index (IR) consists of a series of undulating inflexions.  
During 1998-2003, sub-debts amount levels rapidly increased but they also 
decreased sharply later. However, during the late 2000s, it can be seen that the SDTL 
began to rise again. On the other hand, the interest level of sub-debts has not changed 
much except for a transitory period. A bank’s size, as a control variable, has been 
trended up, but it also, very recently, began to drop.  
Figure 3.2 shows the correlations and covariance within the group. The control 
variable Size has significant negative correlations with capital ratio (CR), inefficiency 
ratio (IR) and deposit ratio (DR), and a relatively greater positive correlation with 
investment securities ratio (ISR). Capital ratio is positively correlated to inefficiency 
ratio (with the value of 0.7891), indicating when capital ratio and inefficiency ratio 
increase, Loans to deposits ratio has a positive correlation with residential real estate 
ratio (with the value of 0.5385), and a negative correlation with deposit ratio (with the 
value of 0.5586).  
 
 
 
 
  
Table 3.2 Sample Summary Statistics 
Table 3.2 shows the summary statistics for accounting variables and sub-debt characteristics for the 
whole sample used in regression (3.2) and (3.3). CR is the ratio of equity to total assets, ROA is the 
ratio of net income to total assets, RRELR is the ratio of residual real estate loans to total assets, 
CILR is the ratio of commercial and industrial loans to total assets, ILR is the ratio of loans to 
individuals of total assets, ISR is the ratio of investment securities to total assets, IR is the ratio of net 
non-interest expense to total assets, LR is the ratio of liquidity assets to total assets, LTDR is the ratio 
of total loans and leases to deposits, DR is the ratio of total deposits to total liabilities, SDTL is the 
ratio of SND amount to total liabilities, INTELEV is the ratio of interests on SND to SND amounts. 
SIZE is the log of total assets. 
Variable  No. Mean Min Max st.dev Skeness Kurtosis 
CR 852 0.1212 -0.9473 0.9976 0.2427 1.1583 4.4062 
ROA 776 3.5181 -35.61 70.46 6.6131 2.3322 25.8462 
RRELR 381 0.1549 0 0.8859 0.2105 1.7364 5.0753 
CILR 229 0.1001 0 0.5881 0.1303 1.5082 4.638 
ILR 191 0.3855 0 3.8251 0.2844 -0.0384 1.8287 
ISR 789 0.3356 0 3.8251 0.3358 1.0399 16.3462 
IR 833 0.0826 -0.1966 1.029 0.1417 3.0556 14.0937 
LR 596 0.3436 -0.2593 5.6503 0.3942 5.3635 63.988 
LTDR 300 1.4293 0.0276 55.1547 3.2314 15.4605 255.7498 
DR 355 0.448 0 0.91 0.2538 -0.3533 2.2216 
SDTL 395 0.1797 -0.2723 8.1784 0.8492 6.5253 47.9829 
INTELEV 400 0.0581 -0.4489 0.8473 0.0545 5.828 130.8856 
SIZE 855 4.0314 0.4472 6.3792 1.3077 -0.5478 2.3688 
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Figure 3.1 Graphs of Panel Data Collapsed to Time  
This graph illustrates the consistency of our data sample for regressions two and three. We collapse the panel data sample into time series on the basis on the mean for 
each variable. 
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Figure 3.2. Correlation and Covariance within the Data Sample for Regressions 2 and 3 
 
Definitions of variables are shown in Table 3.1. 
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3.5.2 Data and Hypothesis Tests for Regressions Four to Seven  
These regression models require calculating the changes of bank characteristic 
variables and the subordinated debt characteristic variables from year t-1 to t. 
Therefore the sample size is smaller due to a one-year shorter sample period. There 
are, in total, 912 observations for 76 firms during the period of 1998-2009. Table 3.3 
illustrates the descriptive statistics for the changes of variables each year. 
Figure 3.3 shows the consistency of the data sample used for regressions four to 
seven. The changes of the capital ratios (CR) from the years 1998 to 2009 appear to 
be smooth. However, the ROA display dramatic fluctuations. The changes of three 
loan portfolios seem to have similar patterns, while investment securities ratios have 
sharp changes during the earlier sample period but tend to die-down later. 
Correspondingly, variables for liquidity have similar trends but total loans to deposits 
(LTDR) display striking changes at a later period. The change of the management 
efficiency variable, IR, has anomalous shapes. Furthermore, the subordinated debt 
amount levels and the interest levels change quite dramatically.  
Figure 3.4 reports the correlations and covariance within the group for data used 
in the rest of the regression models. Consistent with Figure 3.2, Size is negative and 
correlates with capital ratio (CR) and inefficiency ratio (IR) with relatively smaller 
values. However, deposit ratio (DR) has a positive correlation with Size, rather than a 
negative value as shown in Figure 3.2. This result suggests that an increase in Size 
(issuing bank’s total assets) has a positive influence on the increase of the deposit. 
Changes in capital ratio affect positively changes on individual loans ratio (ILR), with 
the value of 0.5523, and still positively affect changes on inefficiency ratio (IR). 
Changes in ROA have positive correlations with changes on residential real estate 
loans ratio (RRELR) (with the value of 0.5292), individual loans ratio (ILR) (with the 
  
value of 0.5247), and liquidity ratio (LR) (with the value of 0.5855). Similarly, 
changes in residential real estate loans ratio (RRELR) have positive correlations with 
changes in liquidity ratio and loans to total deposits ratio (0.4459 and 0.4117, 
respectively). Changes in individual loans ratio also significantly affect the changes in 
deposit ratio (0.4206), and changes in ratio of loans to total deposit are negatively 
correlated with deposit ratio (0.4753). 
Table 3.3 Sample Summary Statistics 
Table 3.3 shows the summary statistics for the changes of accounting variables and sub-debt characteristics for the 
whole sample used in regression 4,5,6 and 7 from time t-1 to t. CR is the ratio of equity to total assets, ROA is the 
ratio of net income to total assets, RRELR is the ratio of residual real estate loans to total assets, CILR is the ratio of 
commercial and industrial loans to total assets, ILR is the ratio of loans to individuals to total assets, ISR is the ratio 
of investment securities to total assets, IR is the ratio of net non-interest expense to total assets, LR is the ratio of 
liquidity assets to total assets, LTDR is the ratio of total loans and leases to deposits, DR is the ratio of total deposits 
to total liabilities, SDTL is the ratio of SND amount to total liabilities, INTELEV is the ratio of interests on SND to 
SND amounts. SIZE is the log of total assets. 
Variable  No. Mean Min Max st.dev Skeness Kurtosis 
CR 773 -0.0085 -0.6945 0.8442 0.073 1.5235 50.0227 
ROA 691 -0.2684 -43.51 43.27 5.2403 -0.3789 29.4691 
RRELR 341 0.0009 -0.2337 0.5183 0.0488 2.9995 43.6655 
CILR 202 0.0012 -0.588 0.5881 0.0771 0.2743 36.7521 
ILR 161 0.0029 -0.3295 0.3731 0.0657 0.9147 16.4779 
ISR 713 -0.0005 -3.4336 3.4659 0.2092 0.0731 20.9037 
IR 754 -0.0016 -0.8903 0.4788 0.0758 -3.7922 49.9521 
LR 521 -0.0071 -3.1114 3.4659 0.2249 -6.6711 90.2866 
LTDR 268 0.1988 -5.1333 53.3788 3.2989 1.5171 25.3922 
DR 316 -0.0146 -0.4608 0.1749 0.0659 -2.2082 14.227 
SDTL 334 -0.0119 -1.8975 1.9728 0.2379 -0.4263 43.1492 
INTELEV 341 -0.0015 -0.9085 1.2962 0.0968 4.2629 121.1493 
SIZE 792 4.0472 0.4472 6.3793 1.3084 -0.5496 2.3792 
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Figure 3.3 Graphs of Panel Data Collapsed to Time for Regressions Require Change Values 
This graph illustrates the consistency of our data sample for regressions four to seven. We collapse the panel data sample into time series on the basis of the mean for 
each variable. 
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Figure 3.4 Correlation and Covariance for the Changes of Variables 
 
Variables are defined in Table 3.1. 
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3.6Result Interpretations 
3.6.1 Bank Performance and the Sub-debt Market Signals  
The results in Table 3.4 show whether sub-debt’s quantities have any effects on 
bank fundamentals. Most of the fundamental variables are significantly related to their 
own one-year-lagged value, except Investment Securities Ratio (ISR) and Inefficiency 
Ratio (IR). The statistics of the Hausman test suggest that for these two regressions 
estimations with fixed effects are more appropriate than with random effects.  
The capital ratio has a negative and 10% level significant coefficient with the 
bank-held sub-debt amount levels at year t (with the value of 0.0344). Similarly, the 
liquidity ratio has a negative and 1% level significant coefficient with the sub-debt 
amount level at the same year (with the value of 0.7502). These results indicate that in 
the case of an increase of the SND amount level, banks’ financial health and liquidity 
decrease. This is because SND is commonly used as a long-term risky investment in 
the year of investment, banks’ equity and liquidity assets drop. With a one-year-lagged 
SND amount level value, coefficients are positive. Particularly, the coefficient 
between liquidity ratio and one-year-lagged SND amount is statistically significant at 
1% level. This result supports our hypothesis that SND increases issuers’ financial 
health, liquidity and ability to sustain future distress in the long run and with time 
hysteresis. ROA has a positive and 5% level statistically significant coefficient with 
an SND amount at time t, whereas a 1% level significant and negative coefficient with 
an SND amount at time t-1.  
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Table 3.4 Effects of Sub-debt Amount on Bank Fundamentals 
Table 3.4 shows the regression estimations of bank fundamentals on the Sub-debt amount with both fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE). The panel sample period is from 1997 to 2009. SND is the ratio of the SND 
amount to total liabilities, SIZE is the natural log of issuing bank’s total assets, Hausman χ2 is adopted to test the appropriateness of the RE estimator with the null hypothesis that the RE estimator is consistent. Year 
dummies are also included to control the year effect. P-values are shown in brackets as ***, **, * indicating significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Capital Ratio 
Return on Average 
Assets 
Residential Real Estate 
Loan Ratio 
Commercial and 
Industrial Loans Ratio 
Individual Loan Ratio 
Investment Securities 
Ratio 
Inefficiency Ratio 
Variable  FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE 
Yi,t-1 
-0.2968 -0.0774 0.319 0.5239 0.6536 0.9667 0.5909 0.8995 0.3091 0.9461 0.0121 0.5892 -0.0964 -0.0006 
[0.014]** [0.246] [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.008]*** [0.000]*** [0.849] [0.000]*** [0.171] [0.999] 
SNDi,t 
-0.0344 -0.0338 1.1152 2.0477 -0.0122 -0.0122 0.0175 0.0052 0.0639 0.1539 0.0636 0.021 -0.0007 -0.0029 
[0.067]* [0.000]*** [0.035]** [0.000]*** [0.265] [0.265] [0.247] [0.728] [0.865] [0.681] [0.317] [0.755] [0.906] [0.443] 
SNDi,t-1 
0.0032 0.0037 -2.2025 -1.8778 0.0021 0.0087 -0.0081 -0.0069 0.0397 0.0646 -0.0314 -0.0195 0.0011 -0.0021 
[0.847] [0.737] [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.847] [0.414] [0.589] [0.638] [0.906] [0.844] [0.619] [0.772] [0.843] [0.498] 
SIZE 
-0.1256 -0.1419 -3.2355 -0.2779 0.0323 0.0069 0.0192 -0.0105 -0.1012 -0.0127 0.1029 0.0284 -0.012 -0.0115 
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.077]* [0.166] [0.092] [0.571] [[0.115] [0.057]* [0.152] [0.217] [0.139] [0.020]** [0.005]*** 
CONS 
0.6449 0.8186 17.4682 2.0574 -0.0987 -0.0284 -0.036 0.0602 0.7621 0.0876 -0.1904 0.0146 0.0517 0.0814 
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.026]** [0.361] [0.231] [0.819] [0.119] [0.005]*** [0.149] [0.624] [0.895] [0.193] [0.004]*** 
N 989 989 819 819 520 520 390 390 403 403 780 780 871 871 
Fixed Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2- Within 0.8054 0.7737 0.2908 0.1848 0.4773 0.4598 0.4714 0.4538 0.1979 0.1339 0.0634 0.0141 0.2346 0.1178 
R2- Between 0.685 0.8009 0.2149 0.6545 0.9593 0.9948 0.8924 0.9683 0.6895 0.9969 0.0162 0.9766 0.0009 0.2704 
R2-Overall 0.726 0.7687 0.1726 0.3941 0.9251 0.9659 0.7747 0.8287 0.7081 0.9501 0.0438 0.3819 0.0605 0.1643 
F 13.24*** - 6.12*** - 9.8*** - 6.06*** - 1.69 - 1.1 - 1.39 - 
Wald-chi - 372.29*** - 174.31*** - 549.284*** - 594.95*** - 236.151*** - 177.32*** - 23.79 
Hausman χ2 40.8*** - 56.89*** - 46.69*** - 32.61*** - 36.72*** - 198.8*** - 22.18* - 
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Table 3.4 Continued  
 Liquidity Ratio 
Loans to Deposits 
Ratio 
Deposit Ratio 
Variable  Fixed  Random Fixed  Random Fixed  Random 
Yi,t-1 
0.2009 0.8417 0.3957 0.8565 0.6334 0.9406 
[0.004]*** [0.000]*** [0.497] [0.043]** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
SNDi,t 
-0.7502 -0.3021 0.2909 0.0812 -0.0147 0.0103 
[0.005]*** [0.234] [0.797] [0.937] [0.371] [0.528] 
SNDi,t-1 
1.6158 0.6447 -0.7444 -0.2982 0.0112 -0.0036 
[0.000]*** [0.017]** [0.948] [0.770] [0.490] [0.824] 
SIZE 
0.0456 0.0085 -2.3358 -0.5109 -0.1174 -0.0027 
[0.345] [0.574] [0.398] [0.269] [0.003]*** [0.734] 
CONS 
0.0352 -0.0022 11.9976 2.9365 0.7512 0.0578 
[0.877] [0.982] [0.359] [0.286] [0.000]*** [0.264] 
N 845 845 559 559 546 546 
Fixed Year Yes Yes Yes 
R2- Within 0.0885 0.0885 0.0668 0.0567 0.6764 0.624 
R2- Between 0.2117 0.9317 0.0102 0.2232 0.8258 0.9826 
R2-Overall 0.3873 0.7413 0.0237 0.0765 0.7851 0.9109 
F 3.23*** - 0.75 - 23.13*** - 
Wald-chi - 667.63*** - 15.15 - 198.356*** 
Hausman χ2 135.79*** - - 3.43 129.68*** - 
 
Table 3.5 shows the results of the third regression model which calculates the 
relationship between sub-debt’s interests and banks’ performance. Similar to Table 3.4, 
nearly all bank fundamental variables are significantly related to their own 
one-year-lagged value, besides the investment securities ratio (based on estimations 
with fixed effects) and the inefficiency ratio (based on estimations with random 
effects). A-year-lagged interest rate has a positive and statistically significant affect on 
the capital ratio at 1% level (the value of coefficient is 1.1725).  
The liquidity ratio has a positive and 1% level statistically significant coefficient 
with the SND interest at year t (with the value of 1.6358), and a negative and 1% level 
statistically significant coefficient with the SND interest at year t-1 (with the value of 
2.5318). This is easy to understand, as issuing banks need to pay interest from the 
second year of issuing onwards, and a possibly larger amount of interest for riskier 
banks. The remaining liquidity variables represent deposit-related characteristics. We 
  
find there is no strong evidence for the SND interest (at both year t and year t-1) to 
have significant impacts on banks’ deposits. One potential reason is that in the UK 
deposits are covered by the government’s safety net, hence depositors are not sensitive 
to banks’ risk taking behaviour. These results indicate that the SND interest has 
constraining effects on the operation of banks, especially on capital health and 
liquidity. 
Overall, the regression results shown in Table 3.4 and Table 3.5 suggest that the 
subordinated debt amount level affects issuing banks’ capital adequacy, liquidity and 
profit-earning capability. We also find significant evidence that sub-debt interest 
provides strong and effective market discipline to issuing banks’ capital adequacy and 
liquidity, without significantly affecting deposits. There is no strong evidence for loan 
portfolio items, such as residential real estate loans, commercial and industrial loans, 
individual loans and investment securities to have been affected by the SND amount 
and interest significantly. Results in this section support the conclusion that the SND 
amount and interest are significant factors in disciplining banks’ capital adequacy and 
liquidity. They actively provide information that is monitored by market participants 
and control banks’ risk taking. 
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Table 3.5 Effects of Sub-debt Interest on Bank Fundamentals 
Table 3.5 shows the regression estimations of bank fundamentals on the Sub-debt Interest with both fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE). The panel sample period is from 1997 to 2009. Interest is the ratio of the 
SND interest on the SND amount, SIZE is the natural log of issuing bank’s total assets, Hausman χ2 is adopted to test the appropriateness of the RE estimator with the null hypothesis that the RE estimator is consistent. 
Year dummies are also included to control the year effect. P-values are shown in brackets as ***, **, * indicating significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Capital Ratio 
Return on Average 
Assets 
Residential Real Estate 
Loan Ratio 
Commercial and 
Industrial Loans Ratio 
Individual Loan Ratio 
Investment Securities 
Ratio 
Inefficiency Ratio 
Variable  FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE 
Yi,t-1 
-0.4352 -0.2256 0.3051 0.5123 0.6619 0.9652 0.6016 0.8878 0.3155 0.9499 0.0142 0.5793 -0.1117 0.003 
[0.000]*** [0.001]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.007]*** [0.000]*** [0.823] [0.000]*** [0.122] [0.954] 
Interesti,t 
-0.2301 0.1513 -1.0155 0.2754 0.0267 0.0298 0.0397 -0.0656 0.0499 0.189 -0.1368 0.0962 -0.0873 0.0407 
[0.645] [0.681] [0.762] [0.931] [0.561] [0.520] [0.785] [0.641] [0.874] [0.498] [0.589] [0.729] [0.577] [0.734] 
Interesti,t-1 
1.1725 0.8188 -5.9958 -4.7754 0.0183 0.0252 0.1122 -0.0159 -0.1257 -0.3052 -0.1005 0.1137 -0.955 0.0515 
[0.007]*** [0.022]** [0.270] [0.343] [0.692] [0.586] [0.437] [0.906] [0.811] [0.504] [0.689] [0.681] [0.551] [0.639] 
SIZE 
-0.1047 -0.1239 -3.2045 -0.3366 0.0377 0.0052 0.0078 -0.0098 -0.1016 -0.1308 0.0925 0.035 -0.0116 -0.0108 
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.041]** [0.102] [0.159] [0.817] [0.104] [0.060]* [0.139] [0.262] [0.058]* [0.012]** [0.004]*** 
CONS 
0.7085 0.6827 17.4514 2.5104 -0.1302 -0.0221 0.0074 0.0619 0.7696 0.1024 -0.1279 -0.0379 0.1127 0.0721 
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.015]** [0.221] [0.315] [0.962] [0.111] [0.006]*** [0.088] [0.738] [0.736] [0.003]*** [0.013]** 
N 989 989 819 819 520 520 390 390 403 403 780 780 871 871 
Fixed Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2- Within 0.8178 0.7774 0.2464 0.1541 0.4729 0.4601 0.4672 0.4512 0.1976 0.1331 0.0606 0.0136 0.2392 0.1081 
R2- Between 0.653 0.7737 0.2623 0.6023 0.9628 0.9925 0.941 0.9671 0.692 0.9967 0.0666 0.9715 0.0001 0.2838 
R2-Overall 0.7041 0.7568 0.1907 0.3644 0.9326 0.9657 0.7993 0.8286 0.7121 0.9502 0.0616 0.3764 0.0536 0.1591 
F 15.56*** - 4.88*** - 9.63*** - 5.96*** - 1.69 - 1.05 - 1.45 - 
Wald-chi - 351.7 - 141.82*** - 54.643*** - 594.46*** - 236.428*** - 172.60*** - 23.09 
Hausman χ2 72.72*** - 36.69*** - 37.59*** - - - - 2.53 165.73*** - - 19.21 
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Table 3.5 Continued 
 Liquidity Ratio 
Loans to Deposits 
Ratio 
Deposit Ratio 
Variable  Fixed  Random Fixed  Random Fixed  Random 
Yi,t-1 
0.4876 0.8751 0.4042 0.8915 0.6459 0.9431 
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.487] [0.035]** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
INTERESTi,t 
1.6358 1.7806 0.7543 0.8405 -0.0006 -0.0133 
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.874] [0.854] [0.993] [0.854] 
INTERESTi,t-1 
-2.5318 -3.063 0.7544 0.7853 0.0061 -0.0049 
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.874] [0.863] [0.928] [0.945] 
SIZE 
-0.0068 -0.0011 -2.5087 -0.3385 -0.1117 -0.0078 
[0.873] [0.921] [0.359] [0.396] [0.004]*** [0.277] 
CONS 
0.2508 0.1378 12.7643 1.8605 0.7161 0.0866 
[0.205] [0.057]* [0.322] [0.437] [0.000]*** [0.074] 
N 845 845 559 559 546 546 
Fixed Year Yes Yes Yes 
R2- Within 0.391 0.3589 0.0665 0.0563 0.6748 0.6245 
R2-Between 0.9305 0.9497 0.0137 0.2329 0.8375 0.9812 
R2-Overall 0.7715 0.8029 0.0263 0.0736 0.7944 0.9099 
F 8.22*** - 0.75 - 22.97*** - 
Wald-chi - 969.70*** - 14.54 - 195.849*** 
Hausman χ2 53.19*** - - 3.85 77.76*** - 
 
The main concern with separate explanatory variables in different regression 
models is that we may suffer a model-biased problem or misspecification. Therefore 
we combine all explanatory variables in one regression as an alternative robust check. 
Calculated estimations are presented in Table 3.6. The results are similar to Table 3.4 
and Table 3.5. The capital ratio has a negative and 5% level statistically significant 
coefficient with an SND amount, and a positive and 1% level significant coefficient 
with a one-year-lagged interest. ROA has a positive and significant coefficient with a 
SND amount at year t, and a negative and significant coefficient with one-year-lagged 
interest value. The inefficiency ratio fails to show a statistically significant coefficient 
with its own lag value. The liquidity ratio has a negative and 1% level significant 
coefficient with an SND amount at year t, a positive and significant coefficient with a 
one-year-lagged SND amount value, as well as with Interest at year t and year t-1.
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Table 3.6 Impacts of SND Amount and Interest on Bank Fundamentals 
Table 3.6 shows the regression estimations of bank fundamentals on the Sub-debt amount and interest with both fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE). The panel sample period is from 1997 to 2009. Interest is the ratio 
of the SND interest on the SND amount, SIZE is the natural log of issuing banks’ total assets, Hausman χ2 is adopted to test the appropriateness of the RE estimator with the null hypothesis that the RE estimator is 
consistent. Year dummies are also included to control the year effect. P-values are shown in brackets as ***, **, * indicating significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Capital Ratio 
Return on Average 
Assets 
Residential Real Estate 
Loan Ratio 
Commercial and 
Industrial Loans Ratio 
Individual Loan Ratio 
Investment Securities 
Ratio 
Inefficiency Ratio 
Variable  FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE 
Yi,t-1 
-0.278 -0.1107 0.3115 0.5214 0.6562 0.9671 0.5868 0.8969 0.3134 0.9482 0.0098 0.5778 -0.1132 0.0036 
[0.013]*** [0.102] [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.008]*** [0.000]*** [0.877] [0.000]*** [0.113] [0.947] 
SNDi,t 
-0.04 -0.0363 1.1043 2.0443 -0.0119 -0.0057 0.0184 0.0049 0.0748 0.1636 0.0628 0.0229 -0.0008 -0.0028 
[0.019]** [0.000]*** [0.037]** [0.000]*** [0.279] [0.594] [0.228] [0.744] [0.845] [0.664] [0.326] [0.735] [0.891] [0.474] 
SNDi,t-1 
0.0042 0.0062 -2.2204 -1.8853 0.0023 0.0087 -0.0075 -0.0067 0.0309 0.0402 -0.0323 -0.0183 0.0014 -0.0021 
[0.770] [0.535] [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.835] [0.414] [0.618] [0.649] [0.928] [0.904] [0.612] [0.786] [0.813] [0.516] 
INTERESTi,t 
0.1713 -0.0619 -1.1662 0.5656 0.0222 0.0324 0.0631 -0.0654 0.0475 0.1879 -0.1269 0.0998 -0.0932 0.0391 
[0.744] [0.858] [0.721] [0.855] [0.631] [0.484] [0.669] [0.645] [0.881] [0.503] [0.617] [0.721] [0.563] [0.747] 
INTERESTi,t-1 
1.3619 1.1211 -6.5629 -4.169 0.015 0.0285 0.1255 -0.0174 -0.1339 -0.2771 -0.0959 0.1149 -0.0978 0.0392 
[0.002]*** [0.001]*** [0.214] [0.398] [0.746] [0.539] [0.389] [0.897] [0.802] [0.552] [0.704] [0.680] [0.552] [0.727] 
SIZE 
-0.1236 -0.1431 -3.1966 -0.2929 0.0323 0.0069 0.0155 -0.0109 -0.1025 -0.0125 0.1059 0.0363 -0.0123 -0.0114 
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.068]* [0.168] [0.088]* [0.654] [0.108] [0.060]* [0.161] [0.208] [0.068]* [0.019]** [0.006]*** 
CONS 
0.7319 0.7687 17.6548 2.2958 -0.1018 -0.0321 -0.0324 0.0663 0.7736 0.0922 -0.1936 -0.0453 0.0669 0.0759 
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.023]** [0.350] [0.186] [0.840] [0.108] [0.007]*** [0.139] [0.621] [0.706] [0.143] [0.014]** 
N 988 988 819 819 520 520 390 390 403 403 780 780 871 871 
Fixed Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2- Within 0.8499 0.8196 0.2957 0.1894 0.4781 0.461 0.4756 0.4522 0.1986 0.1337 0.0645 0.0141 0.2405 0.1137 
R2- Between 0.7297 0.8272 0.2108 0.6508 0.96 0.9928 0.8996 0.9688 0.6866 0.9968 0.0471 0.9712 0.0001 0.2774 
R2-Overall 0.7681 0.8064 0.1738 0.3958 0.9262 0.966 0.7823 0.829 0.7067 0.9503 0.0533 0.3749 0.053 0.1658 
F 14.99*** - 5.48*** - 8.57*** - 5.34*** - 1.47 - 0.98 - 1.23 - 
Wald-chi - 441.56*** - 174.23*** - 545.377*** - 586.59*** - 233.513*** - 169.76*** - 23.65 
Hausman χ2 24.59* - 65.58*** - 39.75*** - 33.20*** - 33.75*** - 177.82*** - 72.55*** - 
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Table 3.6 Continued 
 Liquidity Ratio 
Loans to Deposits 
Ratio 
Deposit Ratio 
Variable  FE RE FE RE FE RE 
Yi,t-1 
0.3115 0.8791 0.3943 0.8585 0.6333 0.9407 
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.501] [0.044]** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
SNDi,t 
-0.6831 -0.3074 0.2984 0.0826 -0.0147 0.0103 
[0.003]*** [0.152] [0.794] [0.936] [0.373] [0.532] 
SNDi,t-1 
1.2459 0.535 -0.0665 -0.2984 0.0112 -0.0036 
[0.000]*** [0.019]** [0.954] [0.771] [0.491] [0.826] 
INTERESTi,t 
1.8969 1.8699 0.844 0.8039 -0.0016 -0.0113 
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.861] [0.861] [0.981] [0.876] 
INTERESTi,t-1 
1.8707 -3.0941 0.8237 0.7046 0.0061 -0.0026 
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.864] [0.878] [0.982] [0.971] 
SIZE 
0.0314 0.0065 -2.3701 -0.5149 -0.1174 -0.0026 
[0.453] [0.616] [0.395] [0.268] [0.004]*** [0.741] 
CONS 
0.0936 0.0636 12.0651 2.8914 0.7511 0.0579 
[0.634] [0.458] [0.361] [0.298] [0.000]*** [0.265] 
N 845 845 559 559 546 546 
Fixed Year Yes Yes Yes 
R2- Within 0.4107 0.3008 0.0671 0.0567 0.6765 0.6242 
R2- Between 0.6498 0.9422 0.0098 0.2254 0.8257 0.9826 
R2-Overall 0.6365 0.8167 0.0231 0.0767 0.785 0.9109 
F 7.62*** - 0.66 - 20.17*** - 
Wald-chi - 102.986*** - 15.03 - 196.34*** 
Hausman χ2 98.32*** - - 3.68 66.24*** - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
3.6.2 The Effects of Changes in Sub-debt Market Signals on 
Changes in Bank Fundamentals 
In regressions reported in Table 3.7 we explore whether sub-debts’ market 
signals, such as changes in quantities and interests, affect changes in issuing banks’ 
fundamentals. We begin by studying the effects of changes in the subordinated debt 
amount levels on changes in the banks’ performance. ROA has a negative and 1% 
level statistically significant coefficient with its one-year-lagged value, and a positive 
coefficient with changes in SND amount with 5% level statistically significance, 
providing strong evidence that the changes of the sub-debt amount levels have 
positive effects on issuing banks’ capital adequacy.  
The inefficiency ratio is negatively related to its own lag value with a 10% level 
statistically significance. At the mean time, changes in SND amounts at year t-1 have 
a positive and significant relation with the changes in the inefficiency ratio from year 
t-1 to year t. The liquidity ratio is affected by its own lag value positively and 
significantly, in the same way as by changes in the SND amount from year t-2 to t-1. 
This result suggests that changes in the SND amount have a positive influence on 
banks’ management and liquidity with time hysteresis. On the other hand, we cannot 
find strong support for the dynamic amount level effect quality of other loans and 
securities investments.  
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Table 3.7 Effects of Changes in SND Amount on Bank Fundamentals  
Table 3.7 shows the regression estimations of changes in bank fundamentals on changes in the Sub-debt amount level with both fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE). The panel sample period is from 1998 to 2009. SND is 
the ratio of the SND amount to total liabilities, SIZE is the natural log of issuing bank’s total assets, Hausman χ2 is adopted to test the appropriateness of the RE estimator with the null hypothesis that the RE estimator is 
consistent. Year dummies are also included to control the year effect. P-values are shown in brackets as ***, **, * indicating significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Capital Ratio Return on Average Assets 
Residential Real Estate 
Loan Ratio 
Commercial and 
Industrial Loans Ratio 
Individual Loan Ratio 
Investment Securities 
Ratio 
Inefficiency Ratio 
Variable  Fixed  Random Fixed Random Fixed  Random fixed  random Fixed Random Fixed  Random Fixed  Random 
△Yi,t-1 
-0.194 -0.0734 -0.3706 0.1273 -0.1832 -0.1069 0.2078 0.4479 -0.4778 -0.0101 -0.2387 0.0098 -0.3282 0.0019 
[0.174] [0.307] [0.010]*** [0.111] [0.246] [0.413] [0.763] [0.439] [0.140] [0.951] [0.050]** [0.715] [0.098]* [0.989] 
△SNDi,t 
-0.0076 0.0022 2.6135 3.7814 -0.0092 -0.0127 -0.1827 -0.0549 2.1527 1.4619 0.0299 0.0124 0.0271 0.0025 
[0.809] [0.833] [0.036]** [0.000]*** [0.754] [0.550] [0.659] [0.848] [0.469] [0.358] [0.356] [0.643] [0.603] [0.934] 
△SNDi,t-1 
0.0161 0.0112 0.2291 0.0099 0.0018 0.0041 -0.048 -0.0077 -0.4523 0.1876 0.0138 0.0064 0.0642 0.0023 
[0.722] [0.713] [0.819] [0.988] [0.953] [0.852] [0.337] [0.857] [0.906] [0.920] [0.796] [0.880] [0.089]* [0.929] 
SIZE 
0.007 -0.0055 -0.344 -0.199 0.001 0.0092 -0.0552 -0.0471 0.0068 -0.0117 0.0228 0.0255 -0.0092 -0.0051 
[0.314] [0.103 [0.390] [0.438] [0.909] [0.195] [0.350] [0.231] [0.901] [0.669] [0.089]* [0.022]** [0.470] [0.560] 
CONS 
-0.0528 0.0343 2.5094 1.0271 -0.0231 -0.036 0.2067 0.2413 -0.0097 0.0648 -0.0641 -0.1126 0.0805 0.0324 
[0.324] [0.234] [0.346] [0.533] [0.693] [0.425] [0.436] [0.285] [0.971] [0.635] [0.460] [0.093]* [0.535] [0.704] 
N 912 912 756 756 480 480 360 360 372 372 720 720 804 804 
Fixed Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2- Within 0.3749 0.1416 0.3475 0.108 0.3077 0.1975 0.2357 0.1319 0.3129 0.1005 0.1924 0.1358 0.3979 0.209 
R2- Between 0.0235 0.2262 0.1833 0.3405 0.112 0.0477 0.0196 0.1186 0.0289 0.1244 0.0044 0.1554 0.1467 0.0104 
R2-Overall 0.0244 0.1699 0.0215 0.2273 0.0998 0.1681 0.0545 0.1309 0.0238 0.0722 0.0168 0.1267 0.0402 0.0929 
F 1.33 - 1.68 - 1.24 - 0.64 - 0.38 - 1.5 - 1.56 - 
Wald-chi - 18.02 - 25.86 - 13.94 - 6.33 - 2.96 - 18.57 - 8.4 
Hausman χ2 83.65*** - 26.4** - - 14.98 - 2.38 - 4.79 - 3.22 24.78** - 
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Table 3.7 Continued 
 Liquidity Ratio Loans to Deposits Ratio Deposit Ratio 
Variable  Fixed  Random Fixed  Random Fixed  Random 
△Yi,t-1 
0.2185 0.1024 -0.0256 -0.0108 -0.123 -0.0306 
[0.507] [0.059]* [0.334] [0.613] [0.315] [0.653] 
△SNDi,t 
0.4326 -0.6941 -3.3867 -3.7043 1.1304 1.0472 
[0.854] [0.387] [0.205] [0.075]* [0.207] [0.117] 
△SNDi,t-1 
-1.0062 0.6091 0.0857 0.0467 -0.0071 0.017 
[0.598] [0.088]* [0.307] [0.480] [0.808] [0.378] 
SIZE 
-0.0216 -0.0078 0.0252 0.0105 -0.0104 -0.0122 
[0.657] [0.609] [0.579] [0.779] [0.435] [0.235] 
CONS 
0.0586 0.0391 -0.0372 -0.1401 0.027 0.0747 
[0.757] [0.630] [0.907] [0.601] [0.718] [0.316] 
N 780 780 516 516 504 504 
Fixed Year Yes Yes Yes 
R2- Within 0.6491 0.2407 0.2372 0.1994 0.2435 0.1845 
R2- Between 0.003 0.3464 0.0107 0.1003 0.0135 0.0192 
R2-Overall 0.0697 0.3576 0.0871 0.1452 0.0729 0.1246 
F 0.62 - 0.93 - 0.87 - 
Wald-chi - 21.15* - 13.45 - 9.97 
Hausman χ2 - 9.75 31.22** - - 9.25 
 
We also explore whether the changes on sub-debt interests affect bank 
fundamentals. The results are shown in Table 3.8. We cannot find strong evidence to 
substantiate the notion that the dynamics of sub-debt interest levels affect banks’ 
capital ratio significantly. However, we find that changes in ROA are positive and 
significantly affected by changes in interest. Moreover, sub-debt interest dynamics 
have negative and statistically significant effects on the deposit ratio. We can 
conclude that the dynamics of sub-debt interest levels have a strong disciplinary force 
upon issuing banks’ deposit-related liquidity characteristics and capital adequacy. 
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Table 3.8 Effects of Changes in SND Interest on Bank Fundamentals  
Table 3.8 shows the regression estimations of changes in bank fundamentals on changes in the Sub-debt amount level with both fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE). The panel sample period is from 1998 to 2009. Interest is 
the change in the SND interest level from time t-1 to t, SIZE is natural log of issuing bank’s total assets, Hausman χ2 is adopted to test the appropriateness of RE estimator with the null hypothesis that the RE estimator is consistent. 
Year dummies are also included to control the year effect. P-values are shown in brackets as ***, **, * indicating significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Capital Ratio Return on Average Assets 
Residential Real Estate 
Loan Ratio 
Commercial and 
Industrial Loans Ratio 
Individual Loan Ratio 
Investment Securities 
Ratio 
Inefficiency Ratio 
Variable  FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE 
△Yi,t-1 
-0.1116 -0.0697 -0.4636 0.0944 -0.2045 -0.1187 0.2736 0.3701 -0.4768 0.0131 -0.2499 0.0097 -0.3192 0.0018 
[0.407] [0.311] [0.001]*** [0.266] [0.172] [0.351] [0.697] [0.511] [0.146] [0.934] [0.043]** [0.718] [0.122] [0.990] 
△Intersti,t 
0.235 0.0036 10.7529 4.5528 -0.0469 -0.0108 0.4122 0.2083 0.2182 0.1559 -0.0464 -0.014 -0.1213 -0.0057 
[0.244] [0.950] [0.196] [0.346] [0.257] [0.745] [0.377] [0.461] [0.863] [0.713] [0.551] [0.800] [0.627] [0.891] 
△Intersti,t-1 
0.053 0.0634 13.5163 11.8175 -0.0086 0.0388 0.0223 -0.2086 -0.6868 -0.7435 -0.0602 -0.0289 0.0271 0.0885 
[0.251] [0.054] [0.094]* [0.025]** [0.849] [0.270] [0.922] [0.161] [0.607] [0.263] [0.445] [0.590] [0.960] [0.787] 
SIZE 
0.0069 -0.0063 -0.4476 -0.1549 0.0009 0.0105 -0.0399 -0.0339 -0.0097 -0.0185 0.022 0.0253 -0.0059 -0.0054 
[0.262] [0.053]* [0.275] [0.583] [0.922] [0.141] [0.413] [0.379] [0.872] [0.504] [0.107] [0.023]** [0.666] [0.530] 
CONS 
-0.0497 0.0373 1.4957 0.8644 -0.0276 -0.0436 0.1057 0.1726 0.1136 0.0987 -0.1065 -0.1118 0.0636 0.0319 
[0.304] [0.180] [0.574] [0.633] [0.629] [0.337] [0.611] [0.441] [0.677] [0.471] [0.168] [0.098]* [0.639] [0.706] 
N 912 912 756 756 480 480 360 360 372 372 720 720 804 804 
Fixed Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2- Within 0.4149 0.1716 0.3391 0.0247 0.3289 0.2039 0.2291 0.1309 0.2976 0.0866 0.1949 0.1332 0.3468 0.2038 
R2-Between 0.0034 0.2383 0.1595 0.1811 0.1228 0.0579 0.0007 0.4149 0.0003 0.1769 0.0067 0.1513 0.0756 0.0084 
R2-Overall 0.0343 0.197 0.0022 0.0964 0.0953 0.1794 0.0658 0.178 0.0309 0.0832 0.0144 0.1262 0.0396 0.0938 
F 1.72 - 1.62 - 1.37 - 0.62 - 0.35 - 1.38 - 1.25 - 
Wald-chi - 22.37 - 9.38 - 15.09 - 9.1 - 3.45 - 18.34 - 8.6 
Hausman χ2 32.01*** - 40.20*** - - 16.79 - 7.03 - 5.03 - 7.85 - 16.86 
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Table 3.8 Continued 
 Liquidity Ratio Loans to Deposits Ratio Deposit Ratio 
Variable  FE RE FE RE FE RE 
△Yi,t-1 
-0.13 0.0784 -0.0285 -0.0064 -0.1929 0.09 
[0.788] [0.096]* [0.327] [0.774] [0.108]* [0.288] 
△Interesti,t 
0.8895 -0.2755 0.0236 -0.3337 -0.9191 -0.2557 
[0.594] [0.588] [0.971] [0.458] [0.078]* [0.033]** 
△Intersti,t-1 
-2.2976 -0.0822 -1.6606 -1.3916 -1.1778 -0.0863 
[0.482] [0.867] [0.402] [0.322] [0.035]** [0.837] 
SIZE 
0.0406 -0.0066 0.0373 0.0161 -0.0068 -0.0151 
[0.622] [0.667] [0.460] [0.683] [0.592] [0.136] 
CONS 
-0.1774 0.0401 -0.1157 -0.1267 0.0038 0.0847 
[0.792] [0.625] [0.726] [0.641] [0.957] [0.247] 
N 780 780 516 516 504 504 
Fixed Year Yes Yes Yes 
R2- Within 0.658 0.324 0.1961 0.1623 0.3245 0.1201 
R2 -Between 0.0652 0.2438 0.0106 0.0986 0.1376 0.21 
R2 -Overall 0.017 0.3188 0.0772 0.1266 0.0581 0.1428 
F 0.89 - 0.73 - 1.3 - 
Wald-chi - 20.13 - 11.14 - 11.66 
Hausman χ2 - 10.62 27.91** - - 14.38 
 
As a robust check we combine all explanatory variables (both changes in SND 
amounts and interests) in one regression model, and results are shown in Table 3.9. 
Consistent with previous results, ROA has a positive coefficient with changes in the 
amount with a 5% level significant sign. The inefficiency ratio is positively and 
statistically related to changes in the amount from year t-2 to t-1. Deposit-related 
liquidity variables are also affected by changes in SND. The loans to the deposit ratio 
has a negative and statistically significant relation with amount changes from the 
previous year, and the deposit ratio also shows a negative coefficient with changes in 
interest level with a 10% level statistically significance. There is no strong evidence to 
argue that changes in SND market signals have significant impacts on loan portfolio 
variables. The investment securities ratio show a positive and statistically significant 
coefficient with size, as well as in Table 3.7 and 3.8, implying investment securities 
are more sensitive to banks’ size than other fundamentals.  
  
    Surprisingly, the capital ratio has a positive and statistically significant 
coefficient with the changes in interest from time t-2 to t-1, indicating interest changes 
enhance issuing banks’ capital adequacy. The statistically significant coefficients on 
the dynamic amount (with the value of 5.2198), the changes in interest from year t-1 
to t (with the value of 7.9272), and the interest dynamic from t-2 to t-1 (with the value 
of 8.7876) suggest that the liquidity ratio is significantly affected by changes in SND 
amounts and interests. The deposit ratio has a negative coefficient with changes in 
interest from year t-2 to t-1 with a 5% level statistically significant sign. These results 
indicate that changes in SND market signals, particularly interests, have both a 
long-term and short-term influence on banks’ liquidity and deposit-related 
characteristics.  
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Table 3.9 Effects of Changes in SND Amount and Interest on Bank Fundamentals 
Table 3.9 shows the regression estimations of changes in bank fundamentals on changes in the Sub-debt amount level and interest level with both fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE). The panel sample period is 
from 1998 to 2009. SND is the changes in the SND amount from time t-1 to t, Interest is the changes in the SND interest level from time t-1 to t , SIZE is the natural log of issuing bank’s total assets, Hausman χ2 is adopted 
to test the appropriateness of the RE estimator with the null hypothesis that the RE estimator is consistent. Year dummies are also included to control the year effect. P-values are shown in brackets as ***, **, * indicating 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Capital Ratio Return on Average Assets 
Residential Real Estate 
Loan Ratio 
Commercial and 
Industrial Loans Ratio 
Individual Loan Ratio 
Investment Securities 
Ratio 
Inefficiency Ratio 
Variable  FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE 
△Yi,t-1 
-0.0699 -0.0736 -0.4099 0.124 -0.19 -0.1044 0.2563 0.3386 -0.3927 0.0344 -0.2479 0.0097 -0.3222 0.0011 
[0.641] [0.302] [0.004]*** [0.116] [0.235] [0.427] [0.722] [0.561] [0.288] [0.840] [0.048]** [0.721] [0.117] [0.994] 
△SNDi,t 
-0.0231 -0.0004 2.6414 3.6069 -0.0097 -0.0118 0.0554 0.0964 1.9525 1.1999 0.0319 0.0122 0.0239 0.0013 
[0.466] [0.967] [0.032]** [0.000]*** [0.744] [0.582] [0.916] [0.780] [0.548] [0.465] [0.336] [0.652] [0.658] [0.965] 
△SNDi,t-1 
0.0199 0.0126 0.6294 0.011 -0.0003 0.0042 -0.0569 -0.0114 -2.8362 -0.6419 0.0115 0.0056 0.0638 0.0022 
[0.651] [0.674] [0.527] [0.987] [0.999] [0.847] [0.275] [0.791] [0.607] [0.752] [0.833] [0.895] [0.102]* [0.926] 
△Intersti,t 
0.0263 0.003 12.5678 4.9009 -0.0474 -0.0111 0.5333 0.2667 0.2918 0.1071 -0.0465 -0.0134 -0.1011 -0.0058 
[0.214] [0.959] [0.127] [0.266] [0.267] [0.741] [0.317] [0.446] [0.832] [0.806] [0.554] [0.811] [0.683] [0.892] 
△Intersti,t-1 
0.0772 0.0661 11.7384 9.0658 -0.0104 0.0379 0.0347 -0.2104 -1.1975 -0.7853 -0.0608 -0.0287 0.0951 0.0864 
[0.142] [0.052]* [0.136] [0.061]* [0.962] [0.287] [0.888] [0.167] [0.526] [0.285] [0.444] [0.596] [0.860] [0.797] 
SIZE 
0.0073 -0.0069 -0.5382 -0.3146 0.0004 0.0105 -0.0364 -0.0281 -0.0042 -0.0166 0.0213 0.0254 -0.0114 -0.0055 
[0.276] [0.044]** [0.184] [0.226] [0.962] [0.148] [0.585] [0.518] [0.951] [0.561] [0.126] [0.028]** [0.419] [0.537] 
CONS 
-0.0548 0.0412 2.0856 1.6465 -0.0255 -0.0436 0.084 0.1411 0.0672 0.0876 -0.0584 -0.1125 0.0928 0.0324 
[0.292] [0.153] [0.422] [0.320] [0.669] [0.343] [0.790] [0.570] [0.833] [0.537] [0.513] [0.106] [0.496] [0.708] 
N 912 912 756 756 480 480 360 360 372 372 720 720 804 804 
Fixed Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2- Within 0.4557 0.18 0.414 0.1574 0.3309 0.2035 0.2691 0.1433 0.3533 0.1226 0.2011 0.139 0.402 0.2107 
R2-Between 0.0025 0.2407 0.0541 0.3437 0.131 0.0627 0.0047 0.3907 0.0001 0.1561 0.0054 0.144 0.1021 0.0093 
R2 Overall 0.0284 0.2049 0.0484 0.2673 0.0949 0.1832 0.059 0.1809 0.0469 0.101 0.016 0.1279 0.0384 0.0939 
F 1.52 - 1.84 - 1.14 - 0.6 - 0.31 - 1.31 - 1.3 - 
Wald-chi - 22.18 - 31.38** - 15.03 - 8.84 - 4.05 - 18.19 - 8.29 
Hausman χ2  6.62 28.71**   15.55  12.48  4.45  3.32 22.78*  
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Table 3.9 Continued  
 Liquidity Ratio Loans to Deposits Ratio Deposit Ratio 
Variable  FE RE FE RE FE RE 
△Yi,t-1 
-1.8249 0.1089 -0.0264 -0.006 -0.1853 0.085 
[0.153]** [0.065]* [0.358] [0.785] [0.128] [0.317] 
△SNDi,t 
1.3928 -0.7686 -4.0024 -3.5722 0.6626 1.1065 
[0.481] [0.367] [0.159] [0.096]* [0.446] [0.091]* 
△SNDi,t-1 
-5.2198 0.5815 0.0859 0.0512 -0.0232 0.0168 
[0.123]** [0.121] [0.314] [0.442] [0.425] [0.373] 
△Intersti,t 
7.9272 -0.2215 0.3635 -0.1167 -0.9409 -0.2535 
[0.135]** [0.723] [0.585] [0.799] [0.087]* [0.026]** 
△Intersti,t-1 
-8.7876 0.0215 -1.9032 -1.5704 -1.1716 -0.0554 
[0.133]** [0.968] [0.335] [0.261] [0.041]** [0.894] 
SIZE 
0.1055 -0.0108 0.0458 0.022 -0.0087 -0.0156 
[0.271] [0.552] [0.361] [0.574] [0.505] [0.123] 
CONS 
-0.32 0.0545 -0.1046 -0.1596 0.0048 0.0898 
[0.312] [0.570] [0.750] [0.556] [0.948] [0.220] 
N 780 780 516 516 504 504 
Fixed Year Yes Yes Yes 
R2- Within 0.9203 0.2464 0.2596 0.2226 0.3518 0.1605 
R2-Between 0.0797 0.3391 0.019 0.1047 0.1327 0.2335 
R2-Overall 0.0266 0.3598 0.0971 0.1526 0.0598 0.1862 
F 1.65 - 0.86 - 1.22 - 
Wald-chi - 20.24 - 14.93 - 15.56 
Hausman χ2 31.90*** - - 4.99 23.78* - 
Table 3.10 shows the results of regression 6 investigating the dummy variables 
that represent the increase of sub-debt amount levels. D1 takes 1 if SND amount 
levels increase from t-1 to t, 0 otherwise. D2 takes 1 if SND amount levels increase 
from t-2 to t-1. D1 has a negative and 10% level significant coefficient with the 
changes of investment securities ratio (with the value of 0.0321). D2 has a negative 
and 5% level significant coefficient with changes in the individual loans ratio. These 
results indicate that the increase of SND amount levels negatively affect issuing banks’ 
loan portfolio and investment securities. Furthermore, changes in the liquidity ratio 
also have a negative coefficient with D2, with 5% level statistical significance, 
suggesting that an increase of the SND amount negatively affects liquidity. All 
estimations are calculated with random effects (RE), as suggested by the statistic of 
Hausman tests. 
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Table 3.10 Results of Amount Change Dummy Variables Estimation 
Table 3.10 shows the regression estimations of changes in bank fundamentals on changes in the Sub-debt amount level and dummy variables with both fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE). The panel sample period 
is from 1998 to 2009. SND is the change in the SND amount from time t-1 to t, D1 takes 1 if the SND amount increases from t-1 to t, 0 otherwise; D2 takes 1 if the SND amount increases from t-2 to t-1, 0 otherwise; SIZE 
is the natural log of issuing bank’s total assets, Hausman χ2 is adopted to test the appropriateness of the RE estimator with the null hypothesis that the RE estimator is consistent. Year dummies are also included to control 
the year effect. P-values are shown in brackets as ***, **, * indicating significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Capital Ratio Return on Average Assets 
Residential Real Estate 
Loan Ratio 
Commercial and 
Industrial Loans Ratio 
Individual Loan Ratio 
Investment Securities 
Ratio 
Inefficiency Ratio 
Variable  FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE 
△Yi,t-1 
-0.1879 -0.0801 -0.3866 0.1289 -0.1768 -0.1076 0.5707 0.4234 -0.4359 -0.0152 -0.2289 0.0168 -0.3368 -0.0044 
[0.194] [0.264] [0.008]*** [0.107] [0.287] [0.417] [0.426] [0.482] [0.162] [0.924] [0.068]* [0.530] [0.091]* [0.976] 
△SNDi,t 
-0.0264 -0.0029 1.9056 3.4633 -0.0116 -0.0092 -0.4406 -0.0828 2.8157 1.6769 0.0462 0.0278 0.0507 -0.0032 
[0.457] [0.781] [0.143] [0.000]*** [0.724] [0.688] [0.323] [0.791] [0.479] [0.431] [0.174] [0.316] [0.371] [0.920] 
D1 
0.0147 0.0113 1.326 0.7257 0.0032 -0.0029 0.0567 0.0083 -0.0429 -0.0088 -0.0257 -0.0321 -0.0395 0.0048 
[0.226] [0.096]* [0.116] [0.169] [0.883] [0.828] [0.113] [0.743] [0.566] [0.815] [0.230] [0.055]* [0.148] [0.770] 
△SNDi,t-1 
0.002 0.0004 0.0929 0.1895 0.002 0.0094 -0.0816 0.0016 5.4447 3.6886 0.0227 0.0036 0.0636 -0.0022 
[0.967] [0.991] [0.929] [0.785] [0.950] [0.685] [0.174] [0.971] [0.248] [0.123] [0.674] [0.933] [0.106]* [0.927] 
D2 
0.0042 0.0054 0.4817 -0.4022 -0.0027 -0.0096 0.0364 -0.0145 -0.1563 -0.0812 -0.0309 -0.0129 -0.0019 0.0102 
[0.736] [0.435] [0.529] [0.443] [0.902] [0.448] [0.358] [0.587] [0.064]** [0.027]** [0.163] [0.439] [0.939] [0.530] 
SIZE 
0.0067 -0.0049 -0.3858 -0.1976 0.0011 0.0097 -0.0714 -0.0463 0.0265 0.0022 0.0223 0.0243 -0.0072 -0.0052 
[0.376] [0.139] [0.334] [0.440] [0.902] [0.181] [0.228] [0.253] [0.602] [0.935] [0.097]* [0.027]** [0.574] [0.553] 
CONS 
-0.0566 0.0232 1.6192 0.8559 -0.0235 -0.033 0.4627 0.2528 -0.0647 0.0502 -0.0323 -0.0749 0.0487 0.0231 
[0.344] [0.431] [0.551] [0.615] [0.716] [0.475] [0.172] [0.275] [0.845] [0.714] [0.715] [0.285] [0.712] [0.793] 
N 912 912 756 756 480 480 360 360 372 372 720 720 804 804 
Fixed Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2- Within 0.4063 0.1684 0.3895 0.1347 0.3091 0.1972 0.3223 0.1374 0.5643 0.305 0.2187 0.1627 0.4425 0.1994 
R2-Between 0.0025 0.251 0.1261 0.4017 0.1291 0.0706 0.0442 0.0968 0.0064 0.084 0.0041 0.1357 0.2057 0.0044 
R2 -Overall 0.0423 0.2017 0.0259 0.2503 0.1014 0.1752 0.0189 0.1386 0.1024 0.1834 0.0249 0.1533 0.0341 0.0979 
F 1.24 - 1.66 - 1.03 - 0.78 - 0.74 - 1.49 - 1.54 - 
Wald-chi - 21.73 - 28.71** - 14.23 - 6.43 - 8.09 - 22.81 - 8.69 
Hausman χ2 43.66*** -- 27.83* - - 14.03 - 16.38 - 7.91 - 5.79 29.34** - 
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Table 3.10 Continued 
 
Liquidity Ratio Loans to Deposits Ratio Deposit Ratio 
Variable  FE RE FE RE FE RE 
△Yi,t-1 
0.2809 0.1031 -0.0209 -0.0085 -0.0809 -0.0261 
[0.593] [0.061] [0.451] [0.694] [0.516] [0.707] 
△SNDi,t 
-2.4868 -0.3828 -5.7168 -6.2609 -0.5586 0.6633 
[0.623] [0.650] [0.191] [0.032]** [0.665] [0.455] 
D1 
0.076 -0.0063 0.0453 0.0617 0.0403 0.0089 
[0.506] [0.728] [0.508] [0.205] [0.089]* [0.547] 
△SNDi,t-1 
-0.3907 0.9492 0.0868 0.0471 -0.0055 0.0192 
[0.924] [0.011]** [0.325] [0.490] [0.850] [0.340] 
D2 
-0.0195 -0.0394 -0.0148 -0.0054 0.0043 -0.0025 
[0.860] [0.011]** [0.772] [0.885] [0.790] [0.825] 
SIZE 
0.0036 -0.0052 0.0236 0.0068 -0.0051 -0.0111 
[0.959] [0.720] [0.611] [0.855] [0.704] [0.287] 
CONS 
0.3208 0.0489 -0.1591 -0.1177 0.0144 0.0708 
[0.793] [0.525] [0.580] [0.664] [0.865] [0.354] 
N 780 780 516 516 504 504 
Fixed Year Yes Yes Yes 
R2- Within 0.7447 0.398 0.2474 0.2125 0.3057 0.2165 
R2-Between 0.04 0.4109 0.0385 0.1248 0.0104 0.003 
R2- Overall 0.0688 0.455 0.1135 0.1669 0.0674 0.1308 
F 0.42 - 0.81 - 0.99 - 
Wald-chi - 30.05** - 14.9 - 10.33 
Hausman χ2 - 8.09 - 4.13 - 20.53 
 
Compared with the changes of the sub-debt amount levels, the increase of the 
interest levels has more disciplining power upon the capital, loans and liquidity. Table 
3.11 shows the results of regression 7 investigating the dummy variables that 
represent the increase of SND interest levels. D3 has a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient with the changes of capital ratio (with the value of 0.0182), as 
well as with the changes of Residential Real Estate Loans ratio (with the value of 
0.0399). On the contrary, D3 has a negative coefficient with changes in the liquidity 
ratio, showing a 10% level statistical significance. D4, which represents the increase 
of the SND interest from year t-2 to t-1, has negative and 5% level statistically 
significant coefficients with the changes of ROA and the loans to the deposit ratio 
(with the values of 1.9871 and 0.1215, respectively). These results indicate that an 
  
increase of the SND interest has timely disciplinary effects on the capital adequacy 
and some loan portfolios, and a negative influence on liquidity.  
In sum, the one-year-lagged increases of subordinated debt amount levels and 
interest levels have significant effects on changes in the issuing banks’ liquidity. A 
surge in the SND amount has more disciplinary power on issuing banks’ quality of 
loans and securities investments than on other fundamentals. The increases in the 
SND interest, on the other hand, has more influence on the issuing banks’ capital 
adequacy, residential real estate loans and deposit-related liquidity characteristic than 
on other fundamentals. Changes in both SND market signals provide long-term and 
short-term discipline.  
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Table 3.11 Results of Interest Change Dummy Variables Estimation 
Table 3.11 shows the regression estimations of changes in bank fundamentals on changes in the Sub-debt interest level and dummy variables with both fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE). The panel sample period 
is from 1998 to 2009. Interest is the change in SND interest from time t-1 to t, D3 takes 1 if the SND interest increases from t-1 to t, 0 otherwise; D4 takes 1 if the SND interest increase from t-2 to t-1, 0 otherwise; SIZE is 
the natural log of issuing bank’s total assets, Hausman χ2 is adopted to test the appropriateness of the RE estimator with the null hypothesis that the RE estimator is consistent. Year dummies are also included to control the 
year effect. P-values are shown in brackets as ***, **, * indicating significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Some results are omitted because of collinearity. 
 
Capital Ratio Return on Average Assets 
Residential Real Estate 
Loan Ratio 
Commercial and 
Industrial Loans Ratio 
Individual Loan Ratio 
Investment Securities 
Ratio 
Inefficiency Ratio 
Variable  FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE 
△Yi,t-1 
-0.0829 -0.0789 -0.5283 0.0925 -0.2059 -0.1188 0.2736 0.3701 -0.4768 0.0131 -0.2522 0.0096 -0.3467 0.0107 
[0.534] [0.253] [0.000]*** [0.278] [0.153] [0.354] [0.697] [0.511] [0.146] [0.934] [0.044]** [0.724] [0.115] [0.940] 
△Intersti,t 
0.0547 0.0041 6.6344 3.8339 -0.0628 -0.0191 0.4122 0.2083 0.2182 0.1559 0.0361 0.0392 -0.1376 0.0005 
[0.815] [0.945] [0.449] [0.470] [0.123] [0.575] [0.377] [0.461] [0.863] [0.713] [0.761] [0.655] [0.594] [0.991] 
D3 
0.0182 0.0053 -0.3345 0.0407 0.0399 0.0136 
Omitted Omitted Omitted  Omitted  
-0.2058 -0.1189 0.0133 -0.0153 
[0.077]* [0.416] [0.656] [0.948] [0.030]** [0.284] [0.358] [0.433] [0.674] [0.338] 
△Intersti,t-1 
0.0397 0.0518 17.2776 13.1558 0.0071 0.0449 0.0223 -0.2086 -0.6868 -0.7435 -0.0384 -0.0335 -0.1822 0.2293 
[0.382] [0.122] [0.034]** [0.016]** [0.872] [0.211] [0.922] [0.161] [0.607] [0.263] [0.756] [0.694] [0.813] [0.557] 
D4 
0.0134 0.0084 -1.9871 -0.6652 -0.0002 -0.0024 
Omitted  Omitted  Omitted  Omitted  
-0.0705 0.011 0.0139 -0.012 
[0.100] [0.185] [0.039]** [0.291] [0.992] [0.854] [0.762] [0.943] [0.679] [0.524] 
SIZE 
0.0076 -0.0059 -0.1838 -0.1152 0.0002 0.0109 -0.0399 -0.0339 -0.0097 -0.0185 0.0231 0.0259 -0.0053 -0.0055 
[0.219] [0.066]* [0.658] [0.688] [0.984] [0.138] [0.413] [0.379] [0.872] [0.504] [0.096]* [0.021]** [0.711] [0.530] 
CONS 
-0.066 0.0296 0.1469 0.6345 -0.0456 -0.0539 0.1057 0.1726 0.1135 0.0986 -0.1079 -0.1152 0.0585 0.0403 
[0.168] [0.291] [0.956] [0.735] [0.449] [0.304] [0.611] [0.441] [0.677] [0.471] [0.166] [0.091]* [0.677] [0.643] 
N 912 912 756 756 480 480 360 360 372 372 760 760 804 804 
Fixed Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2- Within 0.4977 0.2408 0.408 0.042 0.4132 0.2526 0.2291 0.1309 0.2976 0.0866 0.2038 0.139 0.3545 0.1738 
R2-Between 0.0193 0.2111 0.1689 0.1871 0.1714 0.0245 0.0007 0.4149 0.0003 0.1769 0.0051 0.1493 0.0839 0.0002 
R2-Overall 0.0406 0.2117 0.0033 0.1081 0.1062 0.1941 0.0658 0.178 0.0309 0.0832 0.0167 0.1305 0.0308 0.1081 
F 1.98 - 1.79 - 1.63 - 0.62 - 0.35 - 1.25 - 1.06 - 
Wald-chi - 24.69 - 10.42 - 16.14 - 9.1 - 3.45 - 18.76 - 9.81 
Hausman χ2 22.67 - 184.79*** - 34.06*** - - 7.03 - 5.03 - 8.4 - 15.78 
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Table 3.11 Continued  
 Liquidity Ratio Loans to Deposits Ratio Deposit Ratio 
Variable 
FE RE FE RE FE RE 
△Yi,t-1 
0.4395 0.0736 -0.0348 -0.0064 -0.1758 0.089 
[0.435] [0.128] [0.239] [0.773] [0.152] [0.290] 
△Intersti,t 
6.2806 -0.1075 0.6291 -0.4654 -0.3998 -0.2109 
[0.132]* [0.879] [0.460] [0.351] [0.521] [0.069]* 
D3 
-0.2014 -0.0074 -0.0971 -0.0325 -0.0288 -0.0173 
[0.136]* [0.731] [0.163] [0.466] [0.141] [0.125] 
△Intersti,t-1 
3.2169 -0.4139 -0.4049 2.2601 -0.7354 -0.4382 
[0.464] [0.549] [0.887] [0.207] [0.288] [0.465] 
D4 
-0.0131 0.01712 -0.0326 -0.1215 -0.0211 0.0109 
[0.825] [0.468] [0.678] [0.016]** [0.270] [0.483] 
SIZE 
-0.0863 -0.0041 0.0109 -0.0024 -0.0029 -0.0172 
[0.430] [0.799] [0.839] [0.953] [0.822] [0.090]* 
CONS 
1.152 0.0323 -0.0977 -0.0072 0.0244 0.0962 
[0.277] [0.707] [0.774] [0.978] [0.746] [0.189] 
N 780 780 516 516 504 504 
Fixed Year Yes Yes Yes 
R2- Within 0.8213 0.2649 0.241 0.1166 0.3763 0.1667 
R2-Between 0.0158 0.287 0.0342 0.3228 0.0984 0.2489 
R2- Overall 0.0001 0.3285 0.1085 0.2158 0.0702 0.1791 
F 1.23 - 0.78 - 1.36 - 
Wald-chi - 20.06 - 18.99 - 14.84 
Hausman χ2 24.82** - - 12.24 - 21.65 
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3.6.3 Effects of Sub-debt Market Signals on Fundamentals of Big 
Banks  
In this section, it is examined whether sub-debt can exert stronger market 
discipline on bigger banks. For this purpose, we introduce the Large Bank dummy, 
which is a dummy variable that takes 1 if the size (natural logarithm of total assets) 
for the bank is greater than the median size for the sample. The partial results are 
reported in Table 3.12. We estimate the parameters with both fixed effects (FE) and 
random effects (RE), and then adopt a Hausman test to examine the appropriateness 
of the RE estimator with the null hypothesis that the RE estimator is consistent. The 
estimated parameters for one-year-lagged fundamentals, SND characteristics, and 
Hausman χ2 are not reported in Table 3.12. 
Size has a negative and 1% level statistically significant coefficients with ROA 
and the individual loans ratio. The size dummy shows positive and significant signs 
with the individual loans ratio and deposits ratio. These results indicate that individual 
investors are more sensitive to the banks’ size than institution investors. Panel B in 
Table 3.12 presents the estimated results of the size. The size dummy in the regression 
of bank fundamentals on SND interests shows similar conclusions. Size is negatively 
related to capital adequacy, and positively affects other loan portfolios (such as 
residential real estate loans and individual loans). These results indicate that when 
large banks issue more subordinated debt and pay higher interest, investors are 
sensitive to issuers’ capital adequacy and earning, and use other loans as alternative 
portfolios. Surprisingly, the deposit ratio has negative and significant coefficients with 
size and size dummy, in both regressions on SND amount and interest, suggesting that 
investors are sensitive to issuers’ risk taking behaviour. Therefore the market is taking 
disciplinary actions. 
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Table 3.12 Effects of Sub-debt on Fundamentals for Large Banks  
Table 3.12 shows the partial regression estimations of bank fundamentals on the Sub-debt amount and interest levels for large banks with both fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE). The panel 
sample period is from 1997 to 2009. SIZE is the natural log of issuing bank’s total assets; Size Dummy is a dummy variable which takes 1 if the size (natural logarithm of total assets) is greater than the 
median size for the sample. Hausman χ2 is adopted to test the appropriateness of the RE estimator with the null hypothesis that the RE estimator is consistent and the result is not reported. Year 
dummies are also included to control the year effect. P-values are shown in brackets as ***, **, * indicating significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
Variable  Capital Ratio ROA 
Residential 
Real Estate 
Loans Ratio 
Commercial 
and Industrial 
Loans Ratio 
Individual 
Loans Ratio 
Investment 
Securities 
Ratio 
Inefficiency 
Ratio 
Liquidity 
Ratio 
Loans to 
Deposits Ratio 
Deposits Ratio 
Panel A  Size dummy in the regression of bank fundamentals on sub-debt amount  
Size  -0.0375 -2.4493 0.0418 0.0249 -0.1563 0.124 -0.0139 0.0862 -0.7722 -0.1174 
 [0.154] [0.001]*** [0.111] [0.524] [0.002]*** [0.154] [0.151] [0.127] [0.159] [0.003]*** 
Size Dummy -0.3266 -1.9772 -0.0293 -0.0151 0.3055 -0.0869 0.0054 -0.1253 1.6909 -0.1555 
 [0.000]*** [0.100]* [0.423] [0.766] [0.000]*** [0.393] [0.808] [0.165] [0.376] [0.000]*** 
CONS 0.0637 15.1473 0.1163 0.0489 0.6481 0.2036 0.0586 0.0369 2.7549 0.7512 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.292] [0.766] [0.008]*** [0.601] [0.233] [0.873] [0.319] [0.000]*** 
N 988 819 520 390 403 780 871 845 559 546 
Fixed Year YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
FE/RE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE RE FE 
R2-Within 0.8511 0.2994 0.4794 0.4719 0.3467 0.0662 0.2353 0.2132 0.0577 0.6764 
R2-Between 0.6899 0.2347 0.9611 0.8753 0.7643 0.0292 0.0024 0.3197 0.2379 0.8258 
R2-Overall 0.7202 0.1923 0.9238 0.7595 0.7793 0.0523 0.0627 0.4384 0.0804 0.7851 
F 17.34*** 5.95*** 9.21*** 5.64*** 3.38*** 1.08 1.29 3.17*** - 23.13*** 
Wald  - - - - - - - - 15.92 - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          
  
 
 Table 3.12 Continued 
Variable  Capital Ratio ROA 
Residential 
Real Estate 
Loans Ratio 
Commercial 
and Industrial 
Loans Ratio 
Individual 
Loans Ratio 
Investment 
Securities 
Ratio 
Inefficiency 
Ratio 
Liquidity 
Ratio 
Loans to 
Deposits Ratio 
Deposits Ratio 
Panel B Size dummy in the regression of bank fundamentals on sub-debt interest 
Size  -0.0386 -2.5514 0.0481 0.0156 -0.1543 0.1259 -0.1356 -0.0318 -0.7799 -0.1118 
 [0.107] [0.001]*** [0.063]* [0.685] [0.002]*** [0.150] [0.164] [0.565] [0.155] [0.004]*** 
Size Dummy -0.2479 -1.6982 -0.0335 -0.0241 0.3071 -0.1029 0.0049 0.0657 1.7348 -0.1597 
 [0.002]*** [0.187] [0.369] [0.665] [0.000]*** [0.244] [0.820] [0.477] [0.242] [0.000]*** 
CONS 0.4118 15.4773 0.1489 0.0077 0.6318 0.1883 0.1168 0.3107 2.688 0.7161 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.170] [0.962] [0.014]** [0.626] [0.005]*** [0.150] [0.281] [0.000]*** 
N 988 819 520 390 403 780 871 845 559 546 
Fixed Year YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
FE/RE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE RE FE 
R2-Within 0.8485 0.2523 0.4756 0.4682 0.3464 0.0659 0.2398 0.3926 0.0576 0.6748 
R2-Between 0.6261 0.2788 0.9634 0.9253 0.7708 0.0745 0.0007 0.9086 0.2383 0.8375 
R2-Overall 0.6792 0.2019 0.929 0.7833 0.7849 0.0631 0.0562 0.7579 0.0805 0.7944 
F 17.86*** 4.7*** 9.07*** 5.56*** 3.38*** 1.07 1.34 7.72*** - 22.97*** 
Wald  - - - - - - - - 15.94 - 
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Table 3.14 shows the size effects in the regressions of bank fundamentals on the 
changes in SND amounts and interests. Size has positive and 5% level statistically 
significant coefficients with the changes in the investment securities ratio, in both 
regressions on SND amounts and interests. Furthermore, in both of the regressions 
size dummies have positive and statistically significant coefficients with changes in 
the liquidity ratio. Besides, size has a negative impact on the liquidity ratio and 
deposit ratios (with the values of 0.0427 and 0.0255, under the changes in sub-debt 
amount and interest, respectively). These results indicate that for big banks, the 
changes in the subordinated debt amount and interest provide greater driving strength 
to market discipline, especially on investment and deposit-related liquidity.  
This analysis is to a large degree consonant with studies on the impact of size on 
the deposit ratio, as well as with analyzes on the market discipline of the banking 
industry (e.g. Brown and Dinc (2011)). Hypothetically, size and large size dummy 
should have positive and significant coefficients with the deposit ratio and changes in 
the deposit ratio. However, in our results the coefficients are negative. The potential 
explanation for this unexpected outcome is that in the UK market there are few crucial 
international banks that need to be concerned.  
On one hand, as shown in Table 3.13, these large banks issued a substantial part 
of the subordinated debt. 
RBS Group is the largest group in Scotland, and at its earlier peak it was the 
second largest in the UK and Europe and the fifth largest in the world by market 
capitalization. National Westminster Bank was one of the “big four” English clearing 
banks, and became one of the subsidiaries of RBS Group in 2000. Lloyds TSB is not 
only one of the “big four” banks in the UK, but also one of the oldest banks in the UK, 
and merged with HBOS in 2008. Northern Rock is a special case. In the last decade 
  
Northern Rock had converted from a mutual building society whose activities were 
limited by regulation, to retail deposits and mortgages. In 2007, it suffered the first 
bank run that the UK had experienced in over 140 years, following problems in the 
credit markets caused by the US subprime mortgage financial crisis. In 2008, the bank 
was nationalized. 
On the other hand, investors (depositors, loans borrowers, shareholders, etc) who 
are concerned about these banks’ risk-taking behaviour, particularly focus on capital 
adequacy and liquidity through sub-debt market signals. Therefore, issuing 
subordinated debt is an effective instrument in the market discipline mechanism, but 
also a fine tool to eliminate “too-big-to-fail” effects.  
Table 3.13 Bank Sizes and Amounts of Subordinated Debt Issued 
Banks 
Year 
Barclays HSBC NorthRock Lloyds HBOS RBS 
Total Assets (Millions GBP) 
2005 923,671 873.339.2 82,651 309,745 540,873 776,671 
2006 996,023 949,092.8 100,951.1 343,598 591,813 871,276 
2007 1,225,898 1,180,037.2 109,321 353,346 666,947 1,897,575 
2008 2,050,312 175,304.4 104,321 435,200 687,361 2,394,570 
2009 1,376,626 1,458,855 NA 1,022,249 NA 1,696,486 
SND Amount (Millions GBP) 
2005 8,028 12,383.26 785.3 4,669 22,037 28,274 
2006 8,339 13,173.18 762.4 4,252 24,992 27,654 
2007 11,494 13,147.82 1,161.8 9,984 32,948 38,043 
2008 16,134 5,895.82 1,514.9 11,124 19,371 49,154 
2009 25,816 4,408.07 NA 34,727 NA 37,652 
Data Sources: Thomason One Banker; Each bank’s annual report for amounts of subordinated debt.  
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Table 3.14 Effects of Changes in Sub-debt on Fundamentals for Large Banks 
Table 3.14 shows the partial regression estimations of bank fundamentals on changes in the Sub-debt amount and interest levels for large banks with both fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE). The panel 
sample period is from 1998 to 2009. SIZE is the natural log of issuing bank’s total assets; Size Dummy is a dummy variable which takes 1 if the size (natural logarithm of total assets) is greater than the median size 
for the sample. Hausman χ2 is adopted to test the appropriateness of the RE estimator with the null hypothesis that the RE estimator is consistent and the result is not reported. Year dummies are also included to 
control the year effect. P-values are shown in brackets as ***, **, * indicating significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
Variable  Capital Ratio ROA 
Residential 
Real Estate 
Loans Ratio 
Commercial 
and Industrial 
Loans Ratio 
Individual 
Loans Ratio 
Investment 
Securities Ratio 
Inefficiency 
Ratio 
Liquidity Ratio 
Loans to 
Deposits Ratio 
Deposits Ratio 
Panel A  Size dummy in the regression of bank fundamentals on changes of sub-debt amounts 
Size  -0.0052 0.4097 0.0022 -0.0314 -0.0174 0.0388 0.0034 -0.0427 -0.0694 -0.0209 
 [0.658] [0.568] [0.885] [0.571] [0.584] [0.039]** [0.848] [0.141]*** [0.316] [0.123] 
Size Dummy 0.0312 -2.3097 0.0178 -0.0621 0.0468 -0.0386 -0.0229 0.3438 0.2418 0.0392 
 [0.205] [0.211] [0.599] [0.686] [0.717] [0.383] [0.589] [0.028]*** [0.168] [0.324] 
CONS 0.0141 1.1091 0.0122 0.2106 0.0458 0.1423 0.6949 0.0742 0.0693 0.085 
 [0.816] [0.698] [0.848] [0.381] [0.756] [0.059]* [0.943] [0.429] [0.822] [0.259] 
N 912 756 480 360 372 720 804 780 516 504 
Fixed Year YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
FE/RE FE FE RE RE RE RE RE FE RE RE 
R2-Within 0.408 0.3728 0.2146 0.1443 0.1017 0.1391 0.2416 0.9442 0.2108 0.2112 
R2-Between 0.0046 0.1251 0.0444 0.0826 0.1309 0.125 0.0163 0.1008 0.1353 0.0035 
R2-Overall 0.056 0.0405 0.1714 0.1344 0.0755 0.1319 0.0961 0.1562 0.1732 0.1368 
F 1.38 1.7 - - - - - 3.91** - - 
Wald  - - 14.07 6.37 3.02 19.29 8.62 - 15.61 10.93 
           
           
           
           
           
     
 
 
     
  
Table 3.14 Continued  
Variable  Capital Ratio ROA 
Residential 
Real Estate 
Loans Ratio 
Commercial 
and Industrial 
Loans Ratio 
Individual 
Loans Ratio 
Investment 
Securities Ratio 
Inefficiency 
Ratio 
Liquidity Ratio 
Loans to 
Deposits Ratio 
Deposits Ratio 
Panel B Size Dummy in the regression of bank fundamentals on changes of sub-debt interest 
Size  -0.0039 -0.3089 0.0026 -0.0235 -0.0237 0.0411 0.0025 -0.0172 -0.0571 -0.0255 
 [0.710] [0.678] [0.863] [0.660] [0.467] [0.046]** [0.890] [0.786] [0.410] [0.055]* 
Size Dummy 0.0273 -0.4058 0.0205 -0.0428 0.0395 -0.0412 -0.0209 0.2481 0.2279 0.0471 
 [0.218] [0.822] [0.541] [0.776] [0.755] [0.362] [0.613] [0.048]*** [0.197] [0.228] 
CONS 0.0141 1.2212 0.0168 0.1538 0.0843 0.1514 0.8261 0.0415 0.0637 0.0963 
 [0.799] [0.680] [0.791] [0.515] [0.564] [0.060]* [0.932] [0.851] [0.837] [0.191] 
N 912 756 480 360 372 720 804 780 516 504 
Fixed Year YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
FE/RE FE FE RE RE RE RE RE FE RE RE 
R2-Within 0.4416 0.3399 0.2247 0.136 0.0897 0.1379 0.227 0.8551 0.1732 0.1577 
R2-Between 0.0001 0.1608 0.055 0.4002 0.1794 0.121 0.0124 0.0238 0.1331 0.1746 
R2-Overall 0.0644 0.0025 0.1839 0.1796 0.0856 0.1319 0.0967 0.1512 0.1503 0.1605 
F 1.74 1.47 - - - - - 2.11 - - 
Wald  - - 15.32 8.98 3.46 19.15 8.77 - 12.94 13.19 
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3.6.4 Market Discipline during the Global Financial Crisis  
Whether sub-debt provided discipline on banks during the recent global crisis 
period is further examined. Table 3.15 reports the fixed effects estimations of 
equation 2, which is the regression of bank fundamentals on the SND amount. Table 
3.16 reports the estimated results for equation 3, which is the regression of bank 
fundamentals on the SND interest. The sample is separated into two-samples, one for 
the period between 2004 and 2006, and the other for the period from 2007 to the end 
of 2009. The FE/RE estimations failed to apply on equation 4 to 7 because of 
insufficient observations.  
The capital ratio has negative coefficients with the SND amount at both year t 
and t-1 during 2004-2006, with the values of 0.018 and 1.0567, respectively. The 
coefficient with an SND amount at year t-1 become positive and 10% level 
statistically significant (with the value of 0.2929) in 2007-2009 sample. Also, in the 
earlier sample period, ROA has a negative coefficient (0.5995) with an SND amount 
and a positive coefficient (1.7141) with one-year-lagged SND amount. In the later 
sample period (2007-2009), the coefficient with an SND amount at year t becomes 
positive and 1% level statistically significant (with the value of 13.3168), and the 
coefficient with a one-year-lagged SND amount become negative and 1% level 
statistically significant (with the value of 17.3328). These results indicate that in the 
post-crisis era sub-debt amounts provide stronger disciplinary force on issuers’ 
capital adequacy and earnings than in the pre-crisis period. 
The SND amount has little influence on other loan portfolios besides individual 
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loans. The coefficient with the individual loan ratio (4.0712) in 2004-2006 has a 
significant increase (to 6.1721) with a positive and 5% level statistically significant 
sign. This result suggests that investing SND is an alternative portfolio of individual 
loan in the post-crisis era. Hence SND provides a strong constrain on individual 
loans.  
However, disciplinary effects SND amount provided on management quality 
and liquidity have reduced. The inefficiency ratio has a positive and 5% level 
statistical significant coefficient with the SND amount (2.5216) during 2004-2006, 
and a positive coefficient (0.2315) during 2007-2009. The SND amount at year t-1 
also has a positive and significant coefficient with the inefficiency ratio (2.4169), 
and becomes 0.1341 in the period of 2007-09. A similar situation applied to the 
liquidity ratio and deposit ratio. The values of coefficients significantly decreased 
from the 2004-2006 period to the 2007-09 period.  
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Table 3.15 Market Discipline in Pre- and Post-Global Financial Crisis Eras (1) 
Table 3.15 shows the partial regression estimations of bank fundamentals on the Sub-debt amount level for in two periods (2004-2006, and 2007-2009) with both fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE). According to 
Hausman χ2 we report the results of appropriate estimations. The panel sample period is from 2004 to 2009. SIZE is the natural log of issuing bank’s total assets; SND is the SND amount level for bank i at year t. Year 
dummies are also included to control the year effect. P-values are shown in brackets as ***, **, * indicating significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 Capital Ratio Return on Average Assets 
Residential Real Estate 
Loan Ratio 
Commercial and 
Industrial Loans Ratio 
Individual Loan Ratio 
Investment Securities 
Ratio 
Inefficiency Ratio 
Variable  2004-2006 2007-2009 2004-2006 2007-2009 2004-2006 2007-2009 2004-2006 2007-2009 2004-2006 2007-2009 2004-2006 2007-2009 2004-2006 2007-2009 
Yi,t-1 
-1.3007 -0.1082 0.502 -0.1539 0.0552 -0.2759 -0.4184 0.053 0.5294 -0.2514 0.2961 -0.3478 0.1781 -0.0196 
[0.075]** [0.193] [0.000]*** [0.227] [0.702] [0.326] [0.036]** [0.601] [0.002]*** [0.749] [0.011]*** [0.025]** [0.228] [0.434] 
SNDi,t 
-0.018 0.2582 -0.5995 13.3168 -0.0196 -0.0028 0.0166 -0.0232 4.0712 -6.1721 0.0306 0.0109 2.5216 0.2315 
[0.988] [0.704] [0.045]** [0.000]*** [0.115] [0.962] [0.422] [0.560] [0.050]** [0.070]** [0.206] [0.934] [0.056]** [0.275] 
SNDi,t-1 
-1.0567 0.2929 1.7141 -17.3328 -0.0243 -0.0172 -0.0073 0.0173 -0.1505 1.8096 0.0153 -0.0294 2.4169 0.1341 
[0.776] [0.139]* [0.000] [0.000]*** [0.190] [0.596] [0.814] [0.427] [0.880] [0.654] [0.669] [0.686] [0.064]** [0.010]*** 
SIZE 
-0.4472 -0.0146 -4.7926 -3.8626 0.0163 -0.0007 0.0475 0.0193 -0.0681 -0.1808 0.0942 -0.0684 -0.0294 -0.0016 
[0.001]*** [0.195] [0.000]*** [0.006]*** [0.818] [0.986] [0.707] [0.516] [0.701] [0.605] [0.166] [0.464] [0.047]*** [0.784] 
CONS 
2.2758 0.1122 23.2679 22.1828 0.1368 0.2344 0.0727 0.0312 0.4621 1.5224 0.2194 0.9266 0.0048 0.0239 
[0.001]*** [0.043]** [0.000]*** [0.002]*** [0.699] [0.335] [0.910] [0.842] [0.631] [0.447] [0.509] [0.051]** [0.958] [0.448] 
N 197 205 245 169 111 99 87 83 90 79 175 160 189 188 
Fixed Year YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
FE/RE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE 
R2- Within 0.9996 0.645 0.6941 0.4371 0.1867 0.1069 0.2154 0.064 0.5922 0.3507 0.2115 0.1242 0.8846 0.5484 
R2-Between 0.6788 0.29 0.019 0.0147 0.0859 0.9297 0.7598 0.0001 0.9141 0.0913 0.652 0.7848 0.0417 0.34 
R2-Overall 0.551 0.243 0.1174 0.0561 0.0923 0.8523 0.5606 0.0001 0.8967 0.1296 0.6166 0.6696 0.0798 0.0678 
F 88.905*** 1.82 17.78*** 8.10*** 1.38 0.6 1.01 0.44 4.6 0.9 2.32 1.6 6.39 2.63 
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Table 3.15 Continued  
 Liquidity Ratio Loans to Deposits Ratio Deposit Ratio 
Variable  2004-2006 2007-2009 2004-2006 2007-2009 2004-2006 2007-2009 
Yi,t-1 
-0.3696 0.1593 0.2044 -2.0192 0.1549 0.0292 
[0.018]** [0.364] [0.011]*** [0.347] [0.212] [0.926] 
SNDi,t 
-5.2119 -0.4906 -0.0193 2.8005 -0.0295 -0.0739 
[0.000]*** [0.073]* [0.698] [0.809] [0.093]* [0.514] 
SNDi,t-1 
4.5815 1.7564 -0.0085 0.0903 -0.0422 0.046 
[0.000]*** [0.009]*** [0.907] [0.989] [0.102]* [0.475] 
SIZE 
-0.5601 0.3945 -0.3216 -12.4737 -0.1818 -0.0977 
[0.000]*** [0.013]*** [0.403] [0.466] [0.169] [0.563] 
CONS 
3.1631 1.6084 2.6009 67.9971 1.3559 0.9364 
[0.000]*** [0.043]** [0.177] [0.452] [0.046]** [0.288] 
N 186 171 120 114 120 114 
Fixed Year YES YES YES YES YES YES 
FE/RE FE FE FE FE FE FE 
R2- Within 0.6559 0.4215 0.2698 0.0898 0.3779 0.1442 
R2-Between 0.0518 0.0148 0.2217 0.0093 0.2088 0.2423 
R2-Overall 0.0333 0.0126 0.216 0.0068 0.1496 0.3019 
F 13.02*** 3.64 2.03 0.43 3.34 0.73 
 
SND interests provide further examples of the dynamic market discipline 
strength. The results of this investigation are reported in Table 3.16. From the first 
two columns we are aware that the SND interest produce greater disciplinary 
strength to the capital ratio in the later sample. Similar conclusions apply to the ROA, 
which coefficients with SND interests have increased dramatically from 2007 to 
2009, and those coefficients are positive and statistically significant. Furthermore, 
SND interests provide stronger market discipline to the residential real estate loans 
ratio in the post-crisis period. On the other hand, SND interests no longer provide 
sufficient market discipline to liquidity. 
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Table 3.16 Market Discipline in Pre- and Post-Global Financial Crisis Eras (2) 
Table 3.16 shows the partial regression estimations of bank fundamentals on the Sub-debt interest level for in two periods (2004-2006, and 2007-2009) with both fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE). According to 
Hausman χ2 we report the results of appropriate estimations. The panel sample period is from 2004 to 2009. SIZE is the natural log of issuing bank’s total assets; Interest is the SND interest level for bank i at year t. Year 
dummies are also included to control the year effect. P-values are shown in brackets as ***, **, * indicating significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Capital Ratio Return on Average Assets 
Residential Real Estate 
Loan Ratio 
Commercial and 
Industrial Loans Ratio 
Individual Loan Ratio 
Investment Securities 
Ratio 
Inefficiency Ratio 
 2004-2006 2007-2009 2004-2006 2007-2009 2004-2006 2007-2009 2004-2006 2007-2009 2004-2006 2007-2009 2004-2006 2007-2009 2004-2006 2007-2009 
Yi,t-1 
-0.8851 0.1269 0.2699 -0.1646 0.0431 -0.1044 -0.4192 0.0298 0.4929 -0.0537 0.3325 -0.3771 0.0766 -0.0151 
[0.010]*** [0.053]** [0.026]** [0.251] [0.777] [0.712] [0.036]** [0.744] [0.005]*** [0.954] [0.005]*** [0.023]** [0.604] [0.557] 
Intersti,t 
0.6993 -1.3648 -2.6575 15.6434 0.0685 0.5309 0.1134 -0.1484 -0.6843 0.3809 0.0494 0.3627 0.2031 -0.2479 
[0.042]*** [0.030]*** [0.442] [0.078]* [0.599] [0.067]* [0.595] [0.315] [0.404] [0.557] [0.837] [0.445] [0.516] [0.280] 
Interesti,t-1 
0.8432 -0.0683 -5.1995 17.815 0.0039 0.3584 0.1545 0.0276 -0.5665 -0.6817 -0.1867 0.5117 0.2967 -0.0393 
[0.048]*** [0.702] [0.154] [0.178] [0.982] [0.319] [0.629] [0.881] [0.457] [0.825] [0.409] [0.417] [0.315] [0.722] 
SIZE 
-0.3932 -0.0232 -4.3089 -3.6447 0.0589 0.034 -0.0204 0.0192 -0.2081 -0.1817 0.0939 -0.0174 -0.0294 -0.0077 
[0.001]*** [0.020]*** [0.000]*** [0.040]** [0.575] [0.451] [0.922] [0.508] [0.197] [0.696] [0.174] [0.858] [0.061]** [0.198] 
CONS 
1.8872 0.2692 22.1017 18.3251 0.0889 0.0285 0.2589 0.0398 1.3634 1.3849 0.2117 0.6198 0.1381 0.0808 
[0.002]*** [0.003]*** [0.000]*** [0.044]** [0.863] [0.914] [0.803] [0.801] [0.108]* [0.589] [0.532] [0.220] [0.188] [0.020]** 
N 197 205 245 169 111 99 87 83 90 79 175 160 189 188 
Fixed Year YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
FE/RE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE 
R2- Within 0.9998 0.6936 0.5913 0.2485 0.1028 0.203 0.2037 0.1057 0.5315 0.0763 0.2019 0.1666 0.7971 0.3852 
R2-Between 0.7572 0.4309 0.0074 0.0603 0.0355 0.5017 0.8141 0.0117 0.761 0.1171 0.7234 0.9427 0.0132 0.3301 
R2-Overall 0.645 0.1149 0.1117 0.1069 0.078 0.3379 0.546 0.0064 0.7355 0.0749 0.6915 0.7874 0.1644 0.043 
F 91.714*** 2.64 11.33*** 2.31 0.69 1.27 0.94 0.77 3.59 0.14 2.19 1.4 3.27 1.15 
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Table 3.16 Continued 
 Liquidity Ratio Loans to Deposits Ratio Deposit Ratio 
 2004-2006 2007-2009 2004-2006 2007-2009 2004-2006 2007-2009 
Yi,t-1 
-0.3574 -0.1267 0.2058 -2.0488 0.1751 0.013 
[0.010]*** [0.415] [0.015]** [0.343] [0.169] [0.967] 
Intersti,t 
3.0347 -0.3278 1.7236 -5.2132 -0.331 -0.0305 
[0.000]*** [0.705] [0.355] [0.905] [0.961] [0.943] 
Interesti,t-1 
-0.8589 -1.8191 0.4296 -12.3916 0.5061 0.1682 
[0.175] [0.336] [0.674] [0.830] [0.151] [0.765] 
SIZE 
-0.0488 0.1219 -0.3699 -12.5442 -0.1228 -0.0873 
[0.307] [0.495] [0.321] [0.464] [0.362] [0.608] 
CONS 
0.5269 0.0011 2.7147 7.0054 1.0025 0.8778 
[0.028]** [0.999] [0.140] [0.436] [0.137] [0.320] 
N 186 171 120 114 120 114 
Fixed Year YES YES YES YES YES YES 
FE/RE FE FE FE FE FE FE 
R2- Within 0.8547 0.2827 0.2894 0.0888 0.3193 0.1285 
R2-Between 0.4844 0.049 0.1279 0.0163 0.5686 0.2628 
R2-Overall 0.0705 0.0375 0.1269 0.0116 0.5322 0.3271 
F 41.17*** 2.1 2.24 0.42 2.58 0.64 
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3.7 Conclusion  
 
In this chapter the relationship between sub-debt market signals and banks’ 
fundamentals was examined as a way to understand whether UK banks utilise market 
signals to discipline their risk-taking activity. It was discovered that amount levels of 
sub-debt provide restrictions to banks’ capital adequacy and liquidity in both the long 
term (over a year) and the short term. Sub-debt’s interests supply strong market 
discipline on banks’ capital adequacy as well, however, with a one year time lag. 
Sub-debt amounts and interests also produce strong discipline on issuers’ liquidity 
ratio. We could not find strong evidence that SND market signals to loan portfolios.  
Furthermore, the effects of changes in sub-debt market signals on changes in 
bank fundamentals are investigated. Capital adequacy measures are more sensitive to 
the changes in sub-debt amount levels than interests. However, changes in sub-debt 
interests offer more power to discipline the deposit; while the changes in sub-debt 
amounts offer more constraint on banks’ management quality. One year lagged values 
of changes in sub-debt interests have stronger effects on banks’ performance. 
Increasing subordinated debt amount levels have negative and significant impacts on 
the issuers’ individual loans ratio, investment securities ratio and deposit ratios, while 
boosts in debt interests have more inflections on capital adequacy proxies, other loan 
portfolios and on deposit-related liquidity characteristics. 
There are two essential counterparts in the process of market discipline, one 
being the subordinated debt, the other being the issuing banks. In the previous 
discussion, the market signals that subordinated debt might give were examined. In 
this chapter, it was investigated whether the size of banks has effects on the reception 
and reaction of sub-debt market signals. In other words, an analysis was carried out as 
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to whether subordinated debt provides greater market discipline on the bigger banks. 
The answer is found to be positive. Market signals provided by subordinated debt 
have been received well.  
Besides banks’ size effects, time effects of market discipline were also 
considered. Two sub-samples were compared, one from before the financial crisis and 
the other running from the beginning of the crisis. It was examined as to whether 
banks are more sensitive to market discipline through subordinated debt during global 
financial crisis. Subordinated debt has provided stronger and more effective market 
discipline on capital adequacy, earnings and some loans since the financial crisis, but 
has also provided less influence on issuing banks’ liquidity.  
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4.1 Introduction 
In recent years, central banks and multilateral financial institutions have sought 
to promote the use of forward-looking market-based risk measures to supplement 
traditional financial statements analysis (Chan-Lau, 2006; Tudela and Young, 2005). 
Among these measures, the distance-to-default indicator (DD) has received much 
attention. There is a general agreement on the efficacy of DD as an indicator of 
financial distress and fragility capable of capturing default risk for commercial banks. 
In this paper, we study a new dimension of the DD indicator, that is, the role of 
subordinated notes and debentures (SND) in the efficacy of DD functionality. Based 
on the UK banking evidence, the aim of this research is to ascertain the extent that the 
SND market information affects the predictive power of DD in signifying banks’ 
financial distress. To this end, we concentrate on detecting the differences between 
SND issuing banks and non-SND banks in predicting their financial distress. 
We first estimate UK banks’ DD using both book- and market-based information 
including measures of loan quality, earnings, liquidity, capital level and leverage in 
our estimation. Our sample includes 36 UK banks and financial institutions in the 
FTSE 100. The baseline estimation supports book-based measures in predicting 
distance-to-default. However, earnings diversification and leverage are insignificant 
for the whole sample.  
In order to examine the effect of sub-debt issuance, our sample is divided into 
two sub-groups: SND banks and non-SND banks. We find that in addition to those 
measures that are significant for the whole sample, earnings diversification and 
leverage also affect DD for SND banks. On the other hand, the predictive power of 
most measures is poor for non-SND banks. Our findings imply that the default risk of 
SND banks is better captured by book- and market-based measures than is the default 
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risk of non-SND banks. Further, the effect of sub-debt on DD is examined for 
sub-periods before and after the financial crisis. There is a significant difference 
between SND and non-SND banks in the estimation of their DD for the pre- and 
post-crisis periods. We find increasing power of book-and market-based measures on 
predicting banks’ DD from 1997 to 2006, but the explanatory power is lower during 
the financial crisis. In addition, bank fundamentals can more efficiently predict default 
risk for those subordinated debt-issuing banks with higher charter values and bank 
capitalization. 
This paper is organized as follows: We briefly review the relevant literature in 
Section 4.2. In Section 4.3, we define our baseline model for estimating 
distance-to-default and describe our sample. Section 4.4 discusses our findings from 
the baseline model and presents the consequent analysis. Finally, we conclude this 
paper and draw policy implications in Section 4.5. 
 
4.2 Literature Review 
 
An increasing number of papers suggests that bank regulators and supervisors 
should use distance-to-default as a market-based risk measures for financial 
institutions. For example, Gropp et al. (2004) conclude that distance-to-default is an 
efficient market indicator for bank default and fragility, and can be used to prevent 
supervisors from chasing false leads. Chan-Lau (2006) suggests estimating default 
probabilities as the first step towards assessing systematic risks and stress-testing 
financial systems. He also compares the efficiency of different techniques, including 
distance-to-default, credit default swaps, and bond and equity prices.  
Akhigbe et al. (2007) demonstrate that DD is capable of characterizing the 
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default likelihood of commercial banks. Moreover, DD has links with bank-specific 
factors. Specifically, the default likelihood is inversely related to the bank’s capital, 
size and growth opportunities, and positively related to financial leverage and return 
on equity (ROE). In addition, the authors demonstrate that the Federal Reserve 
System could affect bank distress and default likelihood significantly through 
monetary policy. For instance, when the Federal Bank increases interest rates, the 
default likelihood increases, and vice versa. 
One strand of existing empirical work focuses on pricing bank default risk with 
subordinated debt spreads (Evanoff and Wall, 2001; Flannery and Sorescu, 1996; 
Goyal, 2005). In the event of bank failure, subordinated debt investors will generally 
bear greater losses than investors of other debt. Therefore, subordinated debt investors 
have greater incentives to monitor the issuing banks’ excessive risk-taking behaviour. 
The yield spreads, as one of the useable market signals, is considered 
content-sufficient and provides timely information about issuing firms’ default risks. 
Another strand of empirical study measures market efficiency with the amount of 
subordinated debt. Uchida and Satake (2009) investigate whether sub-debt investors 
exert disciplinary pressure on banks’ management and improve efficiency. They apply 
the ratios of the amount of outstanding subordinated liabilities (loans and bonds) to 
total assets as market disciplinary variables.   
However, there are very few studies focusing on the effect of subordinated debt 
on distance-to-default. Kato and Hagendorff (2010) analyse the degree to which 
accounting variables can explain market-based DD measures in the US banking 
industry. They find that the predictive power of bank risk fundamentals is stronger for 
banks that have issued sub-debt than for those without outstanding sub-debt.  
Previous studies (Demsetz, Saidenberg, and Strahan, 1996; Keeley, 1990) agree 
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that charter value is an effective tool to control moral hazard incentives. Banks with 
lower charter values have greater incentives to engage in risk taking. Goyal (2005) 
indicates that investors expect that debt contracts issued by banks with lower charter 
values would offer higher yield spreads and/or more restrictive covenants. 
Furthermore, Demsetz, Saidenberg, and Strahan (1996) and Goyal (2005) point out 
how banks with lower charter values reduce managers’ ex-ante incentives for risk 
taking. Kato and Hagendorff (2010) examine the impact of charter value on banks’ 
fundamentals. For banks issuing subordinated debt, higher charter values indicate that 
accounting-based measures of bank risk have greater explanatory power of variation 
in DD.  
Several studies employ capital as an important indicator of banks’ stability 
(Chan-Lau and Sy, 2007; Koziol and Lawrenz, 2009). Accordingly, capital reserves 
are viewed as capital cushions for default. In other words, highly capitalized banks 
should have a lower default probability than banks with a smaller capital cushion. 
Flannery and Rangan (2008) study the capitalization of large US banks during the 
1990s, establishing that markets can recognize and influence bank default risk. They 
also find that the book to capital ratio and capital cushions can play a complementary 
role in disciplining large financial firms. Elyasiani and Jia (2008) find that bank 
holding companies (BHC) with higher capital ratios have a lower default risk, and are 
less likely to face intervention from regulators and market monitors. 
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4.3 Methodology 
4.3.1 Baseline Model 
We follow the approach adopted by Hillegeist et al. (2004) and Akhigbe, Madura 
and Martin (2007) to calculate banks’ distance-to-default. Market value of assets ( AV ) 
and the volatility of assets ( A ) are two essential inputs to the calculation. These two 
values can be obtained by solving the nonlinear system consisting of two equations. 
The first equation is the description of the value of equity as a call option on firm’s 
assets: 
1 2( ) ( )
rT
E AV V N d De N d
  ,      (4.1) 
where EV  is the value of equity, which is proxied by using the market capitalization 
of the bank. 1( )N d  and 2( )N d  are the cumulative standard normal distributions of 
1d  and 2d , respectively. D  is short-term debt and the current portion of long-term 
debt from the bank’s balance sheet. Following the literature, we use the book value of 
total debt. r  is the risk-free rate, which is proxied by the 1-year Treasury bill rate. 
T  is the length of the period. 1d  and 2d  are given by the following equations: 
1
ln
2
( )A A
A
V
r T
Dd
T


 

,  
2 1 Add T  .  
The second equation of the nonlinear system is the optimal hedge condition 
linking the volatility of equity and that of assets: 
1( )
A
E A
E
V
N d
V
  ,        (4.2) 
where A  is the volatility of equity. E  is estimated using standard deviation of 
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equity returns in one year. The unknowns in the system of equations (1) and (2) are 
AV  and A , while all the other elements are known. The system can be solved using 
Newton iteration. The starting values of iteration can be estimated using the following 
equations: 
 
E E
A
E
V
V D

 

,  
  A E
V D V 
. 
With all these elements obtained, we can then calculate the DD indicator using 
the following definition: 
2
ln
2
( )A A
A
V
r T
DD D
T



 
       (4.3) 
 A branch of literature suggests using fundamentals to estimate banks’ 
distance-to-default or default likelihood (Flannery and Sorescu, 1996; Kato and 
Hagendorff, 2010; Martinez Peria and Schmukler, 2001). Our model is inspired by 
this branch and the baseline model is formulated as follows: 
 
   , 0 1 , 1 2 , 1 ,i t i t i t t i tDD BankRiskFundamentals C d         , (4.4) 
where: 
BankRiskFundamentals = variables (lagged by 1 year) as defined in Table 1 
Ci,t = control variables affecting the bank’s distance-to-default 
dt = year dummies 
i = 1,…, N is the number of banks  
t = 1,…,T is the number of years 
      εi,t = error term with assumed Gaussian properties  
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Table 4.1  Bank Risk Fundamentals  
Variable Definition 
CAP Book value of equity / total assets  
NPLTL Non-performing loans / total loans 
RLLA Reserve for loan losses / total assets  
ROA Profit before interest and tax divided by book value of assets  
NIIR Non-interest income divided by revenues  
CSD Cash and marketable securities / total deposits 
LEV Total book liabilities / total book equity 
MKTLEV Total liabilities / (market value of common stock + book value of preferred 
stock) 
Tobin’s Q (Market capitalization + total assets – total equity)/total assets  
 
Year dummy variables are used to capture the time effects that control for 
intertemporal variations in macroeconomic conditions such as tax effects. We 
consider the natural log of total assets that captures the size effects of banks, such as 
potential diversification benefits or supervisors’ too-big-to-fail policies.  
Many previous studies have employed book-based measures of banking risk 
(Demsetz and Strahan, 1997; Elyasiani and Jia, 2008). Indicators such as 
non-performing loans and reserve for loan losses are commonly used to evaluate loan 
quality and thus they can affect banks’ distance-to-default. Amongst them, 
non-performing loans divided by total loans (NPLTL) indicates the quality of the loan 
portfolio. Higher values of this variable suggest lower asset quality (Akhigbe, Madura, 
and Martin, 2007; Flannery and Sorescu, 1996), and should affect DD negatively. The 
ratio of reserves for loan losses to total assets (RLLA) is another indicator of loan 
quality. Higher reserves for loan losses indicate higher capacity for a bank to bear 
loan losses, and therefore RLLA should have a positive impact on a bank’s 
distance-to-default. 
Earnings other than interest incomes provide diversification of bank portfolios 
and thus reduce the variance of the bank’s returns. To capture the diversification effect, 
we use non-interest incomes divided by revenues (NIIR), which should associate 
positively with distance-to-default. On the other hand, higher profitability signals 
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larger portfolio risk undertaken by the bank. Returns on assets (ROA) as the 
profitability indicator should have negative correlation with distance-to-default.  
Larger asset base and liquidity position should ease the financial constraint on 
the bank. As an index of banks’ liquidity position, a higher ratio of cash and 
marketable securities over deposits (CSD) indicates a higher DD. Similarly, 
well-capitalized (CAP) banks have a lesser chance of defaulting. 
In addition to the book-based measures listed above, market-based measures of 
bank risk have often been adopted (Evanoff, Jagtiani, and Nakata, 2011; Hancock and 
Kwast, 2001; Jagtiani, Kaufman, and Lemieux, 2002). Market leverage (MKTLEV) is 
considered a superior measure of bank risk to risk-based capital ratio, because the 
market-based measure takes into account banks’ credit risks. Market leverage and 
book-measured leverage (LEV) both have positive effects on banks’ liabilities cost, 
hence negative effects on banks’ distance-to-default. 
 
4.3.2 Data and Sample Description 
 
The sample consists of 36 UK banks and financial service institutions listed in 
the FTSE 100, with annual data from 1997 to 2010. Detailed balanced sheet 
information for these 36 financial firms was collected from the Thomson One Banker 
database. Market information, such as stock returns of the firms, was collected from 
Datastream. Table 4.2 shows the descriptive statistics for the variables. 
In our sample, 14 banks or financial institutions have outstanding positions of 
subordinated debt, while 22 do not. Compared with the samples used in studies on the 
US market (Elyasiani and Jia, 2008; Flannery and Rangan, 2008), our sample is 
subordinated debt, the mean value of DD is 7.271. Elyasiani and Jia (2008), using a 
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sample of 110 subordinated debt-holding banks and financial institutions in the US 
market, report a mean of 3.376 over the period from 1992 to 2004. Similarly, Kato 
and Hagendorff (2010) use US bank holding companies’ reports to calculate DD for 
individual firms, and have a mean DD value of 3.913 for the period from 1998 to 
2007. The key descriptive statistics for our pooled sample imply that the UK banking 
system has higher average distance-to-default and more stability than the US financial 
market. The whole sample has an average DD of 6.396, which is smallerer than the 
average DD of SND banks, indicating lower default probability of SND banks.  
The descriptive statistics for both the whole data sample and the sub-sample of 
SND banks show that equity volatility is higher than asset volatility. In terms of 
indicators of loan quality, SND banks have a lower non-performing loan ratio and 
reserves for loan loss. These imply that SND banks have better management of loan 
quality and require smaller corresponding buffer stock for loan loss. SND banks have 
slighter high ROA than sample average and display a tendency to generate more 
revenue from non-interest incomes than average. SND banks also have higher than 
average CAP and tend to finance through issuing equity, and therefore they have 
smaller book and market leverages than sample average. Generally, SND banks 
demonstrate distinct book and market indicators, a fact that inspires our analysis of 
the sub-sample of these banks. 
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Table 4.2  Sample Descriptive Statistics  
 
Table 4.2 shows the sample descriptive statistics. The variable DD is the distance-to-default indicator calculated using equations (1) to (3). Equity volatility (δE) is 
calculated as the standard deviation of daily equity returns multiplied by the square root of the number of trading days in a year. Assets volatility (δA) is the volatility 
of asset returns based on the contingent claims model. CAP is the ratio of equity to total assets, NPLTL is the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans, RLLA is 
the ratio of reserves for loan losses to total assets, ROA is the ratio of profit before interest and tax divided by the book value of assets, NIIR is the ratio of 
non-interest incomes divided by revenues, CSD is the ratio of cash and marketable securities to total deposits, LEV is the ratio of total book liabilities to total book 
equity, MKLEV is the ratio of total liabilities to the sum of market value of common stocks and book value of preferred stocks, Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the sum of 
market capitalization and total assets minus total equity to total assets. 
                    Whole Sample  SND Banks  
 Mean Median Std.Dev Min Max Mean Median Std.Dev Min Max 
DD 6.396  4.440  7.970  0.321  114.594  7.271  5.171  6.860  0.786  52.039  
δe 0.374  0.313  0.274  0.030  3.418  0.372  0.303  0.309  0.030  3.418  
δa 0.158  0.116  0.217  0.004  3.173  0.213  0.155  0.261  0.005  3.173  
CAP 0.312  0.230  0.312  -2.354  0.996  0.442  0.399  0.341  -2.354  0.996  
NPLTL 0.401  0.000  0.903  0.000  6.170  0.126  0.000  0.559  0.000  3.080  
RLLA 0.376  0.000  1.303  0.000  17.720  0.057  0.000  0.236  0.000  1.400  
ROA 0.040  0.025  0.112  -1.160  0.467  0.042  0.030  0.145  -1.160  0.467  
NIIR 0.736  1.000  0.328  0.000  1.000  0.835  1.000  0.293  0.000  1.000  
CSD 27.127  0.000  73.683  0.000  710.354  20.613  0.000  80.102  0.000  710.354  
LEV 9.165  3.089  17.198  -1.017  239.321  3.138  1.359  7.193  -1.017  91.777  
Tobin’sQ 1.542  1.127  1.307  0.453  13.684  1.740  1.189  1.663  0.453  13.684  
MKTLEV 5.452  1.389  13.049  0.005  160.838  1.619  0.744  3.713  0.005  44.181  
Size  6.957  6.696  1.984  0.693  11.724  5.983  5.926  1.324  0.693  8.981  
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The correlation matrixes among variables are reported in Table 4.3. The 
correlation between DD and equity volatility (δe) and asset volatility (δa) is -0.290 and 
-0.090, respectively, and smaller volatility implies larger DD. Whereas in similar 
studies (Kato and Hagendorff, 2010) equity volatility and asset volatility are almost 
perfectly correlated, in this study the correlation between them for financial firms is 
0.702, which indicates that the two variables reflect different firm risk characteristics. 
Panel B in Table 4.3 presents pair-wise correlation between the book-based 
accounting variables of bank risks. The pooled sample is also collapsed into time 
series to examine the time continuity of the data sample. 
Table 4.3 Correlations Matrix 
Table 4.3 presents the correlation matrix for two groups of variables including distance-to-default, banks’ 
volatility, risk measures, performance and control variables. The variable DD is the distance-to-default. 
Equity volatility (δE) is calculated as the standard deviation of daily equity returns multiplied by the 
square root of the number of trading days in a year. Assets volatility (δA) is the volatility of asset returns 
based on the contingent claims model. CAP is the ratio of equity to total assets, NPLTL is the ratio of 
non-performing loans to total loans, RLLA is the ratio of reserve loan losses to total assets, ROA is the 
ratio of profit before interest and tax divided by book value of assets, NIIR is the ratio of non-interest 
income divided by revenues, CSD is the ratio of cash and marketable securities to total deposits, LEV is 
the ratio of total book liabilities to total book equity, MKLEV is the ratio of total liabilities to the sum of 
market value of common stock and book value of preferred stock, Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the sum of 
market capitalization and total assets minus total equity to total assets. 
Panel A Correlation between DD and equity volatility, asset volatility, total liability and total assets 
Variable DD δe δa Liability 
δe -0.290     
δa -0.090  0.702    
Liability -0.101  0.235  -0.327   
Assets -0.097  0.186  -0.376  0.957  
Panel B Correlation between risk measures, performance and control variables 
Variable CAP NPLTL RLLA ROA NIIR CSD LEV Tobin’s 
Q 
MKTL
EV 
NPLTL -0.353          
RLLA -0.112  0.233         
ROA -0.005  -0.117  -0.019        
NIIR 0.100  -0.490  -0.318  0.129       
CSD -0.252  0.413  0.048  -0.082  -0.244      
LEV -0.407  0.283  0.034  -0.102  -0.289  0.215     
Tobin’sQ 0.050  -0.162  -0.097  0.382  0.275  -0.121  -0.168    
Mktlev -0.320  0.445  0.047  -0.097  -0.244  0.418  0.590  -0.158   
Size  -0.408  0.608  0.187  -0.001  -0.589  0.399  0.373  -0.096  0.315  
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4.4 Empirical Results  
4.4.1 Estimating the Baseline Model 
Our baseline model is first estimated using pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). 
The results are shown in Table 4.4 Column (1). With the exception of leverage 
indicators, most indicators display significance. Loan quality (including NPLTL and 
RLLA), liquidity CSD and capital level CAP are all significant at the 1 per cent level. 
Profitability indicator ROA has a significant estimated value of -0.540, and this 
confirms that banks could hold a riskier loan portfolio to generate higher returns. 
However, the earning diversification NIIR does not display significance even at the 10 
per cent level. Further, our estimation does not find significance among the leverage 
indicators. Both book leverage and market leverage coefficients are negative, but 
insignificant. The R-square is 0.398 and shows the fitness of our model. 
Heteroscedasticity is further detected with White’s test, where the Chi-square value is 
35.37 and significant at the 5 per cent level. This test rejects the null hypothesis and 
finds that the specification contains unrestricted heteroscedasticity. 
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Table 4.4 Estimation for the Baseline Models 
Table 4.4 reports the regress analysis of DD on lags of bank fundamentals estimated by OLS, 
fixed effects, random effects. Sample period is from 1997 to 2009. The dependent variable is 
distance-to-default. CAP is the ratio of equity to total assets, NPLTL is the ratio of 
non-performing loans to total loans, RLLA is the ratio of reserve loan losses to total assets, ROA 
is the return on assets, NIIR is the ratio of non-interest incomes to revenues, CSD is the ratio of 
cash and marketable securities to total deposits, LEV is the book leverage, MKLEV is the market 
leverage. Hausman χ
2
 is adopted to test the appropriateness of RE estimator with the null 
hypothesis that the RE estimator is consistent. Year dummies are included to control the year 
effect. P-values are shown in brackets as ***, **, * indicating significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively. 
Variables  (1) OLS  (2) Fixed Effects (3) Random Effects 
CAPi,t-1 31.065  25.095  30.710   
 [0.000]*** [0.001]*** [0.006]***  
NPLTLi,t-1 -2.384  -2.034  -2.527   
 [0.000]*** [0.026]** [0.014]**  
RLLAi,t-1 5.315  3.687  5.598   
 [0.000]*** [0.112] [0.031]** 
ROAi,t-1 -0.540  -0.572  -0.548  
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.002]*** 
NIIRi.t-1 0.022  0.111  0.024  
 [0.334] [0.367] [0.494] 
CSDi,t-1 0.014  0.006  0.014  
 [0.006]*** [0.402] [0.215] 
LEVi,t-1 -0.029  -0.039  -0.024  
 [0.406] [0.446] [0.671] 
MKTLEVi,t-1 -0.024  -0.002  -0.023  
 [0.066]* [0.862] [0.407] 
SIZEi,t 0.632  -0.175  0.597  
 [0.027]** [0.801] [0.045]** 
CONS -5.039  4.536  -4.726   
  [0.121] [0.457] [0.274]   
N 362 362 362  
R
2 
0.398  0.263  0.052   
F  13.85***   
Wald-Chi 35.37** 25.75** 20.16*  
Hausman Test   30.19***     
 
 
 
To cope with heterogeneity, we estimate both fixed effects and random effects for 
the baseline model. Estimated coefficients and p-values are reported in Columns (2) 
and (3) of Table 4.4. For fixed effects estimation, we find only three significant 
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coefficients: CAP, NPLTL and ROA. This result implies that the capital level, loan 
quality and profitability affect the default risk of the banks. RLLA and CSD reflect 
the reserve buffer for loan losses and the liquidity, but they are no longer significant in 
the test for fixed effects. Random effect estimation displays similar estimated values 
and significance, with the exception of the significance of RLLA and SIZE. Generally, 
both fixed effects and random effects estimations find signs consistent with pooled 
regression and with our expectation in Section 3.1. We also conduct a Hausman test to 
examine the appropriateness of the random effects modelled. The results are shown at 
the bottom of Table 4.4. The random effects estimator is consistent; the Hausman 
test’s null hypothesis is soundly rejected. Therefore the fixed effects estimator is more 
appropriate to identify banks’ DD.  
Results in Table 4.4 are also an alternative robust check for the model-bias 
problem. NPLTL and ROA have negative signs and are statistically significant, and 
these results are supporting estimated coefficients under other estimators. RLLA and 
NIIR, consistent with parameters estimated by OLS, fixed effects and random effects, 
have positive and significant coefficients.  
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4.4.2 Distance-to-Default for SND and Non-SND Banks  
 
We aim to examine the difference in explanatory power of book-based risk 
measures for banks’ distance-to-default between SND and non-SND banks. To 
explore this question, the sample is divided into two groups: banks with outstanding 
sub-debt (173 observations), and banks without sub-debt (225 observations). For each 
sub-group, we regress banks’ distance-to-default on risk fundamentals and control 
variables. Results of both fixed effects estimation are reported in Table 4.5. We also 
estimate results from random effects and then conduct a Hausman test. The statistic 
indicates that the fixed effect is a more appropriate approach. 
Results in Column (1) of Table 4.5 reveal that as an indicator of capitalization, 
CAP enters the model with a positive sign (4.859) and is significant at the 10 per cent 
level. One possible explanation for this is that well-capitalized banks are less 
vulnerable to economic or financial shocks. NPLTL has a negative and 5 per cent 
significant coefficient (-1.161). Lower ratio of non-performing loans in banks’ 
portfolio increases banks’ DD. ROA has positive and significant coefficients at the 1 
per cent significance level (10.006). Banks with higher profitability tend to be less 
volatile to financial distress. The NIIR captures banks’ earnings diversification. A 
negative coefficient (-6.453) is consistent with the suggestion that banks with more 
diversified revenues are more capable to deal with financial distress. As an indicator 
for liquidity, CSD has a negative and significant coefficient with DD. Consistent with 
our baseline estimation; both coefficients for book and market leverages are 
insignificant in the estimation for the subsample of SND banks. 
Column (2) of Table 4.5 displays coefficient values and the corresponding 
p-values using the fixed effects estimation for banks without subordinated debt. 
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Different from the estimation for the subsample of SND banks, non-SND banks 
subsample displays insignificant coefficients. R-square for SND and non-SND 
sub-samples are 0.531 and 0.165, respectively, which implies better fitness for the 
model to capture SND banks’ DD. Also, the model displays total significance based 
on F-test for SND banks, but it is insignificant as a whole for non-SND subsample 
estimation. 
Different from existing studies (e.g. Kato and Hagendorff, 2010) our study does 
not deliver strong evidence that there are significant differences in single coefficients 
between Columns (1) and (2). Column 3 in Table 5 displays the differences between 
the estimated coefficients in Columns (1) and (2), and the corresponding t-values to 
test the significance of the differences. Except NIIR and CSD, most t-values of 
differences between other coefficients are not significant. To further examine the 
existence of structural break for the two subsamples, we perform Chow test and the 
F-test statistic is displayed in the second panel in Table 5. The 1 per cent significant 
statistic implies that the model displays difference as a whole in modelling these two 
sub-samples. Although we cannot find major difference between the estimated 
coefficients, the model does show structural break between subsamples for SND and 
non-SND banks. 
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Table 4.5 Distance-to-Default for SND and Non-SND Banks  
Table 4.5 shows the regression estimations of DD on lags of bank fundamentals with fixed effects. The sample 
period is from 1997 to 2009, and it is separated into three subsamples based on whether banks issued outstanding 
SND. The dependent variable DD is the distance-to-default. CAP is the ratio of equity to total assets, NPLTL is 
the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans, RLLA is the ratio of reserve loan losses to total assets, ROA is 
the ratio of profit before interest and tax divided by book value of assets, NIIR is the ratio of non-interest incomes 
divided by revenues, CSD is the ratio of cash and marketable securities to total deposits, LEV is the ratio of total 
book liabilities to total book equity, MKLEV is the ratio of total liabilities to the sum of the market value of 
common stocks and book value of preferred stocks. Hausman χ2 is adopted to test the appropriateness of the RE 
estimator with the null hypothesis that the RE estimator is consistent, but results are not reported. Year dummies 
are also included to control the year effect. P-values are shown in brackets [] as ***, **, * indicating significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. T-values are shown in brackets (). 
 Fixed Effects  Differences in 
coefficients (1)-(2) Variable SND Banks (1) Non-SND (2) 
CAPi,t-1 4.859  0.452  4.407 
 [0.061]* [0.900] (0.996) 
NPLTLi,t-1 -1.161  2.064  -3.225 
 [0.013]** [0.526] (-0.897) 
RLLAi,t-1 2.841  -0.126  2.967 
 [0.441] [0.693] (0.804) 
ROAi,t-1 10.006  -2.021  12.027 
 [0.000]*** [0.868] (0.974) 
NIIRi,t-1 -6.453  24.423  -30.876 
 [0.084]* [0.110] (-1.970)** 
CSDi,t-1 -0.006  0.000  -0.007 
 [0.020]** [0.857] (-2.460)** 
LEVi,t-1 0.241  0.001  0.240 
 [0.278] [0.957] (1.079) 
MKTLEVi,t-1 -0.608  -0.007  -0.600 
 [0.166] [0.874] (-1.368) 
SIZEi,t -1.063  0.738  -1.801 
 [0.156] [0.479] (-1.406) 
CONS 13.465  -17.351  30.816 
  [0.058]* [0.398] (1.423) 
N 173 225  
K 10 10  
RSS 4948  11927   
R
2
 0.531  0.165   
F 12.49*** 3.86  
Chow test   12.92*** 
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4.4.3 Distance-to-Default Over Time  
 
In this section, we examine the explanatory power of book- and market-based 
risk measures on bank distance-to-default across the global financial crisis. We divide 
the whole sample into three sub-periods: 1997 to 2002, 2003 to 2006, which are the 
periods before the financial crisis, and 2007 to 2010, which covers the crisis period. 
We estimate both fixed effects and random effects. The Hausman test statistic 
suggests fixed effects as a more appropriate approach. Table 6 presents the statistics 
obtained through estimation of the fixed effects model. 
In the period 1997-2002, we can see significant differences between the 
estimated coefficients for SND banks and those for non-SND banks. CAP is positive 
and significant for both SND and non-SND banks. This tells the importance of equity 
finance for banks in both sub-samples and inspires our further test with capital 
adequacy in Section 4.5. The insignificant t-value in Column (1)-(4) also confirms 
there is no large difference for this coefficient for the two sub-samples. However, we 
find difference estimated values for other coefficients. ROA, NIIR, LEV are 
significant for SND banks, but insignificant for non-SND banks. Similar as in Section 
4.2, we perform Chow test to detect structural break and find significant statistic at the 
1 per cent level. The model is different as a whole for SDN and non-SND banks in the 
period between 1997 and 2002. 
Chow test for the periods 2003-2006 and 2007-2010 also finds structural break 
between the subsamples of SND and non-SND banks from Chow test. However, 
individual coefficients display different findings from 1997-2002. For the period 
between 2003 and 2006, the model has higher predictive power for SND banks than 
for non-SND banks. CAP, NPLTL, CSN and both leverage indicators are significant at 
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the 1 per cent level for SND subsample. However, none of the estimators is 1 per cent 
significant for non-SND banks. Test for difference between individual coefficients for 
these two subsamples shows similar pattern as 1997-2002. In Column (2)-(5), CSD 
and both leverage indicators have significant difference for estimated values of the 
two sub-samples. Moreover, RLLA and ROA are different, which is not observed in 
1997-2002. 
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Table 4.6 Comparison of DD for SND and Non-SND Banks before and after Financial Crisis 
Table 4.6 shows the regression estimations of DD on lags of bank fundamentals with fixed effects. The panel data sample period is from 1997 to 2009. The dependent 
variable DD is the distance-to-default. CAP is the ratio of equity to total assets, NPLTL is the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans, RLLA is the ratio of reserve 
loan losses to total assets, ROA is the ratio of profit before interest and tax divided by the book value of assets, NIIR is the ratio of non-interest income divided by 
revenues, CSD is the ratio of cash and marketable securities to total deposits, LEV is the ratio of total book liabilities to total book equity, MKLEV is the ratio of total 
liabilities to the sum of the market value of common stocks and book value of preferred stocks. Hausman χ
2
 is adopted to test the appropriateness of the RE estimator 
with the null hypothesis that the RE estimator is consistent, but results are not reported. Year dummies are also included to control the year effect. P-values are shown in 
brackets [] as ***, **, * indicating significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. T-values are shown in brackets (). 
 SND Banks Non-SND Banks Differences in coefficients Ho: SND banks=Non-SND banks? 
 
1997-2002 
(1) 
2003-2006 
(2) 
2007-2010 
(3) 
1997-2002 
(4) 
2003-2006 
(5) 
2007-2010 
(6) 
1997-2002 
(1)-(4) 
2003-2006 
(2)-(5) 
2007-2010 
(3)-(6) 
CAPi,t-1 17.956  2.470  -6.868  25.731  7.599  11.367  -7.775 -5.130 -18.236 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.547] [0.000]*** [0.068]* [0.135] (-1.116) (-1.275) (-1.347) 
NPLTLi,t-1 1.362  9.476  -3.792  -0.115  -1.332  3.090  1.476 10.809 -6.882 
 [0.687] [0.002]*** [0.319] [0.456] [0.033]** [0.611] (0.439) (3.616)** (-0.969) 
RLLAi,t-1 -4.029  -30.309  9.383  -0.628  -0.885  0.947  -3.402 -29.424 8.437 
 [0.615] [0.017]** [0.108] [0.000]*** [0.027]** [0.307] (-0.427) (-2.419)** (1.453) 
ROAi,t-1 3.675  8.074  11.669  -4.315  -0.686  -32.504  7.990 8.760 44.173 
 [0.001]*** [0.064]* [0.009]*** [0.814] [0.965] [0.372] (0.438) (0.552) (1.222) 
NIIRi,t-1 -11.780  1.584  1.635  -1.475  10.476  20.542  -10.305 -8.892 -18.907 
 [0.000]*** [0.735] [0.696] [0.820] [0.062]* [0.377] (-1.539) (-1.248) (-0.810) 
CSDi,t-1 -0.001  -0.032  0.013  0.097  0.011  -0.003  -0.098 -0.042 0.016 
 [0.864] [0.000]*** [0.183] [0.026]** [0.016]** [0.980] (-2.311)** (-4.812)** (0.150) 
LEVi,t-1 0.705  -0.389  -0.128  -0.015  0.015  -0.021  0.720 -0.403 -0.108 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.248] [0.797] [0.269] [0.803] (4.077)** (-17.562)** (-0.783) 
MKTLEVi,t-1 -1.548  0.291  0.331  -0.363  -0.005  0.208  -1.185 0.297 0.123 
 [0.012]** [0.000]*** [0.173] [0.001]*** [0.931] [0.387] (-1.968)** (3.968)** (0.365) 
SIZEi,t -2.125  -1.279  4.799  -1.885  0.334  14.743  -0.240 -1.613 -9.943 
 [0.006]*** [0.211] [0.036]** [0.000]*** [0.708] [0.186] (-0.276) (-1.205) (-0.892) 
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Table 4.6 Continued 
CONS 13.425  15.163  -31.870  19.969  -2.551  -179.206  -6.544 17.713 147.336 
  [0.070]* [0.088]* [0.018]** [0.002]*** [0.805] [0.130] (-0.698) (1.323) (1.269) 
N 66 51 56 77 65 83    
K 10 10 10 10 10 10    
RSS 1223  209 1199 84 72 6511    
Chow test         200.747*** 763.907*** 23.046*** 
R2 0.759  0.873  0.602  0.789  0.904  0.500     
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In the post-crisis period between 2007 and 2010, we find small predictive power 
of book- and market-based fundamentals on banks’ DD. Except ROA and SIZE for 
SND banks, none of the rest coefficients displays significance. Also, t-values in 
Column (3)-(6) find no significant difference for individual coefficients of the two 
subgroups in this period. In addition, R-square of these three periods confirms the 
smaller power of the model in the crisis period. SND and non-SND subsample 
estimations have R-squares of 0.602 and 0.500, respectively, which is much smaller 
than the other two periods. 
In summary, during the period 1997 to 2002, although bank-based accounting 
variables do not show strong explanatory or predictive power for distance-to-default, 
there is strong evidence that SND status enhances disciplinary force on banks. In the 
period between 2003 and 2006, the predictive power of accounting-based variables on 
distance-to-default increases. However, it is hard to conclude that the disciplinary 
force on banks’ financial distress provided by sub-debt has been enhanced 
significantly in the post-global financial crisis era. 
 
4.4.4 Distance-to-Default and Tobin’s Q for SND Banks 
A branch in the literature covers the impact of banks’ charter value on managers’ 
risk taking decisions (e.g. Keeley, 1990). Galloway et al. (1997) and Kato and 
Hagendorff (2010) hold the view that since valuable charters cannot be sold in the 
event of default, valuable charters curtail bank managers’ risk taking. Correspondingly, 
a lower charter value implies a signal of increased requirement for market monitoring 
and discipline. In this light, we examine the impact of charter value on the 
explanatory power of fundamentals on distance-to-default of SND and non-SND 
banks. 
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We proxy charter value by Tobin’s Q. Banks are assigned to different groups 
based on average charter value from 1997 to 2010, i.e., the lowest value quintile (Q1), 
middle value quintiles (Q2-Q4) and the highest value quintile (Q5). We then regress 
distance-to-default on bank risk fundamentals for these sub-groups. Tobin’s Q has 
been widely adopted in the studies of banks’ market value, since it captures market 
power in terms of investment opportunities relative to equity market participants 
(Carpenter and Guariglia, 2008). Our estimation finds a few different characters of 
modelling DD for these subgroups. 
Column (1) in Table 4.7 reports the regression results for banks with low Tobin’s 
Q values (Q1). Most coefficients have insignificant estimated values. CAP, CSD and 
SIZE are significant at the 1 per cent level. Though a few individual coefficients are 
insignificant, the R-square of the low-quintile estimation is high (0.782), which 
indicates the high predictive power of the model for banks with lower charter value. 
Regression results for banks assigned to middle levels of charter value (Q2-Q4) 
are presented in Column (2). R-square of the medium charter value banks estimation 
(0.294) is smaller than the low charter value subgroup. Both profitability and earnings 
diversification enters the modelling for this quintile. ROA has a small and negative 
coefficient (-0.407) and is significant at the 5 per cent level. NIIR has a 1 per cent 
significant coefficient of 23.562. We compare the individual coefficients for Q1 and 
Q2-Q4 and the t-test statistics are displayed in the Column Medium-Low in Table 4.7. 
Statistically, only ROA values are different in these two subgroups. Also, Chow test 
find 1 per cent significant statistic and confirms structural break between low and 
medium charter value banks in modelling their DD. 
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Table 4.7 Distance-to-Default and Tobin’s Q for Sub-debt Banks 
Table 4.7 shows the regression estimations of DD on lags of bank fundamentals with fixed effects. The sample 
period is from 1997 to 2009, and it is separated into three subsamples based on banks’ Tobin’s Q. The dependent 
variable DD is the distance-to-default. CAP is the ratio of equity to total assets, NPLTL is the ratio of 
non-performing loans to total loans, RLLA is the ratio of reserve loan losses to total assets, ROA is the ratio of 
profit before interest and tax divided by book value of assets, NIIR is the ratio of non-interest incomes divided by 
revenues, CSD is the ratio of cash and marketable securities to total deposits, LEV is the ratio of total book 
liabilities to total book equity, MKLEV is the ratio of total liabilities to the sum of the market value of common 
stocks and book value of preferred stocks. Hausman χ2 is adopted to test the appropriateness of the RE estimator 
with the null hypothesis that the RE estimator is consistent, but results are not reported. Year dummies are also 
included to control the year effect. P-values are shown in brackets [] as ***, **, * indicating significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. T-values are shown in brackets (). 
 Fixed Effects  Differences in coefficients  
 Low: Q1 Medium: Q2:Q4 High:Q5 Medium-Low High-Low 
CAPi,t-1 44.568  5.238  2.153  
(3.195)** (3.959)** 
 [0.000]*** [0.392] [0.004]*** 
RLLAi,t-1 -0.258  4.998   
(1.05)  
 [0.775] [0.311]  
ROAi,t-1 -4.166  -0.407   
(1.086)  
 [0.232] [0.025]**  
NIIRi.t-1 1.438  23.562  7.262  
(2.383) (2.163) 
 [0.584] [0.009]*** [0.000]*** 
CSDi,t-1 -5.823  15.239  -4.087  
(1.853) (0.514) 
 [0.000]*** [0.179] [0.201] 
LEVi,t-1 0.016  0.018   
(0.065)  
 [0.404] [0.285]  
MKTLEVi,t-1 0.090  -0.070  0.236  
(0.91) (0.746) 
 [0.552] [0.440] [0.066]* 
SIZE -0.063  0.252  -0.547  
(0.996) (1.865) 
 [0.007]*** [0.425] [0.040]** 
CONS -1.378  1.368  -1.821  
(1.102) (0.207) 
 [0.501] [0.342] [0.007]*** 
N 104 228 66   
K 10 10 10   
RSS 1040 13743 469   
Chow test    16.585*** 210.062*** 
R2 0.782  0.294  0.493      
 
Results in Column (3) are for banks allocated to the highest Tobin’s Q value 
quintile. CAP and NIIR have positive coefficients (2.153 and 7.262, respectively) with 
the 1 per cent level of statistical significance. Market leverage MKTLEV and SIZE 
also display significance at different levels. R-square for this subgroup is 0.493 and 
higher than medium quintile. Therefore, for banks that have higher charter values, 
their accounting-based risk measures explain the variation of DD to a higher degree. 
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Similarly, the differences between the coefficients of low and high subgroups 
(Column High-Low in Table 4.7) are mostly insignificant, except for CAP. However, 
Chow test again finds significant difference between the models of these two 
subgroups as a whole. Kato and Hagendorff (2010) rationalize their similar finding to 
be the effect of higher charter values. With higher charter values and more frequent 
trades, asset values contain more information, and hence reflect fundamentals more 
efficiently. 
 
4.4.5 Distance-to-Default and Capital Adequacy for SND Banks 
 
This section further analyses how capitalization levels impact on the financial 
distress sensitivity of accounting measures. As addressed in previous studies, low 
capitalized financial firms need more discipline from investors and regulators. We 
separate SND banks into two sub-groups by their average capitalization from 1997 to 
2010. 
Column (1) in Table 4.8 displays regression results of the sub-sample containing 
companies with lower than median capitalization. CAP and ROA have positive and 1 
per cent significant coefficients (4.539 and 30.371, respectively). Banks with higher 
capitalization and profitability will be less vulnerable to financial distress. The 
estimated coefficients for higher-than-median capitalized banks are reported in 
Column (2) in Table 4.8. In addition to CAP and ROA, NIIR, LEV, MKTLEV and 
SIZE also have significant coefficients. Not only single coefficient significance finds 
stronger predictive power of the model for high-capitalized banks, R-square of this 
subgroups (0.6392) is also higher than the one for the low-capitalized banks (0.1789).  
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Table 4.8 Distance-to-Default and Capital Adequacy for SND 
Banks 
Table 4.8 shows the regression estimations of DD on lags of bank fundamentals with fixed 
effects. The sample period is from 1997 to 2009, and it is separated into two subsamples 
based on banks’ capital adequacy. The dependent variable DD is the distance-to-default. 
CAP is the ratio of equity to total assets, NPLTL is the ratio of non-performing loans to total 
loans, RLLA is the ratio of reserve loan losses to total assets, ROA is the ratio of profit 
before interest and tax divided by book value of assets, NIIR is the ratio of non-interest 
incomes divided by revenues, CSD is the ratio of cash and marketable securities to total 
deposits, LEV is the ratio of total book liabilities to total book equity, MKLEV is the ratio 
of total liabilities to the sum of the market value of common stocks and book value of 
preferred stocks. Hausman χ2 is adopted to test the appropriateness of the RE estimator with 
the null hypothesis that the RE estimator is consistent, but results are not reported. Year 
dummies are also included to control the year effect. P-values are shown in brackets [] as 
***, **, * indicating significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. T-values are 
shown in brackets (). 
 Fixed Effects  
Differences in 
coefficients  
 Low Capital<Median High Capital > Median  
CAPi,t-1 4.539  15.928  (-1.740) 
 [0.000]*** [0.015]**  
NPLTLi,t-1 1.831    
 [0.453]   
RLLAi,t-1 -0.177    
 [0.551]   
ROAi,t-1 30.371  8.517  (2.258)** 
 [0.002]*** [0.000]***  
NIIRi,t-1 16.064  -6.825  (1.861) 
 [0.178] [0.032]**  
CSDi,t-1 0.009    
 [0.156]   
LEVi,t-1 0.005  1.409  (-2.459)** 
 [0.711] [0.015]**  
MKTLEVi,t-1 -0.012  -1.218  (2.446)** 
 [0.265] [0.015]**  
SIZEi,t 1.248  -1.284  (2.18)** 
 [0.231] [0.015]**  
N 113 82  
K 10 10  
RSS 13325 3219  
Chow test   6.450** 
R2 0.1789 0.6392  
 
We also perform t-tests to find the differences in estimated coefficients of risk 
fundamentals on default risk indicators. The results are displayed in Column (3) of 
Table 4.8. We conclude significant differences between estimated coefficients of two 
models, and this implies that risk fundamentals of lower-than-median capitalized 
 175 
 
banks are more effective in explaining DD and predicting financial distress than are 
those of higher-than-median capitalized SND banks. Chow test also confirms the 
findings of individual coefficients. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
In recent decades, the issues of detecting banks’ financial fragility and predicting 
banking crisis have been intensively addressed by market investors and bank 
regulators. Over the last few years in particular interest in this area has grown, as a 
result of distress in the funding and money markets. Backward-looking book-based 
risk measures are considered to have limited predictive power to warn about future 
events, and therefore market indicators have been widely employed as a complement 
to traditional accounting data. 
We examine the impacts of subordinated debt on the use of market-based 
measures of default risk for banks, using fundamentals. Our analysis employs 
distance-to-default as a market-based measure of financial distress. We find that 
default risk of banks issuing subordinated debt can be better described by book- and 
market-based measures than can default risk of banks without subordinated debt. Our 
findings imply that subordinated debt investors have greater incentives to monitor 
banks and require more information. Therefore, subordinated debts enhance 
information efficiency and transparency, eliminate information asymmetry and moral 
hazard problems, and so work as an effective instrument in market discipline 
mechanisms.  
We also find that bank fundamentals can more efficiently predict default risk for 
banks issuing subordinated debt where they have higher charter values and bank 
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capitalization. We further examine whether the explanatory power of fundamentals on 
default risk differs in the periods before and after financial crisis. The results show 
increasing predictive power of fundamentals on predictive banks’ default risk.  
Bank regulators undertake on-site and off-site monitoring with large amounts of 
bank accounting information. Nevertheless, very many bank failures and bailouts are 
unexpected by regulators and investors, and this suggests that prediction based on 
accounting information only is not efficient. Our analysis implies that the issuance of 
subordinated debt to foster greater levels of market discipline improves the 
informational efficiency of bank fundamentals. Monitoring using fundamental 
information would be more feasible for SND banks than for non-SND banks. 
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5.1 Introduction 
 
Government bank supervision is an essential element in the market discipline 
mechanism, and market discipline potentially assists the regulatory authorities in 
meeting their goals. Market investors influence banks’ risk-taking decisions and 
performance by using financial instruments such as deposits, equity prices, equity 
volatility and subordinated debt spread. The disciplinary force from the market 
fluctuates and only affects a bank’s operation for a short period. Conversely, statutory 
regulation and supervision are more influential, as well as compulsory. Moreover, 
outcomes from government bank supervisors may be recognized by policymakers, 
and become an Act or Bill.  
However, the monitoring and enforcement of prescriptive regulations and the 
associated regulatory authorities are insufficient and ineffective in the modern world. 
Financial institutions have become too complex, and as the marketplace is changing 
rapidly, bank supervision authority has limited human resources to provide timely and 
comprehensive on-site monitoring for each firm.  
Furthermore, supervisors need to consider the benefits and costs of regulating a 
bank. If the benefits are greater than the costs, then a supervisory authority will not 
take any action. Besides, from a personal career perspective, regulating problem 
financial institutions could be incentive- perverse for bank supervisors. Another flaw 
is that the supervisory data are private and confidential. The problem of information 
asymmetry is also the biggest limitation and obstacle of this research. 
The recent academic literature has regularly argued that using market information 
to enhance market discipline will eventually strengthen the banking regulation system. 
There are two research questions which have been highlighted: does market 
information reflect information about banks accurately? And does the market 
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information add information to supervisory assessment in a timely manner?  
This chapter aims to analyse the second question with empirical evidence for the 
UK. Previous studies in this field examine the relationship between changes of 
government ratings assigned to individual credit institutions and market information. 
However, the government ratings of each bank in the UK are confidential. Therefore, 
a dummy variable is used to indicate whether the government supervisors, the 
Financial Services Authority (FSA) have taken enforcement regulatory actions on 
observed banks.  
Regulatory information, market information and accounting data is acquired from 
the five largest banks in the UK financial markets over the period of June 2001 to 
June 2011, and estimated using a bivariate model to determine whether market 
information has an effect on the FSA’s enforcement regulatory actions on observed 
banks. Both Probit and Logistic models are also used to estimate whether market 
information adds more value than balance-sheets alone on supervisory assessments. 
For further investigation into whether market indicators identify problems before 
supervisors, the case of Royal Bank of Scotland Group (RBS) is studied. 
The findings support the conclusion that the market indicators have influences on 
the FSA’s regulatory decisions, but fail to provide additional valuable information to 
supervisors relative to accounting data. In the case study of RBS, it is shown that 
market indicators did signal impending problems before the government announced 
bailout plans for large banks. However, it is difficult to extract clear signals from 
existing sub-debt spreads data, since they tend to reveal systematic risk rather than 
bank-specific risks. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly summarises the 
banking regulation reforms in the UK and the FSA’s supervisory approach. Section 3 
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demonstrates the theoretical underpinnings of this research, and discusses the relevant 
literature. Section 4 presents the empirical designs and data; results and interpretations 
are provided in Section 5. Section 6 concludes this chapter. 
 
5.2 Background  
 
5.2.1 Banking Regulation Reforms in the UK 
 
In the late 20
th
 century, the UK underwent a series of financial reforms, changing 
the structure of the financial sector to encourage greater competition, but also 
designing new financial regulations to ensure continued financial stability within a 
more competitive environment. The Financial Services Act (1986), known as “Big 
Bang”, was one of the foundations of a number of radical reforms. The main objective 
of this Act was to protect investors during the reforms. This Act introduced a 
self-regulation two-tier system for all financial firms, the lower tier comprising six 
self-regulatory organizations (SROs). Each of these was responsible for a different 
aspect of regulation, and was required to adhere to a number of rules. Additionally, 
there were three prudential regulators: the Bank of England for banks, the Building 
Societies Commission for building societies, and the Department of Trade and 
Industry for insurance regulation. Figure 5.1 shows the organizational structure under 
this regulation regime. 
The advantage of this regulatory system was that it could prevent the problem of 
regulatory forbearance, since the self-regulating bodies had more information and 
knowledge about the operations of their businesses and the best solutions for 
problems; therefore they were thought to be the best judges of the standards and rules. 
However, there are also negative arguments in respect of this regulatory system. 
First, there is no substantial evidence to prove that forbearance may not also occur in 
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self-regulation. Regulatory forbearance is caused by a close relationship between the 
regulators and the regulated firms. This familiarity could result in a laxity in their 
enforcement of regulations, even over-protection. There is abundant evidence for this 
problem occurring among state regulators. But under the self-regulatory Act there 
were no clear rules that might prevent this problem. Moreover, there are also 
arguments that self-regulation might encourage collusive behaviour among firms. The 
practical regulator and the regulated firm also have close connections.  
The increasing number of financial conglomerates also justifies the concern as to 
whether the forbearance problem would occur in the self-regulatory system. These 
two factors raise other arguments which favour regulation by government bodies. 
Self-regulation could provide better information, but conglomerates need to face 
costly compliance procedures. State regulators need to take into consideration 
extensive expenses if government bodies want to resolve the information problem. 
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Figure 5.1. UK Self-Regulatory, Functional Regulation (Based on the Financial Services Act 1986) 
UK Regulatory Structure 1997 
                  Department of 
Trade&Industry 
Supervisor Bank of 
England 
 Securities and Investments Board (SIB) Building Societies 
Commission 
 
 
  Self Regulation Orgs Recognised 
Professional 
Bodies 
Recognised 
Investment 
Exchanges** 
  
 SFA IMRO PIA   
      Building 
Societies* 
Insurance 
Companies* 
Institution Banks* Money Market 
Institutions 
Securities Firms Fund Managers  Financial 
Advisers 
Lawyers 
Accountants 
   
          
Legislation Banking Act 
1987 
 Financial Services Act 1986  Building Societies 
Act 1995 
Insurance 
Companies Act 
1982 
          
Responsibility  Prudential 
Supervision 
 Prudential Supervision and Conduct of Business Regulation  Prudential 
Supervision 
Prudential 
Supervision 
 
 
 
 
*Also regulated under the Financial Services Act for their investment business activities. ** Includes Recognised Clearing Houses 
 
Source: Heffernan, S.,2005. Modern Banking, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Page 229. 
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The 1998 Bank of England Act transferred the Bank of England’s supervisory 
powers to the newly created Financial Services Authority (FSA). In 2000 the 
Financial Services and Markets Act (FSMA) established the FSA, an independent 
non-governmental company, as the sole regulator of all financial institutions. To date, 
FSA rules have focused on four areas: maintaining market confidence in the financial 
system, protecting the UK financial system and enhancing financial stability, securing 
the appropriate degree of consumer protection, and reducing the extent of the effects 
of financial crime on businesses. The new regulatory structure under the FSA is 
shown in figure 5.2 
To achieve these statutory objectives, the FSA adopts a number of standards and 
imposes additional rules and regulations. However, as the supervisor of all financial 
institutions, it is impossible for the FSA to introduce a single system of supervision. 
For example, the prudential concerns relating to banks are mainly issues of illiquidity 
and insolvency, while for insurance firms the value of customers’ policies is the most 
important concern. For the general regulation of all financial institutions, the FSA has 
introduced the risk-based approach to regulation. 
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       Figure 5.2. A Single Financial Regulatory in the UK (based on the Financial Services and Market Act, 2000)  
 
                                               New UK Regulatory Structure 2000 
 
Supervisor Financial Services Authority 
 
       Recognised 
Investment 
Exchanges** 
 UK Listing 
Authority 
 
           
Institution Banks* Money 
Market 
Institutions 
Securities 
Firms 
Fund 
Managers  
Financial 
Advisers 
Lawyers 
Accountants  
 Building 
Societies 
 Insurance 
Companies 
           
Legislation                          Financial Services and Markets Act (2000) 
           
Responsibility Prudential supervision, conduct of business for investment activities (including information on mortgages and market conduct). 
 
** Includes Recognised Clearing Houses. 
 
Source: Heffernan, S., 2005. Modern Banking, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Page 233
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From 2007 the world’s financial system has gone through the greatest crisis in the 
history of financial capitalism. In 2006, US sub-prime defaults were rising. Shortly 
afterwards, two large hedge funds failed, leading to spreads in inter-bank funding and 
other credit products to rise sharply, and the Northern Rock credit squeeze damaged 
confidence, due to an initial collapse in liquidity. In 2008, markets lost confidence 
massively: the housing market problems spread widely in many countries, particularly 
the UK and US. The US government increased support for Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac, while the UK mortgage banks were facing intense funding problems.  
Moreover, Lehmans announced bankruptcy in September, AIG raised collateral 
calls and required a government rescue, and collapses of Washington Mutual, 
Bradford & Bingley and Icelandic banks occurred. These events reveal a mix of credit 
problems and major banks as being significantly reliant on central bank support. The 
UK government began to recapitalise and announced measures to prevent the collapse 
of banks in October 2008, such as the Asset Protection Scheme (Turner’s Review, 
2009). Bank supervisors took action in response to the financial crisis, but more 
importantly, they were aware that banking reform was needed, and a series of 
fundamental changes in regulatory approach are currently under discussion.  
The collapse of Northern Rock, the sub-prime crisis that emerged in the United 
States in 2007 and a series of events following on reveal the inherent fragility of the 
UK banking sector, and the flaws in domestic financial regulation also demonstrate 
the clear need for a drastic overhaul of domestic financial regulation and supervisory 
arrangements. The emphases of the ongoing reforms focus on strengthening the 
financial system and reducing the future likelihood and impact of bank failures. In 
February 2009, the new Banking Act with a new ‘Special Resolution Regime’ (SRR) 
was enacted. After that, Lord Turner, the new Chairman of the FSA, published a 
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detailed review of the necessity of UK financial regulation and supervision reform in 
March 2009. In July 2009, the Government and the Conservative Party also followed 
up with their own White Papers on financial reforms.  
Concomitant with regular arguments contributed by the Bank of England and the 
FSA, these documents examine the contributors to the crisis: for example, failings in 
the regulation of liquidity and the design of failure resolution mechanisms, failings in 
corporate governance and market discipline, and flaws in consumer protection issues. 
A comparison of the reform proposals is reported in the Appendix 1. 
These documents also display a clear consensus about what should be done in the 
future. The starting point is to enhance the domestic supervision system, such as 
having more regulations and tighter monitoring of credit rating agencies, greater use 
of central counterparty clearing for derivative instruments and exchange trading, 
improving accounting standards, enhancing market discipline, etc. (FSA, 2009a & 
2009b; HM Treasury, 2009a; Conservative Party, 2009).  
In addition, Lord Turner (2009) also covers the reform debate in the European 
dimension. The focus of current debate on the European bank regulatory and 
supervisory system is ‘single market’ architecture. Member states of the EU can 
choose minimum standards, set by the EU Directives. Three national committees (the 
‘Lamfalussy Committees’) entirely control the supervision of financial entities, and 
co-supervise cross-border activities with host authorities, based on the agreement 
reached at the Basel Concordat in 1975.  
In Turner’s review (2009) the author strongly suggests engineering greater 
co-ordination of supervisory approaches and macro-prudential analysis across Europe, 
as well as a greater co-ordination of deposit insurance arrangements. These 
suggestions also gained support from the UK Government (HM Treasury, 2009a). 
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Although many national authorities have proposed reforms on bank regulation 
and supervision, Hall (2009) still has concerns on many aspects. The recent global 
financial crisis reveals significant challenges faced by authorities in the UK and 
Europe; however, the ultimate financial architecture to produce micro- and macro- 
prudential regulation has yet to be resolved. Moreover, the effectiveness of proposed 
reforms needs to be validated.  
The House of Commons Treasury Committee (2010) claims that the 
“too-big-to-fail” problem is “too important to ignore”. The objectives of banking 
system reforms are to protect the consumer and the taxpayer, ensuring sustainable 
lending to the economy, rather than increasing moral hazards. Therefore, the 
“too-big-to-fail” or “too-important-to-fail” culture should be ended; the new banking 
system should allow systemic institutions to fail smoothly.  
 
5.2.2 FSA’s Supervision Approach 
In January 2000 the Financial Services Authority (FSA) began to set out their 
approach to regulation in ‘A new Regulator for the New Millennium’. In order to 
deliver their statutory objectives, the FSA have issued a series of reports to explain the 
framework in the last decade. The Supervisory Review Process (SRP) has two parts: 
the Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process (ICAAP), which is the firm’s own 
assessment of the internal capital it needs to hold against its risks; and the Supervisory 
Review and Evaluation Process (SREP), which is the supervisors’ assessment of the 
overall prudential risks to a firm/industry, covering inherent business risk, control 
factors and oversight/internal governance. The overall risk management system can be 
described as follows: 
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Figure 5.3 FSA’s Operating Framework 
 
Source: FSA website  
 
In 2003 the FSA introduced their Advanced, Risk-Responsive Operating 
Framework (ARROW), which covers all aspects of risks, including firm-specific, 
thematic and internal risks. Moreover, the ARROW mechanism is undertaking the 
SREP. Under the ARROW regulatory framework both authorised firms and the FSA 
deliver their objectives in an efficient and economical way. However, there were a 
number of areas for potential improvement reflected in the use of this risk-based 
regulatory framework. Therefore, in 2006 the FSA launched the “ARROW II” 
framework, which is a more principles-based approach, and completely overhauled all 
their risk management processes under the new operating framework.   
Although there have been many changes to ARROW II, the fundamental 
approach to the task of supervision has not changed. Under the framework there are 
three main components: ARROW firms, used to assess firm-specific risks, which is 
also referred to as ‘vertical’ supervision; ARROW themes, used to assess cross-cutting 
risks, which is called ‘horizontal’ supervision; and Internal Risk Management, which 
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is used to assess the FSA’s operational risks. The fundamental feature of the risk 
model is to consider risk to be the combination of potential impacts and the likelihood 
of them occurring, as shown below: 
 
Risks to FSMA objective = Impact of the problem if it occurs x Probability of the 
problem occurring 
 
Within this framework the FSA uses this approach to score each authorised firm, 
prioritise risks and make decisions. Scoring is on a simple four-point scale on both 
elements (impact and probability): low, medium low, medium high or high, for both 
the individual firm and the industry. These ratings will determine the firm regulator’s 
overall approach and the intensity of response. 
The probability of problems occurring is classified into ten high-level ‘risk 
groups’ and these ‘risk groups’ are further divided into ‘risk elements’, which cover 
both business and control risks.  
Horizontal dimensions contain three risk categories involving a firm’s market risk, 
such as direct interactions with retail customers and market counterparties; and a 
firm’s internal risks and prudential risks. The FSA focuses more upon and interacts 
with vertical risk groups, such as gross risks within the firm and control risks. 
Whether the FSA will take mitigating action towards authorised firms depends on the 
controls. In the ARROW II risk model where flexibility has been enhanced, senior 
managers can set parameters to reflect their appetite for risk, for example impact 
thresholds and sector weightings. For those firms designated as other than low impact, 
the FSA performs regular risk assessments within the firms. The results of risk 
assessments may lead to further action, known as a Risk Mitigation Programme (RMP) 
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in the follow-up phase. The overall supervisory approach is set out depending on the 
ratings of impact and probability. 
The overall supervision can be differentiated into three approaches: full ARROW, 
a full risk assessment of probability; ARROW light, a reduced-scope risk assessment; 
and the Small Firms Model, which applies to firms which have a low impact. In all 
Full ARROW and ARROW Light assessments there are core areas which the FSA 
assesses explicitly, for instance management, capital and liquidity. In addition, a series 
of structured stages are designed to gather information and process it, as shown in the 
figure below:  
Figure 5.4 The FSA’s Risk-Assessment Framework 
 
Sources: FSA published paper, the FSA’s Risk-Assessment Framework- August 2006, FSA 
website. 
    
Besides the ongoing monitoring process, the FSA requires firms to assess 
regularly the amount of internal capital adequacy as a risk cushion. This process, 
called the Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process (ICAAP), undertaken 
through ARROW and checked by the Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process 
(SREP) review, is the firm’s responsibility and determines a key input into the 
supervisory review process. The FSA has applied SREP to 2,616 firms, including 
banks, building societies and investment firms. The SREP focuses on the regulation of 
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an individual institution, such as assessing a firm’s overall risk profile, measuring 
capital requirements and controlling capital resources. The intensity and depth of the 
SREP process is significantly reliant on the nature, scale and systemic importance of a 
particular firm. 
The risk scores, supervisory reports and assessment reports are confidential. 
However, the FSA publishes its corporate documents regularly, including Annual 
Reports, Business Plan papers, Financial Risk Outlook documents, Annual Public 
Meeting transcripts and FSA Board Meeting minutes. In 2005 the FSA began to 
publish an annual report of enforcement performance accounts (EPA). The EPA 
measures the effectiveness of bank supervisors’ performance, and reports statistical 
information about cases investigated by the Enforcement and Financial Crime 
Division. Their use of powers comprises six major aspects: variation/ 
cancellation/refusal of authorisation/approval/permissions, criminal outcome, 
financial penalty, civil outcome (injunction/restitution), prohibition and public censure 
only. Table 5.1 summaries the statistical data for the use of these powers by the FSA 
from June 2002 to June 2011. 
Table 5.1 Use of Powers (No. of Cases) 
 
Year 
Variation 
/Cancellation
/Refusal 
Criminal 
outcome  
Financial 
Penalty 
Civil 
Outcome 
Prohibition 
 
Public 
Censure 
Only 
Other  
 
2002-2003 35 1 15 4 4 2 0 
2003-2004 34 1 19 7 9 3 0 
2004-2005 44 0 26 4 9 0 0 
2005-2006 45 3 18 5 7 2 1 
2006-2007 65 1 28 3 10 4 1 
2007-2008 99 0 20 1 30 2 1 
2008-2009 122 1 55 7 48 10 0 
2009-2010 142 5 41 11 57 8 2 
2010-2011 109 3 74 10 65 14 5 
Data Sources: FSA Annual Reports, FSA Enforcement Annual Performance Account Reports 
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Figure 5.5 and Figure 5.6 show the total value of fines and the number of fines 
for each financial year, respectively.  
 
 
   
From 2002 to 2005 the number of financial penalty cases and the total amount of 
fines increased smoothly. During the next few years the total amount of fines rose 
dramatically from 2009 to 2011. Similarly, the number of fines has peaked many 
times in the last few decades. In the financial year 2008-2009, soon after the global 
financial crisis erupted and the UK banking panic occurred, the number of cases 
where financial penalties were imposed increased significantly. During 2010-2011, 
just after the New Basel III capital requirement for banks had been launched, the bank 
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regulation and supervision system was criticized strongly, and the number of fines 
rose greatly, as did the level of the fines.  
The failures of the past, such as the nationalisation of Northern Rock and 
Branford & Bingley, the brokering of takeover rescues of Alliance & Leicester (by 
Banco Santander) and HBOS (by Lloyds TSB) also call for reforms in the FSA’s 
supervisory approach. Lord Turner’s review (2009a) states that the primary focus of 
the FSA should not only lie in the regulation of individual institutions 
(‘micro-prudential’ regulation) but also needs to combine the regulation of the overall 
system and systemic risk management (‘macro-prudential’ regulation).  
The FSA is completing the Supervisory Enhancement Programme (SEP), which 
aims to devote increasingly large resources to high-impact firms for the purpose of 
strengthening market discipline and infrastructure, and this programme is supported 
by the UK government (HM Treasury, 2009).  
Moreover, in the ARROW approach, remuneration policies are the new focus. 
Turner (2009) designs remuneration policies for top executives and traders, because 
inappropriate incentives to take extra risks have contributed to the financial crisis 
(Hall, 2009). The FSA’s supervisory approach is no longer ‘light touch’ (Turner’s 
review, 2009), but is becoming more intrusive and systematic. 
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5.3 Literature Review  
 
5.3.1 Theoretical Literature Review 
There is an extensive academic literature regarding the ways in which market 
indicators exert indirect market discipline. Supervisory authorities can use market 
information in setting up early warning systems and take further actions to constrain 
developments in financial institutions, such as changing grades in bank examinations, 
pricing deposit insurance or setting capital requirements (Berger, 1991).  
This stream of research primarily focuses on the US bank supervisory system. 
On-site inspection, where a team of supervisors pay a firm a visit and analyse its 
operations in detail, is considered the “most comprehensive tool for banking 
supervision” (Krainer and Lopz, 2008). As an outcome of on-site supervision, the 
rating CAMEL/BOPEC, which is exercised on a roughly annual basis, reviews the 
examiners’ opinion of the firm’s overall financial condition. It has been well 
documented that changes of supervisory examination outcomes can influence firms’ 
operations in many aspects. 
Swindle (1995) and Ediz et al (1998) give examples of regulator driven control. 
By studying the capital adequacy component of CAMEL on commercial banks in the 
US, Swindle (1995) finds that publicly available information forces a measure of 
regulatory pressure to influence inadequately capitalised banks to improve their 
capital position. Furthermore, Ediz et al (1998) conclude that capital requirements 
from regulators have more influence on bank behaviour than banks’ own internally 
generated capital targets. 
Other research focuses on how rating downgrade drives market control. Crabbe 
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and Post (1994) examine the response of commercial paper issuances and the 
Certificates of Deposit funding market to rating downgrades, and find that a bank’s 
stock of outstanding commercial paper is more sensitive to the rating downgrade, and 
that it consequently contracts its balance sheet. The authors also suggest that deposit 
insurance may remove market discipline from the Certificates of Deposit market; 
therefore the CD shows insignificant responses to the downgrades. Similarly, Billett et 
al (1998) find that rating changes have influences on financial institutions’ funding 
composition. For example, large, uninsured liabilities shift to insured.  
Ultimately, based on the force imparted by market indicators, supervisory 
authorities enforce regulatory actions on observed banks, such as prompt corrective 
actions to complete the mechanism of market discipline. Evanoff and Wall (2001a, 
2002 and 2003) recommend using subordinated debt market indicators, instead of 
capital ratios which are currently used to initiate prompt corrective action by bank 
supervisors. The authors compare the effectiveness of subordinated debt yields and 
risk-based capital respectively to examination ratings in the US, and find that the 
subordinated debt yield spread is the better measurement for reflecting and predicting 
the riskiness of the banking organization. In addition, Meyer (1999) argues that 
subordinated debt spreads provide timely information to help the FDIC to set more 
accurate deposit insurance premiums. 
Finally, Baumann et al (2003), based on the UK supervision authorities, assess 
the behaviour of six market-based indicators in seven major UK-owned banks, which 
represent more than 90% of the total assets of UK banks. The six market-based 
indicators are: bond spreads, credit default swap (CDS) prices, equity prices, equity 
returns, implied volatilities and implied probabilities of default (PDs). The authors 
conclude that equity-based indictors are more sensitive to bank-specific risk factors, 
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while the bond-based market indicators respond more effectively to systematic shocks 
than microeconomic effects. 
Evanoff and Wall (2003) develop a model of optimal bank discipline. The 
objectives of the bank supervisor are to minimize the cost of errors in the disciplining 
of banks and to maximize social welfare. Sometimes these two objectives come into 
conflict. For example, a bank supervisor might sometimes exercise forbearance on 
regulating weak banks and place social welfare at risk. 
Let us assume that banks can be of two quality types Q∈{H,L}. Type L, low 
quality banks, should be disciplined by the regulators, and Type H, high quality banks, 
should not be disciplined. Disciplining type H banks is a type 1 error, which generates 
total social costs of T1. Failure to discipline a type L bank is a type 2 error, which 
generates total social costs of T2. Bank examiners observe bank types by receiving a 
signal of each bank’s quality, R, which takes one of three forms: R∈{A,B,C}. If the 
examiner receives signal A, it indicates with certainty that the bank is type H; and if 
the examiner receives signal C, this signifies that the bank may be type L. However, if 
the examiner receives signal B, it only implies that the bank is type H with probability 
q and type L with the probability (1-q).   
Besides these three forms of signal, an independent signal of a bank’s quality (IS), 
such as a capital adequacy ratio or the yield on a bank’s subordinated debt should be 
observed, and ∞<IS<∞. Through observing this independent signal the bank 
supervisor can trigger Prompt Corrective Action (PCA). With the observation of this 
independent signal, the probability that a bank is a high quality type H bank is P(H/IS), 
the probability that a bank is low quality type L bank is (1-P(H/IS)), and P’(H/IS) >0 
which implies that the probability that a bank is type H is an increasing function of IS.  
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On the assumption that there are no agency problems, the bank examiner always 
uses the signal R optimally. When the signal is A the examiner never disciplines banks, 
when the signal is C the examiner always disciplines banks, and if the signal is B the 
examiner only disciplines banks when the expected cost of incorrectly disciplining 
type H banks that are rated B is greater than the cost of incorrectly failing to discipline 
type L banks, as: 
 
qT1 < (1-q)T2 
 
If the alternative signal, IS, is available, the examiner may incorporate the signal 
to avoid disciplining errors. One way to employ IS into the discipline process is to 
establish a single trigger score (t) for PCA to discipline all banks. In this case, banks 
with IS values less that t would be disciplined, and banks with an IS value greater 
than t but where the examiner receives a signal C would be disciplined as well. 
Therefore, Evanoff and Wall (2003) solving the value of t minimizes the social costs 
of disciplining all banks: 
 
min 1 ( / , ) 1 ( / , ) 2(1 ( / , ))
t t
t
t
SC T p H IS R A dIS T p H IS R B dIS T p H IS R A dIS

 
          
(5.1) 
 
The costs of a Type 1 error arise in the case of some banks with the values of IS 
less than t but with signal A having been disciplined. Moreover, there are potential 
classification errors of some high and low quality banks that receive rating signal B. 
With the certainty that type A banks should not be disciplined, the independent signal 
could be applied only to type B banks. Hence the optimal trigger point for the social 
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planner suggested by Evanoff and Wall (2003) is: 
min 1 ( / , ) 2(1 ( / , ))
t
t
t
SC T p H IS R B dIS T p H IS R A dIS


          (5.2) 
 
The bank supervisor can choose one of the three strategies with the lowest costs: 
(1) discipline all type B banks; (2) discipline none of the type B banks; and (3) 
discipline type B banks with IS >t.  
Consider reality, in which the agency problems exist. Bank supervisors may 
exercise forbearance. A regulator’s incentives towards forbearance are complex. 
Regulators may discover that the costs of disciplining a bank are greater than the 
benefits, or find it is hard to intervene in a timely manner, especially if it affects their 
own career prospects. In this case, let us assume that a supervisor rates all banks as A 
or C, and exercises forbearance or leniency on the C-rated banks with the probability 
of L where 0< L≤1. Moreover, bank supervisors know that they will face a Congress 
penalty if they fail to regulate a C-rated bank. Therefore they may claim that the 
examination of the bank should return to signal A.  
The social planner needs to pick a PCA trigger rate to minimize the following 
social costs which is suggested by Evanoff and Wall (2003), with a given probability 
of forbearance, L: 
min 1 ( / , ) 2( )(1 ( / , ))
t
t
t
SC T p H IS R A dIS T L p H IS R C dIS


         
(5.3) 
 
Evanoff and Wall (2003) calculates the value of t under the effect of an increase 
in the proportion of C rated banks that receive forbearance L as: 
. . 0/ [ 2 2 ( / , )]/[ 1 '( / , ) 2 '( / , )] 0F O C
t
T T p H t R C T p H t R A T Lp H t R C
L


       

 
(5.4) 
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An increase in the forbearance leads to a decrease in t*, and leads to more banks 
being disciplined. 
Equations (5.1) and (5.2) imply the usefulness of an independent signal. In the 
absence of agency costs, a single trigger point for all banks is inefficient. Furthermore, 
the appropriate use of the independent signal may improve social welfare.  
Equations (5.3) and (5.4) indicate that agency contributes to cause bank 
supervisors’ regulatory forbearance, and an increase in the rate of forbearance will 
lead to a lower trigger point for the independent signal. Special attention should be 
paid to the empirical analysis in cases where the examination signal says the bank is 
low-risk but the independent signal says otherwise.  
 
5.3.2 Empirical Literature Review  
Many researchers have examined the potential usefulness of incorporating market 
information into the bank supervisory process. Many existing studies focus primarily 
on two markets: the equity and bond markets.  
The application of equity data in supervisory assessments has been well 
documented, and most of the studies find that the equity market contributes to 
improving the supervisors’ knowledge of intermediaries’ firm-specific financial 
conditions. 
Berger et al (2000) compare supervisory and market assessments for large US 
bank holding companies over the period 1989:Q4 to 1992:Q2 to evaluate which 
assessment can obtain timely and accurate information about their financial conditions. 
The authors gather two confidential measures of supervisory examination, BOPEC 
ratings and the frequency of on-site BHC inspections, and four market indicators: 
Moody’s ratings of outstanding firm debts, BHC’s abnormal stock return, the 
 200 
 
proportion of outstanding equity owned by corporate insiders, and the proportion of 
corporate equity owned by institutional investors.  
The authors also evaluate timeliness by testing the marginal ability of market 
information to predict supervisory ratings, and compare the accuracy of both 
assessments by measuring the marginal value of each assessment group in predicting 
future changes of the firm’s performance. The results suggest that supervisory 
authorities and bond rating agencies are using similar information to complete each 
other’s predictions. However, equity market indicators do not have a strong 
relationship with the supervisory assessments. Compared with the accuracy of equity 
and bond market indicators in predicting further changes in BHC’s performance, 
supervisory assessments are generally less accurate if they are not derived from a 
recent on-site inspection.  
Similarly, Krainer and Lopez (2001) examine the potential contribution of various 
equity market indicators, such as stock returns and the expected default frequency 
(EDF) to help bank supervisors conduct accurate assessment ratings (BOPEC) in the 
US bank holding companies over the period 1990 to 1999. The results indicate that 
equity-based indicators anticipate BOPEC downgrades, and also that the anticipation 
can begin up to four quarters in advance. Therefore, the equity market provides useful 
monitoring information to supervisors. Moreover, the authors propose a BOPEC 
off-site monitoring (BOM) model.  
After estimating quarterly regulatory reports with ordered logit models, Krainer 
and Lopez (2001) find that adding equity market variables into the BOPEC model 
improves the supervisory rating’s forecast accuracy. Based on the off-site monitoring 
model, Krainer and Lopez (2003) find that equity prices do strengthen supervisory 
ratings’ forecasting power on financial institutions’ conditions. Furthermore, Krainer 
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and Lopez (2008) conclude that compared with debt and bond market indicators, 
securities market information can better identify additional ratings downgrades, such 
as banks affected by systemic risk and contagion.   
Gunther et al (2001) claim that stock prices not only help bank supervisors 
predict a bank’s financial condition and then reflect it in ratings appropriately, but that 
they also supply more information to supervisory assessments. Besides focusing the 
accuracy of equity information on supervisory assessments, Curry et al (2003) 
measure to what extent equity market variables provide timely market signals. A 
sample of banks which were downgraded to the CAMEL 3, 4 or 5 levels during the 
period 1988 to 1995 is used in comparison with a sample of banks assigned rates 1 or 
2, which indicate that these banks are healthy. The results of bivariate regressions 
show that market variables appeared to provide timely information before supervisors 
downgraded banks. However, only once combined with quarterly financial data does 
the market information appear to add any marginal improvements. 
Besides comprehensive studies on US markets, Cannata and Quagliariello (2004) 
use an ordered logistic model to determine the ability of abnormal equity return, 
distance to default (DTD) and monthly distance to default (MDTD) in forecasting the 
levels of PATROL ratings. The sample includes Italian listed banks on the Milan stock 
exchange over the period 1995 to 2002. They find that equity returns fail to provide 
reliable information until a time window close to the supervisory assignment, whereas 
DTD is consistent with supervisory ratings. 
The most commonly used measure of risk in bond markets is the bond spread, 
which is defined as the difference in yield on a bond and a risk-free government bond 
of a similar state of maturity and in the same currency. Recently, since Basel II drew 
attention to market discipline and subordinated debt, yield spreads of subordinated 
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debentures and notes have become major concerns. 
Evanoff and Wall (2001a and 2002) support the argument that sub-debt yield 
spreads contain timely and accurate information about issuing banks’ risk-taking 
incentives and overall financial conditions, and therefore that spreads could be used as 
an effective tool of market discipline.  
Evanoff and Wall (2003) further propose the adoption of subordinated debt yield 
spreads as additional triggers for supervisory discipline under Prompt Corrective 
Action (PCA). PCA is currently triggered by the capital adequacy ratio, and the ability 
to limit supervisory forbearance is considered to be weakening through reliance on 
capital ratio. Theoretically, Evanoff and Wall (2003) find that using an imperfect 
measure improves PCA outcomes even if the supervisor has perfect information. To 
capture the probability of failure over the business cycle and long-term effects on 
liquidity and credit risk, the authors also apply subordinated debt yield spreads over 
Treasury securities on empirical analysis, showing that sub-debt yield spreads have 
the substantial predictive powers which current supervisory assessment requires. 
However, they are also concerned that spreads may mislead investors. For example, 
other signs from banks which have high spreads fail to support the notion that the 
banks are high-risk. 
Van der Weide and Kini (2000) propose that bank regulators should require large 
banks to issue a minimum amount of long-term subordinated debt to market investors, 
and furthermore set a comprehensive subordinated debt programme. Without the 
bureaucratic and other inefficiencies entailed in federal government, sub-debt holders 
in both private and secondary markets signal to federal regulators and constrain bank 
risk-taking effectively.  
Hancock and Kwast (2001) observe the secondary market prices of subordinated 
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debt in the US, finding that yield spreads have been affected by many factors, such as 
specific characteristics of the instrument and frequency of the trading bonds. Besides 
its own interest rates, price and maturity, each subordinated debt is affected by other 
debts with prevailing rates and similar levels of maturity. Yields can also be affected 
by timing characteristics for cash flow to bond investors, such as call options, 
step-ups and the frequency of coupon payment.  
To critically analyse whether subordinated debt yield spreads are risk-sensitive, 
Hancock and Kwast develop criteria from alternative data sources, using weekly data 
over the period January 1997 to October 1999 on 265 bonds issued by 40 bank 
holding companies. The authors also derive the KMV model, which estimated default 
frequencies with equity price data and balance sheet information by federal regulators. 
Even the interpretation of sub-debt spreads is more difficult than other bond market 
developments; however, the evidence supports the use of subordinated debt spread in 
supervisory surveillance. 
Furthermore, Covitz, Hancock and Kwast (2004a) analyse the usefulness of 
subordinated debt issuance within banking organization funding strategies over three 
deposit insurance regimes: 1985-87, the de facto too-big-to-fail regime; 1988-1992, 
the purchase and assumption regime, and 1993-2002, the post-FDICIA regime. 
Estimating a sample selection model and an ordinary least squares (OLS) model, the 
authors find that market discipline was weak in the early period but strengthened later. 
Consistently with previous studies, Covitz et al (2004a) find that the secondary 
spreads are influenced by each subordinated debt’s specific characteristics and issuing 
banks’ firm-specific risks. Moreover, they suggest that the risk-sensitivity of spreads 
from the secondary subordinated debt market can be affected by fund managers’ 
decisions. For further analysis of the importance of subordinated debt for bank 
 204 
 
supervisors, the authors propose that the Federal Bank should require large US 
banking organizations to issue a mandatory sub-debt programme. 
Sironi (2003) is one of the few academic studies to focus on the European 
subordinated debt market. With a unique dataset of spreads during the 1991-2000:Q1 
period, Moody’s Bank Financial Strength (MBFS) and Fitch IBCA Individual (FII) 
ratings and bank accounting information, Sironi (2003) finds that sub-debt issued by 
private firms is sensitive to bank risk; however, sub-debt issued by public sector 
banks, such as government owned or guaranteed institutions, fails to show 
risk-sensitive idiosyncrasies due to too-big-to-fail effects. Therefore, this result 
contributes to the loss of control of monetary policy by national central banks and the 
public budget constraints imposed by the European Monetary Union (EMU). 
The recent global financial distress is changing the circumstances of the world, 
and also the banking systems and sub-debt markets. Evenoff, Jagtiani and Nakata 
(2011) take into consideration new sub-debt issuance, new market environments and 
new regulatory frameworks. They find that the degree of market discipline of the US 
banking industry has been enhanced by previous sub-debt programmes, in the same 
way as market transparency. From this perspective the authors suggest the promotion 
of a mandatory subordinated debt programme with specific characteristics in the 
banking regulatory reform in order to achieve greater liquidity and transparency. 
Since market indicators have begun to receive increasing levels of attention from 
policy makers, academic researchers and market investors, a stream of studies has 
emerged comparing market indicators from different markets, mainly the sub-debt 
market and stock market. The results are conflicting. 
Flannery (1998) provides a comprehensive literature review on comparing the 
effects of using different market information in prudential bank supervision within the 
 205 
 
US as empirical evidence. Equity prices of banks, he concludes from the sample, have 
endogamous signs with equity prices of non-bank firms, because Equity investors 
react rationally to firms’ new information. On the other hand, signals from the bond 
market sensibly reflect bank risks. Therefore, regulators should combine private and 
public information to supervise banks, particularly large banking firms. For example, 
stock market indicators can be used to predict a firm’s performance, but bond market 
signals are particularly complementary to supervisory assessments of bank conditions.   
Krainer and Lopez (2008) propose a BOPEC off-site monitoring model (BOM) 
with supervisory information as well as variables from both equity and debt markets. 
To measure the contribution of equity information to the supervisory bodies 
monitoring bank holding companies, they construct an abnormal return derived over a 
period and a fitted return estimated by a two-factor model, while using a BHC’s 
adjusted weighted bond yield to examine the bond market’s contribution to lagged 
BOPEC ratings. The results show that securities market variables improve the model’s 
in-sample fit; however they are weak in out-of-sample forecasting. Additionally, 
debt-based indicators provide information for supervisory assessment when BHCs are 
closer to default; nevertheless equity market indicators provide additional information 
further from default.  
Gropp, Vesala and Vulpes (2002 and 2004) use a logit model and a proportional 
hazard model, and a sample of EU banks to ascertain the quality of two market 
indicators: distance to default, which is driven by the stock market, and subordinated 
debt spreads. The results show that distance to default can predict downgrades 
between six and eighteen months in advance, but that closer to the event the 
predictive power is quite poor. Sub-debt spreads exert influence over twelve months, 
and can only be a useful predictor for banks.  
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In addition, distance to default provides some information relative to accounting 
variables to regulators, but this is not so for spreads. However, combining these two 
market indicators reduces the possibility of misclassifying a sound bank as a weak 
one. Therefore, the appropriate interpretation of market indicators prevents bank 
supervisors from chasing false leads. 
Persson and Blavarg (2003) assess the stability of the Swedish banking system by 
presenting some new indicators based on equity and bond markets; the data sample 
includes six banks that existed through the entire crisis period from 1987 to 1994. 
However, the Swedish subordinated debt market was not liquid enough to be 
employed as a complementary of supervisory assessment. Birchler and Facchinetti 
(2007) examine the Swiss bank supervisory framework, and find that market data 
provides limited useful information to supervisory authorities. 
Hamalainen et al (2010b) produce an event study of Northern Rock, which was 
nationalized in 2007, to analyse whether four financial market instruments identified 
impending problems at Northern Rock. The market instruments include equity signals 
(equity prices, trading volumes, returns and distant-to-default), exchange-traded 
option contracts indicators (implied idiosyncratic volatilities), subordinated debt 
market indicators (yield spreads) and credit default swaps indicators (prices and 
spreads). The paper’s findings support the argument that equity market indicators can 
predict default far in advance, while the sub-debt spreads react closer to default. Also, 
the interpretation of SND spreads requires careful judgement, since the spreads reflect 
many dimensions of risk. 
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5.4 Methodology and Data  
 
5.4.1 Empirical Design 
 
It is difficult to measure bank supervisor regulatory forbearance in the UK. Most 
previous research focuses on US cases. However, it is crucial not to apply the US 
model to UK banking regulation, since the supervision framework and outcomes are 
not the same. Moreover, the ratings that the FSA assigned to banks are confidential. 
These two considerable obstacles make it difficult for this research to be as 
comprehensive as previous studies. 
Birchler and Facchinetti (2007) suggest that the optimal link between market data 
and policy action can be written as: 
 
i = F(M,P,S,d)                                    
 
Where i denotes actions taken by the regulator as a function of a vector of market 
data M, a vector of other public information such as accounting data P, a vector of 
private supervisory information S and a discretionary term d. In this intervention 
function S is not publicly observable, and d cannot be specified in advance.  
Curry et al (2003) assess the timing and magnitude of the relationship between 
equity market valuations of commercial banks in the US and the supervisory effects 
on these financial institutions by examining changes in CAMEL ratings. CAMEL 
ratings are assigned on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being the highest and 5 the lowest. 
Ratings of 1 and 2 imply that institutions’ financial condition is fundamentally sound. 
Downgrading the rating to 3 is an important signal of supervisory concern. 
Downgrading to 4 or 5 indicates the existence of serious problems, with the institution 
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at risk of a distinct possibility of insolvency.  
In the UK banking supervisory system we cannot obtain information of such a 
rating or a similar scale of measurements. However, formal enforcement actions taken 
by the FSA, such as cancelling or refusing authorisation/approval/permissions, as well 
as criminal convictions and financial penalties, are reported in the FSA Annual Report 
and the FSA Enforcement Report every fiscal year. The regulatory enforcement 
actions taken by the FSA on examining banks can be taken as our dependent variable.  
An abundance of studies find that subordinated debt spreads do contain sufficient 
information to reflect an issuing bank’s financial conditions (e.g. DeYoung et al, 2001; 
Jagtiani et al, 2002). Krishnan et al (2005) emphasize that both yield spread levels and 
changes should reflect risk along the entire yield curve. In addition, Evanoff and Wall 
(2001a, 2002) point out that, compared with current regulatory measures used by US 
bank supervisors to trigger “prompt corrective action”, subordinated debt spread is 
more informative for identifying problem banks  
Previous studies of how market information affects supervisory decisions have 
produced solid results (e.g. Flannery, 1998). Greenspan (2001) points out that greater 
disclosure of data from a variety of markets helps policymakers in harnessing market 
discipline, and that significant changes in a large bank’s subordinated debt spreads 
can prompt more intensive monitoring from the bank supervisor. Calomiris (1999) 
argues that to introduce credible market discipline into the deposit insurance systems, 
subordinated debt is an optimal instrument. Hence the author proposes that the 
subordinated debt spread should be the only element in the intervention function..  
Therefore, as suggested by previous related studies, the following models are 
evaluated: 
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Regulation Actionsi,t = α+ΣβiBalance-sheet variablei,t+μi,t (5.1) 
Regulation Actionsi,t = α+ΣδiMarket Variablesi,t+μi,t     (5.2) 
Regulation Actionsi,t = α+ΣβiBalance-sheet variablei,t+ΣδiMarket Variablesi,t+μ
i,t                                                                         (5.3) 
 
Model (5.1) includes only balance-sheet variables and Model (5.2) includes only 
market-based indicators, captured market movements and conditions from the stock 
market and subordinated debt market. In model (5.3) both balance-sheet and 
market-based variables are included to verify the ability of market variables to 
provide extra information to supervisors. As suggested by Cannata and Quagliariello 
(2005) and given the small number of UK listed large banks, all the observations are 
pooled to eliminate the irrelevant time perspective and adopt the lag structure of the 
variables. One advantage of using a panel data set is that although the pooled 
estimator ignores the actual structure of error term, it provides consistent estimates of 
coefficients. Therefore, the models above are described as follows: 
 
Regulation Actionsi,t = α+ΣβiBalance-sheet variablei,t-1+μi,t (5.4) 
Regulation Actionsi,t = α+ΣδiMarket Variablesi,t-1+μi,t     (5.5) 
Regulation Actionsi,t = α + Σ β iBalance-sheet variablei,t-1+ Σ δ iMarket 
Variablesi,t-1+μi,t                                                       (5.6) 
 
The regulatory enforcement actions are sticky and various. Therefore, a dummy 
variable is used to represent whether the FSA has taken action on observed banks. The 
dummy is equal to 1 if the FSA takes regulatory enforcement action on bank i at time 
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t, and 0 otherwise. This in fact is a reason why only five large listed banks are 
considered, instead of all banks listed in the FTSE.  
The FSA enforcement entails FSA’s disciplinary, criminal and civil powers to 
take actions against regulated and non-regulated firms and individuals who have 
failed to have failed to meet the standards that the FSA requests (the FSA, 2010e). 
Examples of enforcements include withdrawing a firm’s authorisation, prohibiting an 
individual from operating in financial services, suspending a firm to up to 12 months 
from undertaking specific regulated activities, and censuring firms and individuals 
through public statements. 
The regulatory actions taken by bank supervisors are not frequent and swift; if all 
listed banks in the UK were studied, the occurrence of too many unchanging values 
for the dependent variables might affect the robustness of the results, and explanatory 
variables might turn out to be significant simply because they explain a few 
regulatory events. Therefore the five largest listed banks in the UK, which are also 
frequently supervised by the FSA, are observed. 
Some of the balance-sheet variables are selected which are widely adopted in 
related studies (e.g. Cannata and Quagliariello, 2005) and by bank supervisory 
authorities (e.g. European Banking Authority, EBA) in off-site supervisory analyses. 
Definitions of selected variables are presented in Table 5.2.  
The proportion of bad debt in total loans captures the overall riskiness of the bank 
portfolio, while the ratio of total loan losses to operating profit indicates the likelihood 
of debtors’ financial conditions on the profit and loss account deteriorating. These two 
ratios are used as indexes of bank riskiness. To capture observed banks’ profitability 
four indicators are used to measure the overall levels of profitability, diversification 
and efficiency.  
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Another risk element to which all bank supervisory bodies pay close attention is 
capital adequacy. Two ratios are used to assess the bank’s capability to satisfy the 
capital requirements. Since Basel I, increasing attention has been paid to the Tier 1 
capital ratio, and it has become a core measure of a bank’s financial strength from a 
regulatory point of view. It is also increasingly being adopted by other market 
operators such as rating agencies. The logarithm of total assets is calculated as a 
control variable. 
Data are obtained for many equity market indicators because each of the banks in 
the study is listed in the FTSE 100, and therefore there is a liquid market for its equity 
liabilities. Daily data are collected from stock markets, and the distance to default 
9
(DD) is then calculated. DD is the variance between market value and asset value, 
constituted by asset volatility, stock volatility and other key risk elements. Other 
market instruments from the equity market, such as equity prices, equity trading 
volumes and equity returns, are also adopted. Another market indicator explored is 
yield spreads of subordinated debt, which is the difference between sub-debt yield and 
treasury bonds with similar maturity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
  9 The detailed literature review and calculation are reported in previous chapter. 
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             Table 5.2 Definitions of Variables 
 
Variable  Description 
Balance-sheet variables 
Riskiness 
RISKBD Bad debts/Total loans 
LLOSS Loan losses / Operating profit 
Profitability  
ROE Net income / Capital and reserves 
NETINCOME Net income / Gross income  
FINSERVINC Income stemming from financial services/ Gross 
income 
Capital Adequacy 
SOLVERATIO Supervisory capital / Risk-weighted assets 
TIER1RATIO Tier 1 capital / Risk-weighted assets 
Control Variable   
Size  Natural logarithm of total assets  
Market indicators  
DD Distance to default 
Equity prices Equity prices for each bank in the study 
Equity trading volumes Equity trading volumes for each bank  
Equity returns Equity returns for each bank 
Spreads Spreads of subordinated debt  
 
5.4.2 Data  
Data are selected from the five biggest banks in the UK: Barclays (BAR), HSBC, 
Lloyds Banking Group (LLOY), Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) and Standard 
Chartered Bank Plc (STAN). The sample period is from June 2001 to June 2011. The 
summary of variables is shown in Table 5.3. 
One potential concern relating on this study is the data sample size. There are 
reasons why the five biggest banks in the UK are selected. From the standpoint of 
SND issuing, compared with small financial institutions, big banks issue subordinated 
debt more frequently and in larger amounts. Hancock and Kwast (2001) and 
Maclachlan (2002) provide evidence that subordinated debt provides stronger 
disciplinary forces to the big banks. Furthermore, UK banks issued 308 new 
subordinated debts from 2001 to May 2011, and 211 of them came from the biggest 
five banks, as shown in Figure 5.7.  
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Secondly, although the FSA regulates small firms, the regulatory actions and 
enforcement cases concerning big banks are more intensive. Moreover, the FSA has 
run intensive stress tests for major banks during the past few years to assess their 
capital requirements and major banks’ potential need to participate in the 
Government’s Asset Protection Scheme (APS). In particular, during 2009 and 2010 
extensive discussions were held with Lloyds Banking Group (LLOY) and the Royal 
Bank of Scotland (RBS). However, there are very few reports about small financial 
organizations’ regulatory actions. Therefore, the biggest five banks in the UK are 
selected to examine whether sub-debt provides indirect market discipline.  
 
 
The dependent variable, regulation, is derived from the FSA annual report, the 
FSA annual enforcement performance account report and the FSA public release 
website. Banks’ accounting data, stock data and subordinated debt market data are 
collected from Thompson One Banker and Datastream. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.7 New Sub-debt Issuance 
Barclays 
17% 
HSBC 
15% 
LLOYDS 7% 
RBS 22% Stan 7% 
Others 
32% 
New Sub-
debt 
issuance by 
UK banks, 
from 2001 
to May 
2011 
Data Source: Thomson  
                        One Banker 
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Table 5.3 Sample Summary Statistics 
Table 5.3 shows the summary statistics for regulation, accounting variables and market variables of the whole sample. REGULATION 
is a dummy variable, and takes 1 if the FSA takes enforcement actions on the bank, 0 otherwise. RISKBD is the ratio of bad debts to 
total loans, LLOSS is the ratio of loan loss to operating profit, ROE is the ratio of net income to capital and reserves, NETING is the 
ratio of net income to gross income, FSERVIN is the ratio of income stemming from financial services to gross income, SOLVER is 
the ratio of supervisory capital to risk-weighted assets, TIER1 is the ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets, SIZE is the natural 
logarithm of total assets, SPREAD refers to the spreads of subordinated debt, DD is the distance to default, EQPRI denotes the equity 
prices for each bank, EQVOL is the equity trading volumes, and EQRET is the equity return. 
Variable No. Mean Median Min Max St.dev Skewness Kurtosis 
REGULATION 50 0.1818 0 0 1 0.3892 1.6499 3.7222 
RISKBD 44 0.0184 0.0164 0.0013 0.0617 0.0124 1.5358 5.7388 
LLOSS 48 3.4316 2.8676 -6.6938 18.0911 3.1682 1.5285 12.7823 
ROE 50 13.8034 15.295 -43.14 37.02 11.1567 -2.6152 15.0483 
NETING 50 11.2452 13.315 -40.3 22.91 9.197 -3.7317 21.0269 
FSERVIN 41 1.2841 0 -0.1212 7.0359 1.8964 1.5303 4.2631 
SOLVER 47 0.2115 0.1956 0.0428 0.3928 0.0913 0.3104 2.1992 
TIER1 47 0.3274 0.3227 0.1425 0.4717 0.0828 -0.1427 2.3812 
SIZE 50 8.7064 8.6756 7.8274 9.3792 0.4082 -0.4437 2.5444 
SPREAD 47 71.6661 40.54 0 389.44 99.6018 1.1867 3.3922 
DD 49 1.622 1.6027 -9.2338 11.1455 4.7665 -0.4012 2.6133 
EQPRI 50 4610.352 4538.7 29.7 17085.4 4927.054 1.0591 3.0012 
EQVOL 50 1.19E+07 9931 1286187 3.55E+07 8200138 0.94 3.6176 
EQRET 50 -0.0399 0.0846 -1.9553 0.6348 0.4431 -2.1901 9.3642 
 
Table 5.3 presents the key descriptive statistics for the pooled sample of the five 
largest banks in the UK from the period 2001 to 2010. The sample mean (median) of 
DD is 1.6220 (1.6072). Cannata and Quagliariello (2005), using a sample of Italian 
banks whose shares were listed on the Italian stock exchange from 1995 to 2002, 
report the mean DD in a range of 1.99 to 3.0, and median DD in a range of 1.99 to 
2.79, for banks assigned different PATROL rating levels. The sample mean (median) 
of Spread value is 96.2373. Evanoff et al (2011) examine the subordinated debt 
spreads issued by banks and bank holding companies in the US for the period 
1990-1999, and report a sample mean of Spread at 90.78.  
Regarding the accounting measures of risk, the mean (median) values of loan 
losses/operating profit and bad debts/total loans are 3.4316 (2.8676) and 0.0184 
(0.0164), respectively. Mean (median) values of ROE are 13.3084 (12.295), this 
indicator capturing the overall probability of banks defaulting. Mean (median) 
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NETINCOME and FINSERVINC are 11.2452 (13.315) and 1.2841 (0), respectively. 
In our sample, the mean (median) values of supervisory capital/total capital and Tier 1 
capital/total capital are 0.2115 (0.1956) and 0.3274 (0.3227) respectively. These 
measures capture overall bank performance from the regulators’ point of view 
(Cannata and Quagliariello, 2005, European Banking Authority). 
Table 5.4 Correlation Matrix 
Table 5.4 represents the correlation matrix for two groups of accounting variables and market variables of the whole sample. 
REGULATION is a dummy variable, and takes 1 if the FSA takes enforcement actions on the bank, 0 otherwise. RISKBD is the 
ratio of bad debts to total loans, LLOSS is the ratio of loan loss to operating profit, ROE is the ratio of net income to capital and 
reserves, NETING is the ratio of net income to gross income, FSERVIN is the ratio of income stemming from financial services 
to gross income, SOLVER is the ratio of supervisory capital to risk-weighted assets, TIER1 is the ratio of Tier 1 capital to 
risk-weighted assets, SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets, SPREAD refers to the spreads of subordinated debt, DD is the 
distance to default, EQPRI denotes the equity prices for each bank, EQVOL is the equity trading volumes, and EQRET is the 
equity return. 
Panel A: Correlations between balance-sheet variables  
 RISKBD LLOSS ROE NETIN FSERVI SOLVER TIER1 
LLOSS .0549       
ROE -.3282 -.0079      
NETIN -.3087 -.0104 .9225     
FSERVI -.1492 -.0339 .0384 .2339    
SOLV -.3841 .1236 .3561 .2575 -.0178   
TIER1 -.0592 .0773 .1873 .1696 .0221 .7152  
Size  .4499 -.0308 -.3274 -.3977 -.6091 -.6215 -.3301 
Panel B: Correlation between market indicators     
 DD SPREAD EQPRI EQVOL     
SPREAD -.1961        
EQPRI .0891 -.1960       
EQVOL -.0025 .4658 -.3535      
EQREN .5576 -.4832 .2336 -.3766     
 
 
Panel A of Table 5.4 presents pair-wise correlations between the balance-sheet 
variables employed to estimate the FSA’s regulatory enforcement actions. The 
correlations among the variables are generally low, except correlations between 
NETINC and ROE, Tier 1 capital ratio and supervisory capital ratio, and size and 
supervisory capital ratio. For example, LOANLOSS has negative correlations with 
profitability indicators. This implies that the higher the likelihood of worsening of 
debtors’ financial conditions, the lower the profitability, diversification and efficiency 
of banks becomes.  
Panel B reports a correlation matrix between selected market indicators. DD and 
Spread are negatively correlated (0.1961). Equity prices also have negative 
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correlations with spreads (0.1960). Equity trading volumes have low and negative 
correlations with DD (0.0025), which indicates that these two indicators are relatively 
independent.  
 
5.5. Empirical Results  
Based on the characteristics of the binomial dependent variable, Logistic and 
Probit models are adopted to examine how explanatory factors influence the bank 
regulators’ reactions towards banks’ performance. 
 
5.5.1 Whether Market Indicators have Impacts on Regulator’s 
Actions 
In this section a bivariate analysis for equations (1) and (2) is performed to 
examine whether market indicators from both the stock exchange and the 
subordinated debt market have an impact on bank regulators’ responses. The results 
are estimated in Probit and Logistic models respectively. Coefficients for parameters 
are reported, as well as coefficients for constant terms. To judge the adequacy of the 
binary-choice model fitted with Probit or Logistic, indicators of evaluating 
specification, likelihood-ratio test and goodness of fit, R
2
, are reported.  
Table 5.5 presents the results calculated by Probit models and Table 5.6 shows the 
results estimated under the Logit models. The likelihood-ratio test statistics of 
bivariate regressions for explanatory variables calculated by the Logistic model are 
greater than test statistics under the Probit model, with the exception of a few 
variables: ROE, financial services incomes ratio and Tier 1 capital ratio. The LR test 
statistics produced by the Probit model for the explanatory factors ROE, 
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FSERINCOME and Tier 1 capital ratio are 0.01, 0.07 and 0.01 respectively. These 
values are the same as LR test statistics calculated by Logistic models. Similarly, the 
R
2
 statistics, which are used to test goodness of fit for estimations, provide positive 
evidence that the Logit model is more suitable than the Probit model.  
The ratio of bad debts/total loans has a positive coefficient (9.727) and is 
statistically significant at a 5 per cent level. Sub-debt spreads (Spreads) has a positive 
and significant impact on the reaction of banking regulators, while the coefficient on 
distance to default (DD) is insignificant, and equity trading volumes have a positive 
and 10% level significant coefficient on regulation actions. Constant terms in these 
regressions are statistically significant, indicating that results are reliable. 
Besides reporting the maximum likelihood estimates of coefficients, the marginal 
effect, which is the effect of infinitesimal changes in explanatory factors, is also 
displayed. The marginal effects imply that distance to default (DD) has a 1.59% lower 
probability of bank regulators taking action, whereas a marginal change in 
subordinated debt spread from the average of 71.6661 basis points is associated with a 
0.15% increase in participation. Because of a high proportion of 0s in the dummy 
variable, the last two columns of each table also present statistical results of testing 
sensitivity and correctly classified, based on the predictions of the binary-choice 
model which have been proposed.
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Table 5.5 Bivariate in Probit Model (without Year Lag) 
 
Table 5.5 represents results of bivariate regression in Probit model. The total observation number is 50, for the five biggest banks in the UK from the period 2001 to May 2011. The dependent variable REGULATION is a 
dummy variable, and takes 1 if the FSA takes enforcement actions on the bank, 0 otherwise. RISKBD is the ratio of bad debts to total loans, LLOSS is the ratio of loan loss to operating profit, ROE is the ratio of net income 
to capital and reserves, NETING is the ratio of net income to gross income, FSERVIN is the ratio of income stemming from financial services to gross income, SOLVER is the ratio of supervisory capital to risk-weighted 
assets, TIER1 is the ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets, SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets, SPREAD refers to the spreads of subordinated debt, DD is the distance to default, EQPRI denotes the equity 
prices for each bank, EQVOL is the equity trading volumes, and EQRET is the equity return. P-values are shown in brackets as ***, **, * indicating significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Bivairate analysis Goodness Of fit Marginal effects Classified 
Variable Coefficients CONS LR test  R2 Predict y Dx/dy Sensitivity Correctly 
RISKST 53.706 
[0.009]** 
-2.134 
[0.000]*** 
8.68 
[0.0032] 
0.2251 0.1261 11.126 
[0.020] 
42.8% 90.91% 
LLOSS -0.047 
[0.526] 
-0.901 
[0.000]*** 
0.44 
[0.5056] 
0.0111 0.1435 -0.0108 
[0.524] 
0% 85.42% 
ROE 0.6995 
[0.972] 
-1.09 
[0.002]*** 
0.001 
[0.9718] 
0.0001 0.1399 0.1557 
[0.972] 
0% 86% 
NETING 0.1062 
[0.711] 
-1.204 
[0.003]*** 
0.15 
[0.6955] 
0.0038 0.1389 0.0023 
[0.710] 
0% 86% 
FSERIN -0.035 
[0.791] 
-1.044*** 
(.000) 
0.07 
[0.7881] 
0.0018 0.1395 -0.0079 
[0.790] 
0% 86% 
SOLVER -3.293 
[0.223] 
-0.448 
[0.388] 
1.60 
[0.2063] 
0.0445 0.1180 -0.6512 
[0.213] 
0% 87.23% 
TIER1 -0.237 
[0.935] 
-1.06 
[0.277] 
0.01 
[0.9349] 
0.0002 0.1276 -0.0495 
[0.935] 
0% 87.23% 
SIZE 1.114 
[0.100] 
-10.891 
[0.070]* 
3.16 
[0.0753] 
0.0781 0.1179 0.2202 
[0.074] 
0% 86% 
DD -0.0804 
[0.97] 
-1.011 
[0.000]*** 
2.91 
[0.0879] 
0.0729 0.1266 -0.0167 
[0.088] 
0% 85.71% 
EQPRI -0.044 
[0.373] 
-0.900 
[0.002]*** 
0.085 
[0.3558] 
0.0211 0.1346 -0.0096 
[0.364] 
0% 86% 
EQVOL 4.938 
[0.074]* 
-1.751 
[0.000]*** 
3.35 
[0.0673] 
0.0827 0.1218 0.0096 
[0.088] 
0% 86% 
EQREN -0.489 
[0.268] 
-1.125*** 
[0.000] 
1.16 
[0.2812] 
0.0287 0.1343 -0.1059 
[0.267] 
0% 86% 
Spreads 0.713 
[0.006]*** 
-1.715 
[0.000]*** 
8.87 
[0.0029] 
0.2532 0.1515 0.0016 
[0.010] 
28.57% 80% 
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Table 5.6 Bivariate Regressions in Logistic Model (without Year Lag) 
 
Table 5.6 represents results of bivariate regression in Logistic model. The total observation number is 50, for the five biggest banks in the UK from the period 2001 to May 2011. The dependent variable REGULATION is a 
dummy variable, and takes 1 if the FSA takes enforcement actions on the bank, 0 otherwise. RISKBD is the ratio of bad debts to total loans, LLOSS is the ratio of loan loss to operating profit, ROE is the ratio of net income to 
capital and reserves, NETING is the ratio of net income to gross income, FSERVIN is the ratio of income stemming from financial services to gross income, SOLVER is the ratio of supervisory capital to risk-weighted assets, 
TIER1 is the ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets, SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets, SPREAD refers to the spreads of subordinated debt, DD is the distance to default, EQPRI denotes the equity prices for each 
bank, EQVOL is the equity trading volumes, and EQRET is the equity return. P-values are shown in brackets as ***, **, * indicating significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Bivairate analysis Goodness Of fit Marginal effects Classified 
Variable Coefficients CONS LR test  R2 Predict y Dx/dy Sensitivity Correctly 
RISKST 9.727 
[0.011]** 
-3.829 
[0.000]*** 
9.07 
[0.0026] 
0.2352 0.1153 9.925 
[0.022] 
42.86% 90.71% 
LLOSS -0.1033 
[0.488] 
-1.446 
[0.014]** 
0.52 
[0.4715] 
0.0130 0.1416 -0.0125 
[0.477] 
0% 85.42% 
ROE 0.1335 
[0.972] 
-1.833 
[0.006]*** 
0.001 
[0.9714] 
0.0001 0.1399 0.0016 
[0.972] 
0% 86% 
NETING 0.0212 
[0.716] 
-2.066 
[0.026]** 
0.16 
[0.6901] 
0.0039 0.1385 0.0025 
[0.713] 
0% 86% 
FSERIN -0.0629 
[0.798] 
-1.753 
[0.000]** 
0.07 
[0.7939] 
0.0017 0.1394 -0.0075 
[0.798] 
0% 86% 
SOLVER -7.118 
[0.210] 
-0.561 
[0.603] 
1.80 
[0.1799] 
0.0501 0.1124 -0.710 
[0.163] 
0% 87.23% 
TIER1 -0.425 
[0.936] 
-1.782 
[0.318] 
0.01 
[0.9363] 
0.0002 0.1276 -0.0473 
[0.936] 
0% 87.23% 
SIZE 2.0545 
[0.110] 
-19.927 
[0.082]* 
3.10 
[0.0781] 
0.0766 0.1151 0.2093 
[0.061] 
0% 86% 
DD -0.147 
[0.095] 
-1.722 
[0.000]*** 
2.94 
[0.0865] 
0.0731 0.1233 -0.0159 
[0.070] 
0% 85.71% 
EQPRI -0.0915 
[0.380] 
-1.459 
[0.006]*** 
0.091 
[0.3399] 
0.0225 0.1456 -0.0011 
[0.1322] 
0% 86% 
EQVOL 8.288 
[0.077]* 
-2.961 
[0.000]*** 
3.16 
[0.0755] 
0.0780 0.1322 0.0088 
[0.063] 
0% 86% 
EQREN -0.844 
[0.271] 
-1.899 
[0.000]*** 
1.12 
[0.2908] 
0.0276 0.1215 -0.0979 
[0.264] 
0% 86% 
Spreads 0.0121 
[0.010]** 
-2.937 
[0.001]*** 
8.73 
[0.0031] 
0.2493 0.1339 0.0015 
[0.015] 
28.57% 80% 
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Probit and Logistic models are also employed to estimate the relationships 
between explanatory factors and regulators’ enhancement actions with a one-year lag. 
Table 5.7 shows the results calculated by the Probit models for regressions (4) and (5), 
and Table 5.8 represents the estimations under the Logistic models for the same 
regressions. Under the Probit regression, equity trading volumes have a positive 
coefficient (9.838) with a 1 per cent level of statistical significance. The value for the 
LR test is greater than the test result of the Logistic model.  
In Table 5.8 which displays bivariate regressions estimated by Logistic models 
with a one-year lag structure, the risky bad debt ratio shows positive and statistically 
significant signs (14.562), similar with the size variable, which is at a 5 per cent 
significant level. The supervisory capital ratio also has a 5 per cent level statistically 
significant coefficient, but with a negative sign (-10.055). All the market indicators 
except DD and equity prices show significant signs. Spreads have a positive and 5 per 
cent level significant coefficient (0.1164), and equity returns have a negative 
coefficient (1.246) with 10 per cent level of significance. Compared with the 
estimated parameters shown in Table 5.5 and 5.6, the results with a one-year lag are 
more intensive and significant, which indicates that balance-sheet variables and 
market indicators have a stronger impact on a regulator’s enforcement actions with a 
one-year delay.  
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Table 5.7 Bivariate Regression in Probit Model with One Year Lag 
Table 5.7 represents results of bivariate regression in Probit model. The total observation number is 50, for the five biggest banks in the UK from the period 2001 to May 2011. The dependent variable REGULATION 
is a dummy variable, and takes 1 if the FSA takes enforcement actions on the bank, 0 otherwise. RISKBD is the ratio of bad debts to total loans, LLOSS is the ratio of loan loss to operating profit, ROE is the ratio of 
net income to capital and reserves, NETING is the ratio of net income to gross income, FSERVIN is the ratio of income stemming from financial services to gross income, SOLVER is the ratio of supervisory capital to 
risk-weighted assets, TIER1 is the ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets, SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets, SPREAD refers to the spreads of subordinated debt, DD is the distance to default, EQPRI 
denotes the equity prices for each bank, EQVOL is the equity trading volumes, and EQRET is the equity return. P-values are shown in brackets as ***, **, * indicating significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 Bivariate Analysis Goodness of Fit Marginal Effects  Classified Measures 
Variable Coefficient CONS Likelihood-ratio 
tests(LR) 
R2 Predict Y dy/dx 
 
Sensitivity Correctly 
classified 
RISKBD 8.0463 
[0.004]*** 
-2.4885 
[0.000]*** 
14.81 
[0.0001] 
0.3321 0.1571 1.9345 
[0.011] 
44.44% 88.64% 
LLOSS 0.0682 
[0.239] 
-1.134 
[0.000]*** 
1.44 
[0.2308] 
0.0310 0.1841 0.0181 
[0.246] 
11.11% 83.33% 
ROE -0.0265 
[0.107] 
-0.513 
[0.070]* 
2.46 
[0.1167] 
0.0492 0.1893 -0.0071 
[0.106] 
0.00% 78.00% 
NETING -0.0237 
[0.217] 
-0.5954 
[0.034] 
1.42 
[0.2341] 
0.0283 0.1941 -0.0065 
[0.216] 
0.00% 78.00% 
FSERVIN -0.126 
[0.372] 
-0.721 
[0.007]*** 
0.88 
[0.3489] 
0.0217 0.1943 -0.0340 
[0.363] 
0.00% 80.49% 
SOLVER -7.263 
[0.007]*** 
1.7959 
[0.072]** 
8.24 
[0.0041] 
0.1646 0.1930 -1.8545 
[0.010] 
0.00% 78.72% 
TIER1 7.2634 
[0.007]*** 
-5.4675 
[0.000]*** 
8.24 
[0.0041] 
0.1646 0.2102 1.8545 
[0.010] 
40.00% 86.00% 
Size  1.725 
[0.013]** 
-16.059 
[0.009]** 
7.98 
[0.0047] 
0.1595 0.1508 0.4038 
[0.005] 
10.00% 80.00% 
DD -0.568 
[0.192] 
-0.841 
[0.000]*** 
1.72 
[0.1894] 
0.0369 0.1753 -0.0146 
[0.188] 
0.00% 81.63% 
EQPRI -0.642  
[0.187] 
-0.586 
[0.030]** 
1.94 
[0.1634] 
0.0388 0.1886 -0.0174 
[0.175] 
0.00% 80.00% 
EQVOL 9.838 
[0.002]*** 
-2.217 
[0.000]*** 
12.68 
[0.0004] 
0.2535 0.1469 2.268 
[0.003] 
30.00% 80.00% 
EQRET -0.6941 
[0.110] 
-0.8952 
[0.000]*** 
2.71 
[0.0994] 
0.0543 0.1928 -0.1901 
[0.117] 
10.00% 82.00% 
SPREAD 0.6994 
[0.011]** 
-1.339 
[0.001]*** 
7.61 
[0.0058] 
0.2150 0.2281 0.0021 
[0.017] 
50.00% 83.87% 
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Table 5.8 Bivariate Regressions in Logistic Model with One Year Lag 
Table 5.8 represents results of bivariate regression in Logistic model. The total observation number is 50, for the five biggest banks in the UK from the period 2001 to May 2011. The dependent variable 
REGULATION is a dummy variable, and takes 1 if the FSA takes enforcement actions on the bank, 0 otherwise. RISKBD is the ratio of bad debts to total loans, LLOSS is the ratio of loan loss to operating profit, ROE 
is the ratio of net income to capital and reserves, NETING is the ratio of net income to gross income, FSERVIN is the ratio of income stemming from financial services to gross income, SOLVER is the ratio of 
supervisory capital to risk-weighted assets, TIER1 is the ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets, SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets, SPREAD refers to the spreads of subordinated debt, DD is the 
distance to default, EQPRI denotes the equity prices for each bank, EQVOL is the equity trading volumes, and EQRET is the equity return. P-values are shown in brackets as ***, **, * indicating significance at 1%, 
5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Bivariate Analysis Goodness of Fit Marginal Effects  Classified Measures 
Variable Coefficient CONS Likelihood-ratio 
tests(LR) 
R2 dy/dx Predict Y Sensitivity Correctly 
classified 
RISKBD 14.562 
[0.008]** 
-4.4719 
[0.001]*** 
15.05 
[0.0001] 
0.3375 1.7861 
[0.017] 
0.1431 44.44% 88.64% 
LLOSS 0.1506 
[0.192] 
-2.0412 
[0.001]*** 
1.84 
[0.1753] 
0.0397 0.0221 
[0.189] 
0.1788 11.11% 83.33% 
ROE -0.0448 
[0.158] 
-0.821 
[0.120] 
2.30 
[0.1296] 
0.0459 -0.0069 
[0.159] 
0.1913 0.00% 78.00% 
NETING -0.0388 
[0.258] 
-0.9792 
[0.050]** 
1.31 
[0.2519] 
0.0262 -0.0061 
[0.259] 
0.1952 0.00% 78.00% 
FSERVIN -0.2202 
[0.395] 
-1.183 
[0.009]** 
0.85 
[0.3573] 
0.0209 -0.0335 
[0.377] 
0.1934 0.00% 80.49% 
SOLVER -10.055 
[0.049]** 
5.991 
[0.529] 
4.88 
[0.0271] 
0.1004 -1.4734 
[0.025] 
0.1783 20.00% 82.98% 
TIER1 -3.049 
[0.486] 
-0.3275 
[0.819] 
0.49 
[0.4837] 
0.0101 -0.5055 
[0.481] 
0.2097 0.00% 78.72% 
Size  3.1492 
[0.016]** 
-29.2225 
[0.013]** 
8.08 
[0.0045] 
0.1616 0.3824 
[0.003] 
0.1414 10.00% 80% 
DD -0.1027 
[0.189] 
-1.3979 
[0.000]*** 
1.76 
[0.1843] 
0.0377 -0.0147 
[0.172] 
0.1729 0.00% 81.63% 
EQPRI -0.1213 
[0.206] 
-0.925 
[0.047]* 
2.00 
[0.1578] 
0.0399 -0.0183 
[0.173] 
0.1847 0.00% 80.00% 
EQVOL 1.647 
[0.003]*** 
-3.734 
[0.000]*** 
12.33 
[0.0004] 
0.2464 2.028 
[0.004] 
0.1436 30.00% 82.00* 
EQRET -1.246* 
[0.097] 
-1.5095 
[0.000]*** 
2.92 
[0.0875] 
0.0583 -0.1906 
[0.098] 
0.1885 10.00% 80.00% 
SPREAD 0.1164** 
[0.017] 
-2.2437 
[0.002]*** 
7.54 
[0.0060] 
0.2129 0.0020 
[0.024] 
0.2221 50.00% 83.87% 
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To further examine the regulatory potential of subordinated debt spreads, the 
dataset is divided into two sub-samples. One sub-sample contains spreads greater than 
the sample mean (71.6661) and the other is for smaller spreads. Consistent with 
empirical designs, regressions are run for each sub-sample in both Probit and Logistic 
models, both with and without the year lag, as well the marginal effects.  
The results are shown in Table 5.9. None of the coefficients on spreads which 
estimated by Probit and Logistic models shows significant signs of regulatory action. 
Column (1) presents the results for regressions of spreads greater than the sample 
mean without the year lagged value under the Probit model, and the LR test statistic 
(2.27) is significantly greater than that of other regressions, the same as the R
2 
(0.1123). These statistics indicate that the model for bigger spreads samples estimated 
by the Probit model has better specifications and is better fitted. For the greater 
spreads reflected by these results, an increasing of sub-debt spreads in the current year 
has a 39.24% probability of predicting bank supervisors’ regulatory actions. 
Compared with the results displayed in columns (3) and (4), it is fair to conclude that 
spreads have predicted ability for regulators’ actions in a timely fashion. 
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Table 5.9 Bivariate Regressions for Different Levels of Sub-debt Spreads under Probit /Logistic Models 
Table 5.9 represents results of bivariate regression for different levels of sub-debt spreads with both Probit and Logistic model. The total observation number is 50, for the five biggest banks in 
the UK from the period 2001 to May 2011. The dependent variable REGULATION is a dummy variable, and takes 1 if the FSA takes enforcement actions on the bank, 0 otherwise. RISKBD is 
the ratio of bad debts to total loans, LLOSS is the ratio of loan loss to operating profit, ROE is the ratio of net income to capital and reserves, NETING is the ratio of net income to gross income, 
FSERVIN is the ratio of income stemming from financial services to gross income, SOLVER is the ratio of supervisory capital to risk-weighted assets, TIER1 is the ratio of Tier 1 capital to 
risk-weighted assets, SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets, SPREAD refers to the spreads of subordinated debt, DD is the distance to default, EQPRI denotes the equity prices for each 
bank, EQVOL is the equity trading volumes, and EQRET is the equity return. P-values are shown in brackets as ***, **, * indicating significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Spreads > Sample Mean Spreads< Sample Mean 
 Without Year Lag With One Year Lag Without Year Lag With One Year Lag 
 Probit  Logistic Probit  Logistic Probit  Logistic Probit  Logistic 
Coefficient 0.599 0.952 0.419 0.677 -0.256 -0.525 -0.131 -0.276 
 [0.153] [0.167] [0.233] [0.246] [0.409] [0.418] [0.724] [0.714] 
CONS -1.437 -2.296 -0.743 -1.211 -1.053 -1.751 -1.133 -1.896 
 [0.109] [0.124] [0.243] [0.256] [0.010]*** [0.021]** [0.009]*** [0.022]** 
LR test 2.27 2.23 1.52 1.52 0.97 0.97 0.13 0.14 
 [0.1323] [0.1356] [0.2169] [0.2170] [0.3238] [0.3243] [0.7231] [0.7113] 
R
2 
0.1123 0.1103 0.0736 0.0735 0.0489 0.0488 0.0066 0.0072 
Marginal Effects: 
Predict y 0.3924 0.3902 0.4698 0.4671 0.0782 0.0782 0.1058 0.1052 
Dy/dx 0.0023 0.0022 0.0016 0.0016 -0.0037 -0.0037 -0.0023 -0.0026 
(P value ) [0.155] [0.168] [0.234] [0.247] [0.341] [0.308] [0.723] [0.710] 
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5.5.2 Whether Market Information Provides Additional 
Information to Bank Regulators 
To verify the ability of market indicators to provide additional information to 
bank supervisors, a Probit model and a Logistic model are estimated in which the 
dummy variable indicates that the FSA’s enforcement action is the dependent variable 
and that the balance-sheet and market-based indicators are the explanatory factors.  
Since the enforcement statements are reported on an annual basis, and actions are 
taken when events occur, the aim is to investigate the possibility of exploiting 
secondary market-based data, such as spreads of the subordinated debt market and 
distance to default, calculated mainly for stock market supervisory purposes, and 
other equity market indicators which bank regulators may pay attention to, such as 
equity prices, trading volumes and equity returns. Compared with supervisory 
statistics, these kinds of market information are timelier and are more easily accessed 
by market investors.  
Both Probit and Logistic estimations are used to calculate parameters for both 
regressions (3) and (6), and the results are reported in Table 5.10. Hypothesis tests and 
tests for evaluating specification and goodness of fit are also reported in both tables. 
Wald tests for adding variables are conducted; results are included in both tables. 
Besides correlation coefficients, the marginal effects of the explanatory factors are 
also shown in Table 5.11. 
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Table 5.10 Multivariate Regressions with Probit and Logistic Models (without Year Lag) 
 
Table 5.10 represents results of regression of regulation dummy on accounting and market variables with both the Probit and Logistic model. The total observation number 
is 50. The panel sample period is from the period 2001 to May 2011. The dependent variable REGULATION is a dummy variable, and takes 1 if the FSA takes 
enforcement actions on the bank, 0 otherwise. RISKBD is the ratio of bad debts to total loans, LLOSS is the ratio of loan loss to operating profit, ROE is the ratio of net 
income to capital and reserves, NETING is the ratio of net income to gross income, FSERVIN is the ratio of income stemming from financial services to gross income, 
SOLVER is the ratio of supervisory capital to risk-weighted assets, TIER1 is the ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets, SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets, 
SPREAD refers to the spreads of subordinated debt, DD is the distance to default, EQPRI denotes the equity prices for each bank, EQVOL is the equity trading volumes, 
and EQRET is the equity return. P-values are shown in brackets as ***, **, * indicating significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Model1 Model2 Model3 Model 4 Model5 Model6 
Variable Probit Logistic Probit Logistic Probit Logistic Probit Logistic Probit Logistic Probit Logistic 
RISKBD 1.979 3.418 2.319 3.881 2.036 3.574 2.042 3.469 2.025 3.469 2.642 4.259 
 [0.017]** [0.021]** [0.027]** [0.029]** [0.021]** [0.027]** [0.066]* [0.021]** [0.019]** [0.021]** [0.131] [0.149] 
LLOSS -0.316 -0.5286 -0.236 -0.398 -0.307 -.0507 -0.227 -0.571 -0.345 -0.571 1.148 1.846 
 [0.180] [0.199] [0.376] [0.393] [0.189] [0.215] [0.367] [0.226] [0.220] [0.226] [0.366] [0.391] 
ROE -0.032 -0.050 -0.029 -0.039 -0.01 0.042 -0.191 -0.033 -0.023 -0.033 -0.506 -0.810 
 [0.695] [0.730] [0.710] [0.786] [0.929] [0.983] [0.341] [0.836] [0.795] [0.836] [0.318] [0.343] 
NETING 0.593 0.993 0.581 0.968 0.591 0.989 1.005 0.988 0.597 0.988 1.885 3.048 
 [0.096] [0.124] [0.084] [0.107] [0.093] [0.125] [0.166] [0.114] [0.089] [0.114] [0.240] [0.263] 
FSERIN -0.381 -0.735 -0.581 -0.986 -0.429 -0.839 -0.279 -0.815 -0.430 -0.815 -9.411 -15.213 
 [0.537] [0.547] [0.499] [0.507] [0.457] [0.545] [0.615] [0.536] [0.529] [0.536] [0.295] [0.319] 
TIER1 -4.496 -9.48 -3.899 -6.824 -0.633 -0.727 -1.623 -8.744 -4.175 -8.744 15.881 25.578 
 [0.600] [0.567] [0.660] [0.688] [0.970] [0.998] [0.876] [0.602] [0.628] [0.602] [0.483] [0.509] 
SOLVE 6.194 11.547 9.337 14.865 1.470 -0.235 10.917 11.249 6.147 11.249 29.493 46.988 
 [0.545] [0.520] [0.412] [0.435] [0.943] [0.999] [0.402] [0.531] [0.547] [0.531] [0.252] [0.278] 
SIZE 1.129 1.457 0.966 1.483 0.805 0.616 1.542 1.485 1.165 1.485 -2.814 -4.446 
 [0.675] [0.772] [0.751] [0.784] [0.780] [0.910] [0.621] [0.773] [0.673] [0.773] [0.524] [0.551] 
DD ---- ---- 0.115 0.185 ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 
   [0.533] [0.576] ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 
EQPRI ---- ---- ---- ----- 0.462 0.116 ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 
     [0.794] [0.729] ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 
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Table 5.10 Continued  
EQVOL ---- ---- ---- ----- ---- ---- 2.437 
[0.252] 
4.137 
[0.233] 
---- ---- ---- ---- 
EQRET ---- ---- ---- ----- ---- ---- ---- ---- 0.445 
[0.836] 
0.722 
[0.842] 
---- ---- 
SPREAD ---- ---- ---- ----- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 0.121 0.196 
 ---- ---- ---- ----- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- [0.288] [0.312] 
CONS -2.139 -3.193 -2.176 -3.513 -1.953 -2.701 -33.821 -55.086 -22.016 -32.531 -18.309 -30.433 
 [0.439] [0.018] [0.470] [0.516] [0.516] [0.600] [0.369] [0.399] [0.438] [0.533] [0.588] [0.606] 
LR test 19.05 18.77 19.14 18.77 19.11 18.89 21.14 20.92 19.09 18.81 19.75 19.56 
 [0.0149] [0.0162] [0.0240] [0.0273] [0.0242] [0.0262] [0.0120] [0.0130] [0.0244] [0.0269] [0.0195] [0.0209] 
R
2 
0.5688 0.5604 0.5774 0.5661 0.5708 0.5640 0.6313 0.6247 0.5701 0.5616 0.6395 0.6332 
Test for 
Non-linear 
2.006 3.4509 2.382 3.973 2.051 3.575 2.153 3.612 2.059 3.512 3.000 4.831 
 [0.018] [0.022] [0.030] [0.032] [0.020] [0.026] [0.074] [0.072] [0.021] [0.022] [0.147] [0.166] 
Wald tests ---- ---- -2.176 
[0.470] 
-3.513 
[0.516] 
0.07 
[0.7942] 
0.12 
[0.7292] 
1.31 
[0.2516] 
1.42 
[0.2330] 
0.04 
[0.8359] 
0.04 
[0.8423] 
1.13 
[0.2878] 
1.02 
[0.3117] 
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The first two columns report the estimated coefficients for model 1, which 
investigates the relationship between the FSA’s actions and accounting variables that 
bank supervisors always use. The Likelihood-ratio test statistics are 19.05 and 18.77 
respectively, which suggests that the model fits well. Moreover, the R
2
 (0.5688 and 
0.5604 respectively) provides evidence for the goodness of fit of the model. These 
results imply that the binary-choice model is well fitted. However, there is no strong 
evidence that balance-sheet variables have significant coefficients with the UK 
banking regulator’s enforcement actions besides the bad debt ratio, which captures the 
overall riskiness of a bank’s portfolio.  
Columns (3) and (4) present the estimated parameters for model 2 which added 
distance to default (DD) as an extra explanatory factor. Statistics for evaluating 
specification and goodness of fit imply that model 2 is better than the benchmark 
(model 1). As a stock market-based indicator, distance to default (DD) has a positive 
coefficient with a bank supervisor’s actions, but the estimated coefficient does not 
appear strongly statistically significant.  
The test statistics in column (3) are greater than in column (1), implying that the 
model which adds DD as an explanatory factor is more reliable than the one without 
DD. A Wald test is also produced to identify the importance of adding DD. However, 
the F-statistic shows a statistically insignificant result. Column (3) in Table 5.11 
shows that as the DD statistic for each financial institution increases, there is a 0.3% 
higher probability of participating supervision.  
Model 3 is the regression, and adds equity prices as one of the additional 
explanatory factors to the balance-sheet variables that regulators currently use. The 
statistic for the LR test under the Probit model is greater than the value estimated by 
the Logistic model, as well as the R
2
. The equity prices fail to show any significant 
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sign of regulatory actions. Balance-sheet variables, besides the bad debt ratio, also 
present insignificant relationships with the dummy explained variable. The marginal 
effects indicate that an increase of equity prices raises a 16.71% probability of the 
regulators utilising equity price in their off-site assessments.  
There are similar results for model 4, which adds equity trading volumes in the 
regression, and model 5, which examines the additional information equity returns 
provide to regulators. Neither of the market indicators have statistically significant 
coefficients, and the risky bad-debt ratio has positive and statistically significant 
coefficients in all regression models. These results imply that even with the timely 
information from equity markets, a bank regulator still mainly focuses on a bank’s bad 
debts. The higher the proportion of bad debts to total loans, the greater is the 
possibility that the bank supervisor will take regulatory action. 
To investigate the evidence of the contribution of subordinated debt spreads, 
spread is added as an explanatory factor in model 6 and the results are shown in 
columns (11) and (12) in Table 5.10, with parameters calculated by Probit estimation 
and Logistic estimation respectively. There is not a significant coefficient on spreads. 
Column (11) in Table 5.11 shows that marginal effects of spreads indicate that spread 
has limited explanatory power to predict supervisory actions.  
Interestingly, the risky bad-debt ratio shows statistically insignificant coefficients 
in model 6. This result implies that including spread in off-site risk assessments, risky 
bad debt ratio is no longer the priority of bank regulators, because spread can provide 
additional information on the overall riskiness of debt structure. Moreover, what 
matters for this research is that the model can be verified with subordinated debt 
spreads to achieve a better fit than the other two models. The R
2
 values of model 6 
(0.6395 and 0.6332) are greater than the benchmark model (0.5688 and 0.5604), and 
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the likelihood-ratio test statistic (19.75) is greater than both model 1 and model 2 
(19.05 and 19.14 respectively). Although the Wald test for adding Spreads fails to 
present strongly statistically significant signs, we find that spreads of subordinated 
debt provide additional information to bank regulators, relative to the balance-sheet 
information they currently employ. 
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Table 5.11Marginal Effects for Probit and Logistic Models (without Year Lag) 
Table 5.11 represents the marginal effects of the regression of the regulation dummy on accounting and market variables with both the Probit and Logistic model. The total observation number is 50. 
The panel sample period is from the period 2001 to May 2011. The dependent variable REGULATION is a dummy variable, and takes 1 if the FSA takes enforcement actions on the bank, 0 otherwise. 
RISKBD is the ratio of bad debts to total loans, LLOSS is the ratio of loan loss to operating profit, ROE is the ratio of net income to capital and reserves, NETING is the ratio of net income to gross 
income, FSERVIN is the ratio of income stemming from financial services to gross income, SOLVER is the ratio of supervisory capital to risk-weighted assets, TIER1 is the ratio of Tier 1 capital to 
risk-weighted assets, SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets, SPREAD refers to the spreads of subordinated debt, DD is the distance to default, EQPRI denotes the equity prices for each bank, 
EQVOL is the equity trading volumes, and EQRET is the equity return. P-values are shown in brackets as ***, **, * indicating significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Model1 Model2 Model3 Model 4 Model5 Model6 
Variable Probit Logistic Probit Logistic Probit Logistic Probit Logistic Probit Logistic Probit Logistic 
RISKBD 0.9078 1.9295 0.6485 1.8547 0.7364 1.6847 0.0106 0.2713 0.6364 1.6659 0.5011 0.6510 
 [0.768] [0.595] [0.796] [0.612] [0.790] [0.629] [0.924] [0.793] [0.807] [0.631] [0.131] [0.941] 
LLOSS -0.0014 -0.0029 -0.0006 -0.0019 -0.0011 -0.0023 -0.0000 -0.0003 -0.0011 -0.0027 0.0021 0.0002 
 [0.761] [0.587] [0.815] [0.685] [0.786] [0.626] [0.924] [0.804] [0.796] [0.607] [0.366] [0.938] 
ROE -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0009 -.00001 
 [0.795] [0.747] [0.828] [0.807] [0.934] [0.983] [0.920] [0.771] [0.865] [0.852] [0.318] [0.939] 
NETING 0.0027 0.0056 0.0016 0.0046 0.0021 0.0046 0.0001 0.0013 0.0018 0.0047 0.0035 0.0004 
 [0.757] [0.570] [0.799] [0.623] [0.782] [0.607] [0.922] [0.780] [0.802] [0.619] [0.240] [0.939] 
FSERVIN -0.0017 -0.0042 -0.0016 -0.0047 -0.0015 -0.0039 -0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0013 -0.0039 -0.0178 -0.0023 
 [0.778] [0.662] [0.778] [0.607] [0.790] [0.657] [0.926] [0.823] [0.800] [0.652] [0.295] [0.939] 
TIER1 -0.0206 -0.0535 -0.0109 -0.0326 -0.0023 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0021 -0.0131 -0.0419 0.0301 0.0039 
 [0.784] [0.673] [0.827] [0.761] [0.971] [0.998] [0.938] [0.906] [0.828] [0.723] [0.483] [0.938] 
SOLVE 0.0284 0.0651 0.0261 0.0710 0.0053 -0.0001 0.0006 0.0146 -0.0193 0.0540 0.0559 0.0072 
 [0.792] [0.683] [0.801] [0.664] [0.949] [0.999] [0.922] [0.790] [0.825] [0.713] [0.252] [0.940] 
SIZE 0.0051 0.0082 0.0027 0.0071 0.0029 0.0029 0.0001 0.0018 0.0036 0.0071 -0.0053 -0.0006 
 [0.788] [0.782] [0.848] [0.811] [0.838] [0.910] [0.919] [0.782] [0.816] [0.788] [0.524] [0.939] 
DD ---- ---- 0.0003 0.0008 ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 
 ---- ---- [0.786] [0.648] ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 
EQPrice ---- ---- ---- ---- 0.1671 0.5511 ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 
 ---- ---- ---- ---- [0.827] [0.739] ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 
EQVOL ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 0.1261 
[0.921] 
0.3271 
[0.778] 
---- ---- ---- ---- 
EQRET ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 0.0014 
[0.833] 
0.0034 
[0.829] 
---- ---- 
SPREAD ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 0.0002 0.0003 
 ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- [0.288] [0.939] 
Predict Y 0.0014 0.0056 0.0008 0.0048 0.0011 0.0047 0.0001 0.0008 0.0009 0.0048 0.0016 0.0015 
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Also considered is the time-lagged structure, which is examined in regression 6. 
The parameters estimated by both Probit and Logistic models are shown in Table 5.12. 
The results of the benchmark model (model 1) which includes only accounting 
information that the regulator assesses are shown in columns (1) and (2). The risky 
bad-debt ratio displays positive and statistically significant coefficients under both of 
the models.  
Model 2 examines the additional informative potential that distance to default 
(DD) provides (in column 3 and 4). The statistics of the LR test and R
2
 calculated by 
the Logistic model are greater than the statistics of the Probit model, indicating that 
the results under the Logistic model have better explanatory power. The 
one-year-lagged value of balance sheet variables and DD show statistical 
insignificance with the dependent variable. The additional predictive power of equity 
prices is examined in model 3. The equity prices show no sign of significantly 
correlating with regulatory actions, but the statistics of the LR test and R
2
 are greater 
than the benchmark regression.  
Column (7) tests whether equity trading volumes related to regulatory actions in 
the Probit estimation. The LR test statistic (25.16) and R
2
 (0.6356) indicate that the 
results of the Probit model are better fitted. Equity trading volumes have a positive 
coefficient with a 10 per cent level of statistical significance. Furthermore, compared 
with the benchmark (reported in column 1) the indicators of specification fitness are 
greater. Model 5 examines whether equity return as a market indicator provides 
additional information relative to balance-sheet information to bank regulators. The 
coefficients on equity returns show no sign of statistical significance, but the bad-debt 
ratio has positive and significant coefficients.  
The results for model 6 report that neither spreads nor balance sheet variables 
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have significant relationships with regulators’ actions. However, LR test statistics for 
both Probit and Logistic estimations for model 6 are greater than model 1, which 
excludes market indicators. Therefore, including the spreads in the regression 
improves the model’s specification fitness.  
Table 5.13 shows the marginal effects. With an increase of spreads there is a 0.38% 
probability of providing additional regulatory information to bank supervisors. It is 
relatively smaller regarding the marginal effects of equity trading volumes (87.39% in 
the Probit estimation and 72.99% in the Logistic estimation). However, the marginal 
effects of spreads are greater than equity prices’ marginal effects (0.1% in both Probit 
and Logistic models). 
The dataset is also divided into two sub-samples to evaluate progressive 
information reflected by different values of spreads. However, owing to the limited 
number of observations Probit and Logistic estimations are not conducted. 
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Table 5.12 Regressions in Probit / Logistic Models (with One-year-lag) 
Table 5.12 represents the results of the regression of the regulation dummy on accounting and market variables with both the Probit and Logistic model. The total observation number is 50. The panel sample period is from the period 2001 to 
May 2011. The dependent variable REGULATION is a dummy variable, and takes 1 if the FSA takes enforcement actions on the bank, 0 otherwise. RISKBD is the ratio of bad debts to total loans, LLOSS is the ratio of loan loss to operating 
profit, ROE is the ratio of net income to capital and reserves, NETING is the ratio of net income to gross income, FSERVIN is the ratio of income stemming from financial services to gross income, SOLVER is the ratio of supervisory capital 
to risk-weighted assets, TIER1 is the ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets, SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets, SPREAD refers to the spreads of subordinated debt, DD is the distance to default, EQPRI denotes the equity 
prices for each bank, EQVOL is the equity trading volumes, and EQRET is the equity return. P-values are shown in brackets as ***, **, * indicating significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Model1 Model2 Model3 Model 4 Model5 Model6 
Variable Probit Logistic Probit Logistic Probit Logistic Probit Logistic Probit Logistic Probit Logistic 
RISKBD 1.293 2.366 1.007 1.873 3.480 6.075 1.1485 2.069 1.197 2.211 1.219 2.083 
 [0.030]** [0.050]* [0.089]* [0.106] [0.321] [0.321] [0.238] [0.236] [0.039]** [0.060]* [0.339] [0.349] 
LLOSS 0.121 0.229 0.0194 0.017 -0.726 -1.286 0.171 0.296 0.103 0.191 0.663 1.119 
 [0.443] [0.421] [0.912] [0.957] [0.594] [0.583] [0.619] [0.619] [0.512] [0.515] [0.171] [0.194] 
ROE -0.045 -0.075 -0.034 -0.040 0.227 0.3888 -0.084 -0.138 -0.047 -0.069 -0.097 -0.157 
 [0.578] [0.607] [0.672] [0.781] [0.265] [0.263] [0.405] [0.446] [0.555] [0.618] [0.378] [0.421] 
NETING 0.072 0.117 0.078 0.111 -0.195 -0.342 0.122 0.201 0.078 0.118 0.139 0.219 
 [0.456] [0.502] [0.426] [0.517] [0.446] [0.440] [0.322] [0.363] [0.419] [0.488] [0.286] [0.349] 
FSERVIN -0.489 -0.844 -0.401 -0.668 0.322 0.592 -0.478 -0.873 -0.489 -0.854 -2.592 -4.104 
 [0.341] [0.371] [0.484] [0.543] [0.985] [0.947] [0.522] [0.516] [0.352] [0.396] [0.454] [0.484] 
TIER1 -1.308 -2.602 -2.648 -6.215 -66.764 -11.419 -3.084 -5.427 -1.830 -3.846 -1.749 -2.613 
 [0.856] [0.842] [0.713] [0.650] [0.259] [0.262] [0.714] [0.721] [0.796] [0.768] [0.863] [0.883] 
SOLVE 11.123 21.994 9.243 21.071 52.483 90.157 13.294 22.868 11.328 23.687 18.399 32.649 
 [0.235] [0.253] [0.342] [0.290] [0.141] [0.148] [0.217] [0.270] [0.215] [0.223] [0.118] [0.144] 
SIZE 1.861 3.632 1.571 3.297 8.114 13.941 1.042 1.878 1.828 3.665 -0.423 -0.5927 
 [0.282] [0.253] [0.421] [0.368] [0.195] [0.202] [0.662] [0.648] [0.292] [0.261] [0.903] [0.923] 
DD ---- ---- -0.093 -0.189 ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 
   [0.516] [0.502]         
EQPRI ---- ---- ---- ---- -0.0018 -0.0031 ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 
     [0.342] [0.340]       
EQVOL ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 1.667 
[0.088]* 
2.757 
[0.100] 
---- ---- ---- ---- 
EQRET ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- -0.455 
[0.640] 
-0.957 
[0.611] 
---- ---- 
SPREAD ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 0.041 0.066 
           [0.366] [0.381] 
CONS -22.137 -42.823 -18.019 -37.185 -58.804 -101.252 -16.678 -29.495 -21.516 -42.742 -5.718 -11.226 
 [0.168] [0.155] [0.336] [0.294] [0.151] [0.161] [0.445] [0.437] [0.182] [0.164] [0.845] [0.830] 
LR tests 20.66 21.03 18.42 18.84 31.02 30.96 25.16 24.98 20.89 21.32 22.85 22.80 
 [0.0081] [0.0071] [0.0306] [0.0266] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0028] [0.0030] [0.0132] [0.0113] [0.0065] [0.0067] 
R2 0.5220 0.5314 0.5073 0.5190 0.7839 0.7823 0.6356 0.6312 0.5277 0.5386 0.6350 0.6335 
Tests for non-lines  1.407 2.590 1.084 2.047 3.412 5.963 1.259 2.259 1.302 2.430 1.364 2.351 
[0.024] [0.045] [0.084] [0.099] [0.302] [0.303] [0.187] [0.195] [0.032] [0.032] [0.264] [0.270] 
Wald tests  ---- ---- 0.42 
[0.5159] 
0.45 
[0.5017] 
0.90 
[0.3417] 
0.91 
[0.3399] 
2.92 
[0.0876] 
2.70 
[0.1003] 
0.22 
[0.6379] 
0.26 
[0.6105] 
0.82 
[0.3664] 
0.77 
[0.3808] 
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Table 5.13 Marginal Effects for Probit /Logistic Models with One-year-lag 
Table 5.13 represents the marginal effects of the regression of the regulation dummy on accounting and market variables with both the Probit and Logistic model. The total observation number is 50. 
The panel sample period is from the period 2001 to May 2011. The dependent variable REGULATION is a dummy variable, and takes 1 if the FSA takes enforcement actions on the bank, 0 otherwise. 
RISKBD is the ratio of bad debts to total loans, LLOSS is the ratio of loan loss to operating profit, ROE is the ratio of net income to capital and reserves, NETING is the ratio of net income to gross 
income, FSERVIN is the ratio of income stemming from financial services to gross income, SOLVER is the ratio of supervisory capital to risk-weighted assets, TIER1 is the ratio of Tier 1 capital to 
risk-weighted assets, SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets, SPREAD refers to the spreads of subordinated debt, DD is the distance to default, EQPRI denotes the equity prices for each bank, 
EQVOL is the equity trading volumes, and EQRET is the equity return. P-values are shown in brackets as ***, **, * indicating significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Model1 Model2 Model3 Model 4 Model5 Model6 
Variable Probit Logistic Probit Logistic Probit Logistic Probit Logistic Probit Logistic Probit Logistic 
RISKBD 9.283 6.985 8.6853 6.3697 0.6296 0.0203 6.0403 5.4963 9.1055 6.6359 11.4104 9.9509 
 [0.319] [0.326] [0.292] [0.332] [0.994] [0.945] [0.554] [0.489] [0.305 [0.334] [0.453] [0.463] 
LLOSS 0.0087 0.0067 0.0016 0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0004 .0090 0.0078 0.0078 0.0057 0.0621 0.0534 
 [0.450] [0.450] [0.908] [0.956] [0.994] [0.944] [0.619] [0.611] [0.501] [0.518] [0.423] [0.404] 
ROE -0.0033 -0.0022 -0.0030 -0.0013 -0.0002 0.0015 -0.0045 -0.0036 -0.0035 -0.0021 -0.0091 -0.0075 
 [0.627] [0.662] [0.702] [0.796] [0.994] [0.708] [0.635] [0.624] [0.616] [0.677] [0.524] [0.515] 
NETING 0.0052 0.0034 0.0067 0.0037 0.0003 -0.0001 0.0064 0.0053 0.0059 0.0035 0.0130 0.0105 
 [0.544] [0.592] [0.551] [0.622] [0.996] [0.944] [0.612] [0.590] [0.532] [0.598] [0.449] [0.448] 
FSERIN -0.0351 -0.0249 -0.0345 -0.0227 0.0496 0.0001 -0.0251 -0.0232 -0.0372 -0.0256 -0.2425 -0.1960 
 [0.224] [0.269] [0.278] [0.373] [0.994] [0.972] [0.403] [0.354] [0.218] [0.281] [0.382] [0.425] 
TIER1 -0.0938 -0.0768 -0.2284 -0.2113 -0.0631 -0.0038 -0.1622 -0.1441 -0.1392 -0.1154 -0.1636 -0.1248 
 [0.853] [0.838] [0.714] [0.658] [0.994] [0.946] [0.728] [0.727] [0.794] [0.767] [0.869] [0.887] 
SOLVE 0.7982 0.6494 0.7972 0.7164 0.0496 0.0030 0.6991 0.6072 0.8616 0.7110 1.7209 1.5591 
 [0.381] [0.368] [0.446] [0.429] [0.994] [0.946] [0.545] [0.489] [0.383] [0.384] [0.440] [0.423] 
SIZE 0.1336 0.1072 0.1354 0.1121 0.0076 0.0004 0.0548 0.0498 0.1391 0.1100 -0.0395 -0.0283 
 [0.510] [0.497] [0.571] [0.560] [0.994] [0.946] [0.734] [0.710] [0.514] [0.513] [0.898] [0.920] 
DD ---- ---- -0.0080 -0.0064 ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 
   [0.616] [0.609]         
EQPRI ---- ---- ---- ---- -0.0001 -0.0001 ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 
    [0.994] [0.945]       
EQVOL ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 0.8739 
[0.601] 
0.7299 
[0.558] 
---- ---- ---- ---- 
EQRET ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- -0.0346 
[0.688] 
-0.0287 
[0.663] 
---- ---- 
SPREAD ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 0.0038 0.0032 
           [0.356] [0.378] 
Predict Y 0.0319 0.0304 0.0400 0.0352 0.0001 0.0003 0.0221 0.0273 0.0343 0.0309 0.0443 0.0502 
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5.5.3 Case Study: Did the Market Signals Help the FSA to 
anticipate Impending Problems at RBS? 
This section investigates a case study of one of the five biggest banks in the UK 
and assesses whether market signals of this bank’s impending problems existed and 
whether these market signals helped the bank supervisor, the FSA, to anticipate 
impending problems. An analytical background is sketched to the events that 
culminated in the announcement on 24 November 2009, in which the Bank of 
England for the first time revealed that it had been lending RBS emergency funding 
since October 2008. For reference purposes, Appendix 2 tables the events both before 
and after October 2008 in detail. This section utilises data from the Nexis UK, 
London Stock Exchange Regulatory News Services and other financial media to 
identify key dates and access source material. 
 
5.5.3.1 Background 
As one of the biggest multinational banking groups in the UK, RBS has been 
enthusiastic in international expansion in US, European and Asia-Pacific markets in 
the last few decades. In 2005 the bank expanded into China, acquiring a 10% stake in 
the Bank of China for £1.7 billion. RBS opened 2007 reporting profitability in the 
previous financial year and a high dividend (25%) (RBS, 2007). In 2007, the Group 
led a consortium to acquire the Dutch bank ABN AMRO, and declared their victory in 
the takeover battle on 9 October 2007 with a higher offer than Barclays.  
Market investigators and researchers speculated that RBS had overpaid for the 
Dutch bank, and the market reacted to the news with the company’s share price 
declining 875.6p within a week. Furthermore, with the impact of the US sub-prime 
crisis and the bail-out of Northern Rock, the share price kept falling during the rest of 
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the year. However, the chairman concluded the takeover positively: “the acquisition of 
ABN AMRO will deliver good, long-term value enhancement to shareholders” (Royal 
Bank of Scotland Group, 2008). 
On 22 April 2008 RBS announced the largest rights issue in British corporate 
history which aimed to raise £12 bn in new capital, and then issued new long-term 
bonds or debts. Immediately, rating agencies downgraded RBS’s financial strength 
ratings and debt ratings. Later on, in order to gain more capital, RBS launched a range 
of new savings accounts. From October 2008 onwards the Bank of England began to 
secretly inject emergency funds into RBS. This action has been recognized by the 
market as “classic lender of last resort operation” (Giles et al, 2009).  
On 13 October 2008, the British Prime Minister Gordon Brown made a speech 
announcing that the UK government had decided to bail out the financial system. The 
Treasury infused new capital into RBS by preference shares. This resulted in a total 
government ownership stake in RBS of 58%. Meanwhile, RBS announced a profit 
warning, published details of capital rises and announced that dividends were to be 
stopped until it paid off the preference shares dividend of the UK government. 
At the beginning of 2009, RBS announced losses. At the same time, the UK 
government converted their preference shares into ordinary shares, which resulted in 
70% ownership of RBS. Later on, the UK government forced RBS to forgo the right 
to claim tax benefits, in order to participate in the government insurance scheme. The 
market’s reaction to this news was significant: the common stock price declined 
sharply on 27 February 2009.  
In May 2009, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) officially launched a 
supervisory investigation into RBS as it required partial taxpayer bailout support. The 
investigation lasted more than a year. On 2 December 2010, the FSA announced that 
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the investigation was closed, and confirmed that “RBS made a series of bad decisions 
in the years immediately before the financial crisis” (FSA, 2010c), most significantly 
the acquisition of ABN AMRO in 2007 and the 2008 capital raisings. However, the 
FSA cannot publish the content of the RBS review. Towards the end of 2009, RBS 
began to sell part of its operations in other countries. At the end of the year, the Bank 
of England revealed for the first time that it had lent RBS and HBOS emergency 
funding in October and November 2008.  
In 2010, the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) together with 
the Financial Services Authority (FSA) and the European Banking Authority (EBA) 
published a statement of its intention to conduct an EU-wide stress-test exercise. The 
results were published on 15 July 2011. Four UK banks (Barclays, HSBC, RBS and 
Lloyds) passed, and RBS “remains well capitalised with a Core Tier 1 capital ratio 
passing both the baseline and adverse scenarios” (FSA, 2011c).  
 
5.5.3.2 Did Market Signals Anticipate Impending Problems? 
This section analyses the signalling qualities of different market instruments. Two 
types of markets were included: equity and subordinated debt. 
 
5.5.3.2.1 Equities 
The five major multinational banks in the study are listed in the FTSE 100, 
therefore their equity liabilities are liquid. Based on existing literature (e.g. 
Hamalainen et al, 2010b) the qualities of the following equity market indicators are 
examined: stock prices, trading volume and returns. 
Equity prices. Market participants, central bankers and supervisors use equity 
prices to picture the average view and compare the development between different 
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banks, although equity prices can be affected by many factors, such as market 
overreactions or herding, and there is no unambiguous link between stock prices and 
default risk (Persson and Blavary, 2003).  
In the RBS context, however, their share price had been consistently failing since 
the beginning of 2008, and even at the end of 2007 RBS had just declared their 
victory in the ABN AMRO takeover battle. Even if RBS raised new capital and UK 
government-infused funds, the deterioration in the RBS share price becomes truly 
apparent after the profit warning issued in October 2008. Figure 5.8 presents the share 
price data for the five UK multinational banks; the arrow indicates when RBS issued a 
profit warning. 
 
 
The worst deterioration in RBS’s share price occurred in April and May 2007, 
when RBS announced the proposed acquisition of ABN AMRO with other 
international banks. Figure 5.9 emphasises that RBS was the best-performing UK 
bank in terms of shares during 2006.  
The figure again suggests that the market’s intensive reactions to the suspicion 
that the RBS-led consortium overpaid the ABN AMRO and that the equity market 
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became particularly concerned with RBS after the profit warning in October. This 
may well be because the British Prime Minister announced the bailout plan for the 
financial system, which accelerated deterioration in market investors’ confidence in 
the UK banking system, particularly shortly after the Northern Rock credit crisis and 
sharp drops in the FTSE as concerns over the US sub-prime crisis increased. 
 
Equity trading volumes. Although there is also no clear link between equity 
trading volumes and default risk, supervisory authorities can employ trading volumes 
to indicate potential issues that may have been identified by equity market investors 
and to discover what requires further investigation (Hamalainen et al, 2010b).  
Figure 5.10 illustrates a simple peer analysis with other multinational banks, and 
suggests consistently higher trading volumes in RBS shares, particularly after the 
profits warning in October 2008. The two peaks in trading volumes may imply that 
for investors searching for potential value stocks, however, the jump in October 
warranted further investigation. Similarly, the Lloyds TSB Banking Group had a 
higher peak of share trading volume, which may have alerted the supervisory 
authorities to conduct further investigations.  
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Equity returns. In order to further test whether equity market indicators 
anticipated RBS’s problems, the cumulative weekly returns for the bank were 
calculated, along with those of other two similar banks between January 2007 and 30 
September 2008. Figure 5.11 presents the results. As for the equity price signal graphs, 
the equity return dropped significantly during the Dutch bank takeover battle. Before 
the profit warning in October 2008, RBS’s equity returns had already become 
significant and thus signalled a potential concern. 
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5.5.3.2.2 Subordinated Debt  
This study focuses on sterling-issued subordinated debt. Hamalainen et al (2007) 
suggest that the currency of denomination does influence sub-debt spreads. Moreover, 
only non-perpetual in maturity, non-callable subordinated debts which are regularly 
traded were selected. Figure 5.12 and 5.13 present the findings for the five biggest 
banks in the UK. Figure 5.12 shows those bonds with ten years and less to maturity, 
and suggests that RBS spreads had been rising until the rights issuance in April. 
Before the profit warning in October, sub-debt spreads declined sharply. This may be 
because RBS had been downgraded by rating agencies in April and June. Immediately 
after the announcement of RBS’s rights issuance, Fitch downgraded RBS to ‘AA’. 
Shortly after, Moody’s Investor Services cut RBS’s senior debt rating down to ‘Aa2’, 
then soon afterwards to ‘Aa1’. However, RBS raised subordinated debt spreads to 
absorb new capital, despite the existence of high volatility and great risks as indicated 
by rating agencies. 
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Figure 5.13 reports the sub-debt spreads for a selection of sterling-dominated 
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subordinated debt issued by the five observed international-expanded banks with 
greater than ten years to maturity. The turbulences in two maturity groups are similar. 
RBS’s sub-debt spreads are generally higher than other selected subordinated debt. 
This may be because RBS was eager to expand and raise new capital between 2007 
and 2008. However, it should not be forgotten that higher spreads may indicate 
potential greater risks.   
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For the high spreads of all banks during 2007, Hamalainen et al (2010b) explain 
that this was because investors were recognising increased risks in the whole financial 
system, and therefore that high sub-debt spreads were caused by market rather than 
bank-specific fluencies. However, from 2008 onwards, RBS’s SND spreads are the 
highest of the five observed banks. As a risk indicator from the subordinated debt 
market, widening spreads may imply potential issues that bank supervisors should 
further investigate, although Group et al (2002) claim that SND spreads signal 
problems up to six months before a bank falls into financial distress. 
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5.5.4 Comparative Signalling Analysis of Financial Instruments 
and Their Applications by the Supervisory Authorities 
Of the financial instruments from two capital markets analysed in this study, 
equities appear to present the clearest signals with regard to RBS and the swiftest 
response by market participants during the acquisition of ABN AMRO in 2007 and 
the raising of new capital in 2008. There were significant bank-specific falls in equity 
prices, trading volumes and returns.  
The bank-specific signs are apparent at two turning points: one was the dramatic 
fall in April 2007, which was the stage during which RBS offered an ABN AMRO 
takeover bid; the other was when RBS announced a profit warning in October 2008. 
Meanwhile, the government revealed the bailout plans for the bank and the financial 
system. These disclosures appear to have highlighted to the market the weakness in 
RBS’s business model and accelerated declines in RBS’s share price.  
Sub-debt spreads report significant jumps in RBS’s spreads following the 
announcement of the rights issue and sales of retail and commercial banking 
operations. By analysing Northern Rock, Hamalainen et al (2010b) conclude that 
SND spreads were considerably slower in indicating concerns with Northern Rock. In 
this study there is no significant evidence that sub-debt spreads take a long time to 
highlight specific concerns with RBS.  
However, it is difficult to extract clear bank-specific signals from the general 
bond market trend for rising subordinated debt spreads. Spreads of subordinated debt 
with similar levels of maturity issued by Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds and Standard 
Chartered display similar waves. Hence finding comparable SND instruments for risk 
signalling purposes is difficult, even though the subordinated debt market in the UK 
has become considerably larger and more liquid in the past decade. Therefore, 
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proponents of sub-debt market discipline propose to standardise the subordinated debt 
structure, for instance through mandatory sub-debt policies. 
In the recent global banking crisis, RBS was neither the first nor the only victim. 
In September 2007 the Tripartite Authorities announced provision of Lender of Last 
Resort emergency funding facilities to Northern Rock, and the UK government 
guaranteed all existing retail savings and certain existing wholesale liabilities. 
Although the House of Commons Treasury Committee (2009b) views the reasons for 
Northern Rock’s crisis as lying in the tightening of wholesale funding markets; while 
the Northern Rock business model was highly dependent on wholesale funding, it also 
points out that “The Financial Services Authority systematically failed in its 
regulatory duty to ensure that Northern Rock would not pose a systemic risk” (House 
of Commons Treasury Committee, 2009b). Hamalainen et al (2010b) suggest that the 
regulatory authorities could concentrate on equity market signals to enhance their 
monitoring of bank risk. 
The biggest difference between RBS and Northern Rock is that RBS had a 
leverage business model. Before October 2008, when RBS announced a £20bn capital 
raising programme which was underwritten by HM Treasury, equity market indicators 
could prompt the regulatory authorities concerned with RBS. However, with 84% 
state-owned shares, RBS’s equity indicators are difficult to use to illustrate potential 
problems. Therefore, the regulatory authorities should look for other market indicators 
which are able to reveal leverage risks. Sub-debt spreads are relatively straightforward 
indicators that had alerted the supervisory authorities to undertake further 
investigation into RBS. Furthermore, the regulatory authorities should consider 
mandatory subordinated debt programmes, to standardise subordinated debt structure 
and obtain timely, effective and bank-specific information. 
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5.6 Conclusion 
 
This study builds upon previous studies in using subordinated debt for indirect 
market discipline for the UK banks. Market data has been widely used in off-site 
monitoring models assigned by regulators; for example, in studies on how the US 
market data affects the CAMEL ratings, and how market data also has been used for 
the purposes of anticipating downgrades of regulators’ ratings. Moreover, previous 
studies pointed out that subordinated debt’s disciplinary role only works well for 
well-capitalized financial organizations.  
A sample of five of the biggest banks in the UK was used in the analysis, along 
with the disciplinary actions taken by FSA on these five banks between the years 2002 
and 2010. In the first part of the analysis, extensive bivariate analysis confirms the 
existence of timely information in sub-debt spreads which affects the FSA’s 
regulatory actions. In addition, the structure and quality of loans are under the 
scrutiny of policy makers and bank regulators.  
The second part of the analysis tests whether subordinated debt market 
information provides additional information for models. We find signs that 
subordinated debt spreads act as a replacement of the risky bad-debt ratio, but we 
cannot find strong evidence that sub-debt spreads have significant correlation 
coefficients with the regulatory actions taken by the FSA. In other words, evidence 
cannot be found that besides accounting data, the FSA have used subordinated debt 
market data as an instrument of indirect market discipline wisely and appropriately. 
An event study was also conducted for the Royal Bank of Scotland Group (RBS), 
one of the largest multinational banking groups, announced as having to be bailed out 
by the UK government on 13 October 2008. Four market indicators (equity prices, 
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equity trading volumes, abnormal returns and sub-debt spreads) were analysed. The 
results support the argument that market indicators anticipated the problems of RBS, 
but also support the argument of existing market discipline literature that it is difficult 
to extract clear risk signals from sub-debt spreads (Hancock and Kwast, 2001), 
because sub-debt spreads trend to reflect systematic risk, and equity indicators reveal 
bank-specific risks.  
Therefore, this chapter provides evidence to support the proposal of mandatory 
subordinated debt programmes, in order to provide market participants, including 
government regulatory authorities, with regular subordinated debt information, for 
then subordinated debt could be used as an efficient instrument of indirect market 
discipline in the UK. 
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6.1 Main Findings of the Research 
 
This thesis has examined the efficacy of subordinated debt as an instrument of 
market discipline, both direct and indirect, in the UK banking industry. The UK case 
represents a fine opportunity to study whether market discipline can be effectively 
channelled into banks via subordinated debt. The active involvement of British banks 
in subordinated debt issuance and transactions has created a data-rich environment in 
which it is possible to explore the nexus of relationships between market discipline 
and the subordinated debt market. Such research is potentially especially fruitful 
given that most UK debt securities are publicly placed, and hence the scope for and 
depth of the working of market discipline via subordinated debt could be considerable 
in the UK banking industry. This contrasts with the situation for privately issued debt 
in other countries, such as Japan, where research productivity is limited to some 
extent by data availability. Furthermore, a series of recent bank failures and responses 
to them by UK supervisory authorities provides a useful setting for an empirical 
examination. Study of these events can reveal the flaws in UK financial regulation 
and highlight the usefulness of the sub-debt market as a mechanism for generating 
indirect market discipline.  
Using the UK data, the research empirically investigates how and to what extent 
bank sub-debt plays a role in providing market discipline whereby the private sector is 
deployed to monitor and influence bank risk taking, and complements official 
supervision and regulation of UK banks. The investigation centres on three 
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fundamental questions at the core of the subordinated debt literature:  1) Do sub-debt 
price movements have a signalling effect that can indicate the risk-taking level of 
issuing banks accurately and in a timely manner? 2) Is the price signal recognized by 
banks, and does it influence their behaviour; that is, do disciplinary forces generated 
from the sub-debt market constrain issuing banks’ risk-taking incentives and 
performance?  3) To what extent does the regulatory authority in the UK react to the 
sub-debt price signal, or how useful is sub-debt as a tool contributing to regulatory 
action and efficacy?  
The examination of whether there exists a signalling effect of sub-debt price 
movements focuses on whether yield spreads of sub-debt issued by UK banks are 
sensitive to bank risks during the sample period 1997 to 2009. The results show that 
traditional ratings such as those provided by Moody’s and S&P have significant and 
negative impacts on spreads, and investors have exercised rational discrimination 
between different risk profiles of UK banks. However, accounting measures show an 
absence of the explanatory power of spreads. Likewise, market conditions have little 
influence on the sub-debt market in the UK, except those related to European markets. 
It can then be concluded that yield spreads of sub-debt contain timely and accurate 
information on issuing banks’ risk taking, and this underpins the proposals that 
advocate forcing large financial institutions to issue subordinated debt to the public on 
a regular basis. 
It is essential for the working of the proposed sub-debt scheme that the issuing 
banks are receptive to sub-debt market indicators and adjust their risk-taking 
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behaviour accordingly. Using panel data from 1997 to 2009 to examine to what extent 
British banks respond to sub-debt signals such as amount of debt and interest payable, 
we find that, with a time lag of one year, the amount of sub-debt can impose strong 
discipline on banks’ capital adequacy, suggesting that amount of sub-debt issued is a 
conditioning factor on banks’ capital adequacy and management quality. However, the 
strength of discipline provided by sub-debt’s interest is not as great.  
Both debt amount and debt interest have the power to explain changes in the 
quality of loans and securities investments. For bank liquidity, the level of interest 
compels strong market discipline on all proxies of bank liquidity, while amount of 
sub-debt issued appears to impose discipline on the liquidity ratio only. This multitude 
of evidence confirms the influence of sub-debt as a means of market discipline. With 
some time hysteresis, signals emanating from the sub-debt market are shown to be 
able to induce interactions of market discipline with banks’ fundamentals, including 
bank managers’ risk-taking decisions on management, liquidity and solvency. But 
when it comes to large British banks, evidence shows that the disciplinary strength 
provided by sub-debt has been dented. In addition, comparing the two sample periods, 
the pre-crisis sample shows stronger market discipline strength than that in the 
post-crisis period. 
The influencing effect of the sub-debt market is also reflected in sub-debt’s 
impact on banks’ default risk and financial distress. Using forward-looking 
market-based risk measures to supplement analysis of traditional financial statements, 
we find that issuing sub-debt requires banks to disclose more accounting information 
 252 
 
to market participants, especially in the case of banks with high charter value and low 
capitalization. In addition, empirical evidence shows that in the wake of the recent 
financial crisis, the market-based distress indicator (distance to default) carries more 
information about the banks to regulators, particularly about the banks that have 
issued sub-debts. 
The fundamental rationale for regulators’ resorting to the sub-debt market is that 
the market discipline it generates may improve and complement government bank 
regulation. To examine this particular influence, or the indirect market discipline, the 
five biggest UK banks are selected for a case study. While in the UK banking industry 
there is supportive evidence for the direct disciplining effect generated by the 
sub-debt market, no significant evidence can be found that the UK financial regulator 
has adopted sub-debt market signals as a risk proxy in on- and off-site bank 
monitoring. The FSA is shown to have little enthusiasm for subjecting itself to 
indirect market discipline, reflecting its distrust of the usefulness of the market in 
providing disciplining effects. In an additional event study of the Royal Bank of 
Scotland, which during 2008 and 2009 received a series of bailouts from the 
government (i.e. taxpayers), we analyse and compare indicators based on the share 
market and the sub-debt market, respectively. The outcome suggests that indicators 
from both markets had anticipated the problems of RBS, but sub-debt indicators tend 
to reflect systematic rather than firm-specific risks. 
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6.2 Implications for Reform of Bank Regulation     
The notion of using sub-debt as a means of market discipline stems from the 
recognition that it can produce desirable disciplining effects that can complement 
government regulation over banks. This thesis confirms the existence in the UK 
banking industry of the signalling, monitoring and enforcing effects of such market 
discipline. These effects can be very useful to investors and bank managers in helping 
them balance risk control and investment efficiency. But more important is their 
potential input in the reform of bank regulation, by advancing a paradigm change that 
may usher in a fundamental role for market discipline in government supervision and 
regulation of banks.   
The research exposes flaws and weaknesses in the current regulatory framework. 
For example, the findings raise a logical doubt on rating agencies’ estimations of 
creditworthiness. Rating agencies have been too generous in giving out top ratings to 
please the issuers of securities. Because of this malpractice, market participants are 
misguided with backward-looking and anamorphic information. Furthermore, many 
economists and policy makers have pointed out that the materialization of the 
financial crisis in 2007 is to an important extent related to the inadequacy of the Basel 
II Capital Accord (Moosa, 2010). Empirical results in this thesis have also shown that 
under the present regulatory framework, liquidity and leverage have been ignored, 
which also contributes to the controversial issue of micro-prudential regulatory 
reform.  
The default response of the regulators has been to add new regulations to the old. 
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But at best this serves only to patch up the troubled regulatory system, and in reality 
the approach often creates more problems than it solves. In time, viable alternatives 
must be found, and enlisting market discipline is a prominent option for consideration. 
In this regard, as shown in this research, the subordinated debt market can be a 
valuable instrument.  
The sub-debt market can provide solid information infrastructure for effective 
bank supervision and regulation via the market indicators it produces. With the rapid 
development of the banking industry in terms of operational complexity, product 
diversity and asset size, relying solely on conventional accounting information to 
discipline banks has become increasingly problematic. This situation requires that 
investors and bank supervisors focus more closely on information dispersing from 
market indicators. At this juncture, the emergence of the sub-debt market provides an 
apt mechanism for generating information that can usefully assist government 
regulation. To improve bank regulation, sub-debt information such as sub-debt 
spreads and distance to default has many advantages over the accounting data 
traditionally used by the regulatory authority for overseeing banks. For example, 
sub-debt market information is forward-looking, while accounting data are of a 
retrospective nature. In addition, sub-debt information is available with high 
frequency and in a very timely manner.  
The sub-debt market can be a cost effective complement to official regulation. In 
response to the challenges posed by the growing complexity of banking, and by the 
motivation of bank managers and shareholders to take excessive risks in order to 
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maximize their own benefits (Ahmed, 2009), the regulatory authority tends to pin 
hopes of regulatory improvement on more extensive information disclosure. However, 
this is time-consuming, and it is increasingly expensive to force banks to disclose 
information. In addition to the fact that the sub-debt market can generate 
forward-looking and high frequency information, we have shown that compulsory 
issuance of sub-debt can make banks become more transparent regarding their risk 
profiles. This, in turn, can help the conduct of bank regulation at low cost.  
The complementarity of the sub-debt market to government regulation for market 
discipline is also reflected in the ability of the sub-debt market to force banks to 
behave in a manner desired by the regulator. As shown in this thesis, discipline from 
the sub-debt market has the power to constrain bank managers’ risk-taking incentives. 
The study has also found that sub-debt signals can act as predictive indicators of 
banks’ default probability, another property that the regulators can make use of to 
improve their regulatory action.  
These properties of the sub-debt market render it an apposite mechanism that can 
generate direct and indirect market discipline. Such disciplining effects are shown to 
be capable of directing banks to behave in a way desired by the regulatory authority. 
As such, sub-debt constitutes a viable complement to government regulation of banks. 
The evidence documented in this research therefore argues a case for a paradigm 
change in bank regulation. In reforming bank supervision and regulation, rather than 
relentlessly adding new regulations to the old, more attention should be given to 
allowing a more prominent role for the sub-debt market in the regulatory framework.  
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6.3 Limitations and Areas for Further Research 
 
      The market discipline effects on subordinated debt issued by the UK banks are 
examined in this thesis through both direct and indirect approaches. The UK 
subordinated debt market has been very active, and it is in particular attractive for 
studying the desirability and feasibility of subordinated debt as an instrument of 
market discipline. However, issuing subordinated debt is not mandatory for UK banks, 
even thought Basel II had made such recommendation. Moreover, subordinated debt 
is in the light of its expensive issuing costs merely optional when gaining capital for 
large banks. Therefore, data availability is not as sufficient as other risky investment 
such as shares; hence it is one limitation in my research. 
      The efficiency of subordinated debt as an instrument of market discipline is 
empirically examined in chapter 2, with a unique dataset that includes yield spreads, 
ratings, accounting measures of bank risk and market conditions indexes. For the 
accounting measures of bank risks, not all the firms in our selected sample report 
continuous financial data across the sample period. The potential reasons are that 
several financial institutions fail to keep operating through the sample period due to 
business suspending, bankruptcy or other unknown circumstances. Furthermore, we 
adopt both banks and financial institutions in our observation, which do not follow the 
same accounting code. Take the loan loss reserve for example: it is optional to include 
this element in the annual report disclosure of financial institutions. Therefore, 
observations of the ratio of loan loss reserve of total loan are significantly less than 
other variables (401 out of 631). 
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  In order to examine the direct disciplinary strength provided by SND yield 
spreads at the launch of issuance we adopt fixed-rate debt in the primary market. 
Therefore, there are openings for further research in the direct market discipline 
provided by floating-rate SND or in the secondary market. Also, the efficiency of 
changes in yield spreads of floating rate as market signals of direct discipline remains 
uncovered.  
   The reaction of financial institutions to the disciplinary effects provided by 
subordinated debt is examined in Chapter 3. The investigations are not only conducted 
into the proxies of market discipline and bank efficiency, but also into changes in 
these proxies, to provide a unique angle on to what extent the issuing banks would 
respond to the signals of subordinated debt. However, the optimal quantity structure 
and pricing of SND to maximize issuers' management and profit remains uncovered. 
Moreover, whether other risky investments, such as uninsured deposits, certificates of 
deposit and common equity provide market discipline remains unclear. Equally 
diffuse is the question to what extent in which approach, and comparisons of 
disciplinary effects from subordinated debt and other investments popularly adopted 
by market participants.  
   Subordinated debt's impact on banks' default risk and financial distress indicator 
(distance-to-default) is examined in Chapter 4. It is an increasing trend that central 
banks and multilateral financial institutions use forward-looking market-based risk 
measures to supplement traditional financial statements analysis. Although 
subordinated debt is actively issued in the UK market, as acknowledged before, 
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because of its high cost and non-mandatory nature, our data pool on subordinated debt 
is not as sufficient as on other market-based risk portfolios (such as stock). The 
relationships between bank fundamentals and default risk indicators in the context of 
other markets have not yet been discussed, and this uncovered area proposes a 
direction for further research.  
   The effectiveness of subordinated debt in eliminating regulatory forbearance by 
proving indirect market discipline is investigated in Chapter 5. The potential 
usefulness in incorporating market information into the bank supervisory process has 
been discussed. However, it is difficult to measure the bank supervisor regulatory 
forbearance in the UK. Previous research focuses predominantly on US cases, and it is 
critical to apply the US model to the UK banking regulation, since the supervision 
framework and outcomes are not the same. Furthermore, ratings that the FSA assigned 
to individual banks are confidential. Hence these two considerable obstacles make it 
difficult for this research to be as comprehensive as previous studies.  
   With free access to regulatory data, future studies can focus on grading the FSA 
assigned to individually observed financial institutions which issued SND, and 
changes in grading with changes in SND’s market signals. Also, the optimal portfolio 
and pricing of SND to eliminate FSA’s regulatory forbearance, and indirect market 
discipline combined with other market information remain open questions. 
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Appendix 1. A Comparison of the Reform Proposals  
 
 Current System
a 
FSA Treasury Bank of England 
Regulatory achitecture     
1. Micro-prudent regulation FSA DSA FSA FSA 
2. Macro-prudent regulation ---- FSA/ Bank of 
England 
re-constitution of the 
Financial Stability 
Committee as a joint 
FSA/Bank of 
England Committee 
?
b 
Bank of England 
3. Trigger of SRR FSA FSA FSA Bank of England  
4. Operational control of 
SRR 
Bank of England ? Bank of England  Bank of England  
5. Tripartite system Standing 
Committee  
? New ‘Council for 
Financial 
Stability’ 
(comprising 
existing Standing 
Committee 
membership) 
? 
6. Consumer protection FSA FSA FSA FSA 
7. Consumer credit 
regulation 
OFT OFT OFT OFT? 
8. Deposit protection FSA (runs the 
FSCS) 
FSA FSA FSA? 
9. Statutory responsibility 
for financial stability 
Bank of England  ? Bank of England 
and FSA 
Bank of England  
a
 Under the Financial System and Markets Act 2000 and the Banking Act 2009 
b
 A ‘?’ denotes the absence of a clear statement on the policy/principle concerned. 
Sources; Hall, M(2009) 
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Appendix 2: RBS –Pre-crisis and Post Crisis Timeline 
18 April 2007 RBS-led consortium banks (including RBS, Fortis, Banco Santander) jointly 
bid for ABN AMRO. RBS proposed to take over ABN’s Chicago operations, 
LaSalle and ABN’s wholesale operations. 
23 April 2007 ABN AMRO and Barclays announced the proposed acquisition of ABN 
AMRO by Barclays. 
31 May 2007 Standard & Poor’s rating services affirm that its ‘AA-’ long- and ‘A-1+’ 
short-term counterparty credit ratings on Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc. 
26 July 2007 The FTSE 100 drops 3.14% as concerns over the US sub-prime crisis intensify 
30 July 2007 ABN AMRO withdrew its support for Barclays’ offer which was lower than 
the offer from the RBS-led consortium. 
3 August 2007 Fitch ratings affirm RBS’s long-term issuer default rating of ‘AA+’ to reflect 
its consistently strong performance, powerful and diversified franchise and 
good asset quality. 
9 August 2007 The European Central Bank, the US Federal Reserve and Bank of Japan pump 
unprecedented amounts of liquidity into the financial system to allay fears 
about a credit crunch. This represents the start of numerous actions by central 
banks into the money markets to shore up confidence in the financial system. 
10 August 2007 The FTSE 100 suffers its worst one-day fall (3.7%) for more than four years. 
14 August 2007 RBS announced that it bought a 3.25% stake in ABN AMRO Holding NV. The 
Dutch bank was attempting to buy for $96.5 billion in what would be the 
banking industry’s largest takeover.  
16 August 2007 The FEST 100 drops a further 4.1%. 
14 September 
2007 
The Tripartite Authorities announce that the Bank of England is providing 
Lender of Last Resort emergence funding facilities to Northern Rock to allow 
it to continue operating. Under the open-ended facility, the bank is charged a 
penal rate and can use mortgages and mortgage-backed securities as collateral. 
9 Oct 2007 RBS-led consortium announced the victory of bidding for control of ABN 
AMRO with €70bn offer. 
11 December 
2007 
Moody’s Investors Services affirmed the Aa1/P-1/B+ ratings of the RBS. The 
outlook on the Bank Financial Strength Ratings and long-term debt and 
deposit ratings remain negative. 
22 April 2008 RBS announced the largest rights issue in British corporate history, which 
aimed to raise ￡12 bn in new capital to offset a writedown of ￡5.9 bn 
resulting from credit market positions and to shore up its reserves following 
the purchase of ABN AMRO. 
22 April 2008 Fitch downgraded RBS to ‘AA’. 
20 June 2008 RBS announced that Greenock Funding No.1 Plc issued approximately 
￡3.71 billion of asset-backed floating-rate notes, due October 2048. 
27 June 2008 Moody’s Investor Services cut RBS’s senior debt rating to ‘Aa2’. Moody’s 
said the downgrade reflects the higher volatility the ratings agency expects to 
continue in RBS’ earning from its investment banking activities and the 
greater risk of impairments in the UK, and both these developments align the 
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bank’s financial strength rating more closely with ‘B’ BFSR peers. 
30 June 2008 Moody’s downgraded senior debt rating of RBS to ‘Aa2’ from ‘Aa1’. 
12 September 
2008 
RBS sold $2 billion of six-year extendible medium-term floating-rate notes. 
23 September 
2008 
RBS launched a range of new savings accounts, including Cash ISA with a top 
rate of 7.25%. 
1 Oct 2008 The Bank of England began to extent ￡61.6bn in emergency funds to the 
banks at the height of the financial crisis in 2007, this movement is called 
“classic lender of last resort operation”. The banks, RBS and HBOS, and the 
authorities decided to keep the Bank’s operation secret, because disclosing 
details of the lending to the two banks “would seriously jeopardise the 
financial stability of the system as a whole”. The Government provided a 
￡20bn bail-out and a further injection of capital followed. 
7 October 2008 Standard & Poor lowered RBS’s long- and short-term counterparty credit 
ratings to A+/A-1 from AA-/A-1+. 
13 October 2008 British Prime Minister Gordon Brown announced a UK government bailout of 
the financial system. The Treasury would infuse ￡37 billion ($64b, €47b) of 
new capital into RBS, Lloyds TSB and HBOS Plc, to avert financial sector 
collapse. This results in a total government ownership in RBS of 58%. 
 
At the same day, RBS announced a profit warning along with details of a 
￡20bn capital raising and decision not to pay a dividend until it had repaid 
￡5bn of preference shares being bought by the UK government. 
27 October 2008 Fitch downgraded the long-term issuer default rating to AA- from AA with a 
stable outlook, senior unsecured rating to AA- from AA, subordinated debt 
rating and preferred stock rating to A+ from AA- and individual rating to B/C/ 
from A/B for RBS. 
27 Nov 2008 RBS issued 5.0 million noncumulative sterling preferred shares series. 
19 January 2009 RBS announced that had made a loss of ￡28bn of which ￡20bn was due to 
ABN AMRO. At the same time the government converted their preference 
shares to ordinary shares resulting in a 70% ownership of RBS. 
21 January 2009 Fitch downgraded the individual ratings of the RBS to E from B/C. 
27 February 
2009 
Significant decline in the common stock price of RBS, as investors reacted 
negatively to news that the UK government has forced RBS to forgo the right 
to claim tax benefits in exchange for its participant in the government 
insurance scheme. 
May 2009 The FSA launched a supervisory investigation into the RBS, as one of the UK 
banks that required partial taxpayer bailout support. This work considered if 
regulatory rules had been broken and what, if any, action was appropriate. The 
review was necessarily extensive and looked specifically at the conduct of 
senior individuals at the bank, the acquisition of ABN AMRO in 2007 and the 
2008 capital raisings.  
4 Aug 2009 RBS announced that it has signed an agreement to sell part of its Retail& 
Commercial Banking operating in Asia for total consideration of $418million. 
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3 Nov 2009 HM Treasury announced the implementation of financial stability measures 
for Lloyds Banking Group and Royal Bank of Scotland. RBS is allowed to 
participate in the Government’s Asset Protection Scheme (APS) under revised 
terms that improve incentives and deliver better risk-sharing with the private 
sector. 
24 Nov 2009 The Bank of England has revealed for the first time that it lent RBS and 
HBOS ￡61.6bn in emergency funding last October and November. 
15 June 2010 S&P corrected rating on floating rate note issued by RBS to ‘A’. 
18 June 2010 The Committee of European Banking Supervisors published its statement to 
conduct stress testing exercises in the context of supervisory authorities and 
central banks’ risk assessment of the banking sector and as a way to assess the 
risks facing individual institutions. 
3 Aug 2010 The FSA fined members of RBS ￡5.6 m for failing to have adequacy system 
and controls in place to prevent breaches of UK financial sanctions. 
2 Dec 2010 The FSA closed supervisory investigation of RBS. The review confirmed that 
RBS made a series of bad decisions in the years immediately before the 
financial crisis, most significantly the acquisition of ABN AMRO and the 
decision to aggressively expand its investment banking business. However, the 
review concluded that these bad decisions were not the results of a lack of 
integrity by any individual and the FSA did not identify any instances of fraud 
or dishonest activity by RBS senior individuals or a failure of governance on 
the part of the Board. 
20 Dec 2010 RBS closed at 3.9% below VWP but at 35.9% to 52-week low 
11 January 2011 The Financial Services Authority (FSA) has fine the RBS and National 
Westminster Bank ￡2.8m for multiple failings in the way they handled 
customers’ complaints, responding inadequately to more than half the 
complaints reviewed by the FSA. 
18 January 2011 The RBS announced that it has reached agreement for the sale of the Priory 
Group to Advent International for an enterprise value of up to GBP 925 
million. 
19 January 2011 The RBS dropped 1.3% on high volatility 
23 March 2011 The RBS announced that it has sold a portfolio of its commercial real estate 
loans and assets in Spain to several wholly owned. 
15 July 2011 Results for European Banking Industry stress test released. RBS passed. In the 
statement on stress test results, EBA addressed that “RBS remains well 
capitalised with a Core Tier 1 capital (CT1) ratio passing both the baseline and 
adverse scenarios”. 
27 July 2011 The RBS agreed to issuance of a Consent Order by US bank regulators 
relating the deficiencies identified last year in certain of its governance, risk 
management and compliance systems and controls in the United States. 
15 August 2011 RBS still 84% owned by the UK government  
Sources: Nexis UK, London Stock Exchange regulatory news services, financial times and other 
accessible media resources.  
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